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PREFACE
The present study represents an attempt to throw a
little new light upon a phase of American history which has
been somewhat neglected in the past. There is great need for
a thorough study of the subject of the fur trade in all its
various phases, social, economic, and political, without which
the history of the American frontier can never be adeouately
interpreted. In the present instance, the writer has endeav-
ored to describe the northwest fur trade during the period of
British ascendancy prior to 1800, and likewise to trace the in-
fluence of this traffic upon the diplomacy of the time.
Particular emphasis has been laid upon the economic and
political aspects of the industry, the nature of the contact be-
tween the white trader and the red man having been touched upon
but lightly. Limitations of time and space have made it seem de-
sirable to omit for the present a detailed description of the
more romantic aspects of the fur trade; while there is the addi-
tional consideration that this phase of the subject may best be
studied in the journals and diaries of the traders themselves,
a great many of which are accessible to the general reader in
printed form. One who desires to obtain a picture of the ro-
mantic and adventurous side of this wilderness traffic can do
no better than to secure it at first hand from the "Journals"
of Peter Pond and John Long or from Alexander Mackenzie's

iv.
Voyages . The writer also feels it necessary to call attention
to the fact that his treatment of Anglo-American diplomacy of
the period between 1774 and 1796 is in a sense incomplete, as
all that has been attempted has been to trace the influence of
the peltry trade in the relations between Great Britain and the
United States. While little has been said concerning certain
other very important considerations affecting the negotiation
of the Treaty of 1785 and the Jay Treaty, at the same time an
effort has been made to avoid laying an undue emphasis upon the
importance of the traffic in furs.
A large part of the introductory chapter is based upon
work which has already been done by others; and the frequency
with which certain titles appear in the footnotes will indicate
the persons to whom the writer is indebted for this material.
The remaining chapters are based for the most part upon original
sources, in both printed and manuscript form. In collecting
this original material, the following repositories were visited
personally: the Canadian Archives at Ottawa; the Archives of
the District of Montreal; the library of McGill University and
the Bibliotheoue Saint-Sulpice , at Montreal; the Toronto Pub-
lic Library; and the Burton Collection at Detroit, which now
forms a part of the Detroit Public Library. At each of these
places every possible courtesy was shown the writer and every
possible facility was placed at his disposal for conducting his
research. A considerable amount of material in the form of
transcripts has also been obtained from London archives, es-
pecially from the Public Record Office, which has served to

throw much light upon diplomatic aspects of the fur trade.
The study which is contained in the following pages
was undertaken at the suggestion of Professor Clarence W. Alvord
and has been completed under his supervision. To him the writ-
er desires to express his gratitude, both for the criticism and
advice which he has offered from time to time during the progress
of the work, and for the assistance which he has rendered in the
task of gathering trie necessary material.
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1CHAPTER I.
Introduction
The fur trade of North America began with the first
contact "between Europeans and the native Indians and has con-
tinued to the present day. The geographical area which has at
one time and another been the scene of the traders' operations
is practically co-extensive with the continent itself. In his
search for furs and peltries, the white man has roamed from
the lands bordering the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico to
the frozen regions lying under the Arctic Circle and from the
rock-bound shores of New England to the distant "Northwest
coast." The story of the traffic in furs must of necessity
constitute the principal theme of the early chapters in the
history of almost any part of North America. The era of the
fur trade has, generally speaking, been but a transitory stage
in the historical development of any given region, beginning
with the penetration of the wilderness by the explorer and
disappearing before the onward march of the settler. ^ In the
far North, however, where a rigorous climate has barred the
settler's advance, the industry still flourishes, and the
Hudson's Bay Company stands to the people of milder regions
as a living reminder of their own vanished past.
In the story of no portion of North America has the
peltry trade played a more important and romantic r6le than in
that of the mighty region drained by the Great Lakes and the
^Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in
American History," American Historical Association Report
, 1893,
pp. 208-211.

2upper Mississippi. This vast area was originally a country
teeming with fur-bearing animals and, moreover, the marvelous
system of lakes and rivers by which it was drained rendered
possible the profitable exploitation of the industry. The
history of the region is, in fact, utterly incomprehensible
without a knowledge of the fur trade, which is so intimately
bound up with the story of early settlement, Indian relations,
war, and international diplomacy.
The year 1763 is of great importance for the history
of the northwest trade, for it saw the consummation of a poli-
tical change which had momentous consequences for the commerce
of the region. It marked the close of the period of French
ascendancy and the beginning of an era in which the subjects
of Great Britain were to play the leading role. It is the
purpose of this study to trace the development of the fur trade
under British influence but before undertaking this task, a
few words should be said concerning the general characteristics
of the period which ended in 1763.
Trade with the Indians went hand in hand with the
early exploration and settlement of Worth America. Gosnold
xThis region may, for the sake of convenience, be
referred to as the "Northwest," a term which has had various
meanings at different times. During the period covered by the
present study, the word "Northwest" was applied almost exclusive-
ly to the country beyond Lake Superior. For present purposes,
however, it has not seemed wise to employ it in this restricted
sense, so when the word is used in these pages, it will be under-
stood to refer to the country lying northwest of the Ohio, and
including the area drained by the Great Lakes and the upper
Mississippi, as well as those more remote regions which v/ere
penetrated by the traders resorting to Michillimackinac
.

3bartered with the savages on his voyage to the coast of .New
England in 160E, and in 162£, Captain John Smith reported that
a great many beaver skins had been sent from Canada and New
England during the past six years."1" The rapid extension of the
peltry trade was only a matter of time as the fur-bearing
country along the coast became exhausted and competition in-
creased. As the traders began pushing into the interior from
the coast, it was natural that the colonies having easy access
to the Mississippi Valley and the Great Lakes should enjoy
superior advantages, and the result was that New iork and
Pennsylvania came to possess a virtual monopoly of the English
traffic in furs. 2 Albany, which controlled the route to Lake
Ontario, became the great center of the business, which was
at first carried on largely by the frontier settlers living
in the Mohawk ^iiver valley, The early traders of Pennsylvania
were likewise mostly frontiersmen who transported their goods
to the Indian country by means of pack horses.
In Canada, the industry was from the very first
under the strict supervision of the government. Cherishing
the fond hope of founding a populous colony, the French govern-
ment at the beginning made an effort to prevent Canadian
•^Mcllwain, V.raxall ' s Abridgment of the Hew York Indian
Records, 1678-1751
, pp. XIX, XIII. For a good summary of the
New England fur trade, see Note A, Ibid . , p. 1XVIII.
2i:cllwain, Wraxall's Abridgment
, pp. aV. , XXVII . ,XVIII
.
3 Johnson, report to the Lords of Trade, Hew York
Colonial Documents, VII., 953.

4traders from going into the interior. To this end, great
fairs were established at Montreal and Three Hivers, in the
expectation that the distant tribes by bringing their furs
thither to be sold, would thus make it unnecessary for the
colonists to go into the Indian country themselves. The plan
was a failure, however, because traders established themselves
above Montreal, and intercepted the Indians as they descended
the river, and purchased their furs.-1- It was but a short time
before the younger and more adventurous members of the communi
ty began to take to the woods in order to carry on the trade;
and, as this was contrary to the policy of the government, an
effort was made to prevent a general exodus from the colony by
granting a limited number of licenses for carrying on the com-
merce of the interior. In spite of government regulations
there arose a large class of forest rangers, or coureurs de
bois , who played a most important part in the trade during the
French regime as well as the years which followed. 2 Along with
the traders went the Jesuits, who established missions at re-
mote places in the Great Lakes' country and labored to convert
the savages to the Christian faith.
Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada
, IL, 102-104.
2 Ibid., II., 104, 105; 109-112.
^Johnson's Report, 1767, New York Colonial docu-
ments, VII., 954.

5A clash between the interests of the French and
English was only a question of time. During the closing years
of the seventeenth century, English traders began pushing into
the region which had already been entered by their opponents,
while the Hudson's Bay Company on the north began to loom up
as a possible rival to the French. It was becoming apparent
that if the latter desired to hold their trade, they must adopt
vigorous measures. -he result was that the French began to
build stockaded trading posts at strategic points in the in-
terior in order to preserve the fur trade and the friendship
of the Indians, upon which the former so vitally depended.
^
A period of intense intercolonial rivalry began which did not
end until the signing of the Treaty of Paris.
The English were considerably handicapped at the
outset, inasmuch as their rivals had obtained an earlier start
g
and had penetrated the Northwest long before them. ¥he French
The French traders had made the most of their start in order
to gain the friendship of the Indians, a task in which they
were assisted by the influence which their countrymen, the
Jesuits, exercised over the tribes which they visited. Then,
Turner, "The Indian Trade of Wisconsin, " 33. Johns
Hookins University Studies , 9th Series, 11-12. The Hudson's
Bay Company was founded in 1670, and Dongan, while governor of
New York, endeavored to extend British trade into the Great
Lakes' region. See also I.lcllwain, Vv'raxall ' s Abridgment , pp.
LXI-LXIV.
p
Mcllwain, 7. raxall ' s Abridgment
, p. XL.
^Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country , 78;
Johnson, Report on Indian Affairs, 1767, S ew York Colonial
ocuments, VII., 954.

6too, the character of the ^rench traders was such that they
readily adapted themselves to the manners and customs of the
tribes to which they resorted, while the English, on the other
hand, were often lawless persons who cheated the savages and
committed many other abuses, the inevitable consequence of
which was. to cause themselves to be cordially disliked."1" The
French a^so possessed the inestimable advantage of a central-
ized control of Indian affairs, while the English were handi-
capped by the inefficiency of a system in v/hich the management
of trade was left to the individual colonies. The French
government took great pains to conciliate the Indians, and in
case a trader was guilty of abuses, took care that at least a
2
show of punishment wr.s made. The French trade was on the
other hand cursed by a false economic system, saddled upon it
by a paternalistic government, which established monopolies
for the export of beaver skins from Canada and compelled those
who "enjoyed" this exclusive privilege to take all the skins
offered them at a certain fixed sum, in utter defiance of the
laws of supply and demand.
"Mcllwain, Wraxall' s Abridgment
. p. XL; Carter,
Great Britain and t he Illinois Country
. 85,86; Alvord, The
Mississippi Valley in British Politics . ( In press. ) This work
embodies by far the most comprehensive treatment of Indian
affairs and trade in British Worth America during the period
from 1763 to 1774 that has yet been made, and it is to this
study that the writer is indebted for a large amount of the
material of the present chapter. See also Johnson's Report,
1767, Hew York Colonial Documents
.
VII., 954.
2Carter. Great Britain and the Illinois Country
.
78,
85, 86; Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politic s.
The colonies appear to have failed in the management of Indian
affairs because of their mutual rivalry and jealousy.
See next page.
i
7The English, however, enjoyed one very marked ad-
vantage over their rivals. With the exception of powder, their
goods were much cheaper than those imported by the French and
this fact accounts for the very considerable trade which English
merchants came to enjoy and likewise explains how it was that
in spite of so many handicaps, they were even able to threaten
the supremacy of their rivals in the Great Lakes' region. The
chief menace to French commerce was the trade carried on by way
of Albany and the Mohawk. The colony of Hew York, however,
sent very few traders into the interior, but dealt with the
western tribes through the Iroquois, who controlled the route
from the Hudson Hiver to the lakes and played the role of mid-
dlemen between the English and the more remote Indians. The
cheapness of English goods enabled the Iroquois to carry on a
trade in this way which was advantageous to all parties con-
cerned, with the exception of the French. 1 In 1722, the colony
of New York established a post at Oswego, which controlled the
Mohawk communication with the Upper Country, and constituted
^Parkman, in the Old Regime in Canada
,
II., 105-109,
gives a vivid description of this French system of monopolies.
This plan, whereby the holder of the monopoly v/as obliged to
receive all beaver offered at a certain price, led to the
enormous extension of the fur industry, inasmuch as the traders
were assured of a market for all the skins which they were able
to secure from the Indians. At times the market was so glutted
with this variety of peltry that there was no sale for it in
France, and the directors of the company holding the monopoly
for its exportation resorted to the expedient of burning a
large part of the supply which they received.
1-MoIlwain, Wraxall ' s Abridgment , pp. X1I-XLV.

8a continual menace and defiance to the French traders."1" So
great an advantage, in fact, did the cheaper English goods
possess, that the French themselves succeeded in opening up
a commercial intercourse with New York which all efforts failed
wholly to suppress. Their merchants were able to "buy English
goods, carry them to Canada, and exchange them for furs, reap-
ing a larger nrofit than if they had used merchandise of their
own manufacture, while the unscrupulous Albany traders con-
tinued to supply them, in spite of the protests of the Iroquois
2
and the efforts of the colonial government.
While the merchants of New York were challenging
French commercial supremacy at Oswego, traders from Pennsyl-
vania were penetrating the region between the Ohio and the
lakes. As years went on, these intruders grew in number and
became a menace to French authority. In 1741, De Noyan wrote
from Detroit, complaining of the growing influence of the
English over the Indians and declaring his intention of pillag-
ing their traders. It is in this commercial rivalry that the
beginnings of the Seven Years' War are to be found and the
^Governor Burnet was responsible for the establish-
ment of Oswego, for the purpose of carrying on the Indian
trade. The fact that the Iroquois monopolized the trade be-
tween the English and the western tribes explains why New
York built no forts west of Oswego. Hcllwain, Y.raxall's
Abridgment
, pp. XLIV<, LI I., LXXXI.
2 Johnson's Report, 1767, New York Colonial Documents,
VII., 954; Mcllwain, Wraxall's Abridgment , pp. LXIV-LXXXI.
%cllwain, T»raxall ' s Abridgment , p. aVI.

9feeling of bitterness was greatly intensified by the establish-
ment in 1748 of an English trading post at Pickawillany, on the
Big Miami. ^ In 1752 a force of French and Indians reduced the
post and there is doubtless a considerable element of truth
in the statement that this event really marks the opening of
the final struggle for the mastery of the continent.
It was not in the Indian country but rather in the
heart of Canada that the French cause was lost. The reduction
of Quebec and the capitulation of Montreal delivered the pro-
vince into the hands of the English, together with the fur
trade for which both sides had been contending for so many
years. It was indeed a rich prize which had fallen to the
victors, as the nature of the French commercial establishment
in the Upper Country at the time of the Conquest bears ample
witness. The posts occupied by the French covered an enormous
range of territory and, besides those in the neighborhood of
the Great Lakes, their establishments extended down into the
Illinois country and hundreds of leagues into the region beyond
Lake Superior. The commerce of these various places had been
exploited in different ways. There were first of all the free
posts, of which the principal ones were Michillimackinac and
Detroit, where anyone might carry on a trade by obtaining a
"'"The post at Pickawillany was established by traders
from Virginia and Pennsylvania, who were during this period
pressing beyond the Alleghanies in considerable numbers.
Winsor, The Mississippi Basin , 249.
%/Idlwain, V.raxall's Abridgment
, p. XYII-. ; Chalmers,
Revolt of the American Colonies
,
II., 263.

10
license for the purpose. At certain others, as Niagara,
Presqu' Isle, and Toronto, the King had an exclusive right to
the trade; and finally, there were posts which were farmed out
to individuals for a fixed sum, among which were Ouiatanon,
1 2Chequamegon, La Baye, and St. Joseph's. With regard to the
importance of the trade, it was estimated that its average
annual value for the years preceding the Conouest was no less
than £140, 000. 3
The capitulation of Montreal on September 8, 1760,
completed the military conquest of Canada. Immediately after
the overthrow of French dominion in North America, there was
a great rush of British traders to the Indian country, which
rendered it necessary that measures be taken to determine the
future status of the commerce of the Upper Country. General
Gage disapproved of the French practice of exploiting the posts
by the granting of monopolies, and upon the occupation of
Montreal, the whole system of special privileges built up by
the French was done away with. He believed that a better
method of deriving a revenue from the fur trade would be to
levy a duty upon the importation of peltry into England. The
Throughout the present study, the name "La Baye" is
used to designate the trading post situated upon the body of
water now called Green Bay.
2Gage T s letter to Amherst, dated March £0, 1762, con-
tains an interesting account of the state of the Indian trade
at the time of the reduction of Canada. Michigan Pioneer and
Historical Collections
, XII., 14. To this letter is appended
a list of the posts at which the French were accustomed to trade
with the Indians. Ibid
. , 21. See also Bougainftville ' s Memoir,
compiled in 1757. Wisconsin Historical Collections , XVII L, 167,
For notes 3, 4, and 5 see next page.

11
political change, together with the inrush of British traders,
which followed the connuest of Canada naturally resulted in
considerable confusion and as the commercial control formerly
exercised by the French at once disappeared, it was imperative
that measures should be taken to establish peace and order in
the Indian country. An effort was made to restrict the acti-
vities of the traders to certain posts and to limit the sale
of rum, while Sir William Johnson, during his visit to Detroit
in the summer of 1761, established a scale of prices at which
furs and Indian goods were to be bought and sold, the purpose
of which was to ensure fair dealing and prevent disorder."1"
The hopes and expectations of the British merchants
were momentarily cut short by the terrible Indian outbreak
known in history as Pontiac's Conspiracy. Numerous causes con
tributed to the revolt, chief among which was a fear on the
part of the Indians that the English setxlers were about to
occupy their lands, a belief which it is very probable the
Estimate contained in General Murray '8 Report on the
State of the Government of Quebec, June 5, 1762. Shortt and
Doughty, Constitutional Documents , 57.
^Winsor, The Mississippi Basin , 405.
5Gage to Amherst, March 20, 1762, Llichigan Pioneer and
Historical Collections
,
XIX., 17. Gage recommended that the
smaller posts be abolished and that the trade be confined to
Kaministiquia, Michillimackinac , La Baye, Detroit, and Ouiatanon.
For several years after the Conouest, however, the military
commanders at the posts were accustomed to grant exclusive
rights to the trade in certain quarters, but this practice was
doubtless a makeshift for retaining some degree of control over
commerce. Ho legal monopolies were granted, in the form of
leases, as under the French regime. Henry, Travels , Bain' ed.
183.
Ijohnson's Reioort, 1767. Hew York Colonial Documents
,
VII., 960.

12
French did all in their power to disseminate among the savages.
The policy of the British government in not giving presents to
the Indians so generously as the French had done likewise
caused widespread dissatisfaction. In addition to these rea-
sons, the conduct of the British traders was likewise a contri-
buting cause to the outbreak. They had never been as diplo-
matic in their dealings with the Indians as the French had been.
They made the savages drunk and then proceeded to rob them,
while one of the specific reasons given by the Indians for the
outbreak was the exorbitant prices charged by British traders
for their goods, especially powder. VJhen it is remembered that
in addition to these grievances, the woods were filled with
French traders who bitterly hated the English and did every-
thing in their power to instill their own fear and dislike into
the minds of the Indians, it is not surprising that the tribes
in the Great Lakes' region broke out into revolt.
The immediate effect of the war upon the commerce
of the Upper Country was disastrous. The traders at Michilli-
mackinac and other smaller posts in the interior were plundered
and murdered, while a similar fate befell large numbers who
were on the communications. The royal proclamation of October
1Johnson to Amherst, July 11, 1763, Hew York Colonial
Documents
,
VII., 532; Johnson's Report, 1767, ibid . , 962, 963;
Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac , 179-186.
^Johnson's Report, 1767, New York Colonial Documents ,
VII., 962, 963; Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac , passim . For
a vivid account of the Indian uprising at Michillimackinac
,
see Henry's Travels , Bain ed. 77-104.
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7, 1763, was designed to allay the fears of the Indians by
prohibiting settlers from encroaching on their great western
domain but its promulgation was too late to prevent hostili-
ties. Among other provisions, the Proclamation contained the
first announcement of the general policy to be followed by the
British government with respect to the fur trade. It was
stipulated that commerce with the Indians should be free and
open to all of his Llajesty's subjects who should take out
licenses from the governors or commanders in chief of the pro-
vinces wherein they resided and give security for the obser-
vance of such rules as might be laid down for the regulation
of the trade.
^
Pontiac's Conspiracy was suppressed in 1764, but
meanwhile the British ministry had come to realize the neces-
sity of adopting effective measures for the regulation of
Indian affairs and trade. The Proclamation of 1763, it will
be noted, did not prescribe any rules for the regulation of
the fur trade but simply announced the general policy which
it was intended to follow in the future, while the ministry
had as yet done nothing to interfere with the laws enacted by
the colonies during the preceding years. At the time of the
conouest of Canada, licenses for the Indian trade were issued
by the governors of the various provinces, notwithstanding
the fact that in 1756, two departments for the supervision of
Indian affairs had been created, a northern and a southern, the
^Shortt and Doughty, Constitutional .uocuments , 119.

14
former of which was in charge of V/illiam Johnson as superin-
tendent. 1
The whole question of the regulation of Indian af-
fairs and the control of the fur trade came up for discussion
in 1764; and in the summer of that year, the Lords of Trade
formulated a "Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs
This plan provided for -the imperialization of the control of
Indian affairs by the establishment of two departments, each
composed of certain designated tribes. A superintendent was
placed over each department, under whom deputies were to be
appointed to assist in the administration of business. All
existing colonial laws respecting trade and intercourse with
the savages were to be repealed, and it was provided that in
the northern district, commerce should be confined to the
posts, where it could be carried on under the inspection of
the department. Certain tariffs for the trade were to be es-
tablished by officers known as commissaries acting in concert
with the Indians and merchants at the various posts and truck
houses. Traders were to obtain licenses from colonial authori
ties and give security for the observance of the rules laid
down for the regulation of commerce. Moreover, no one was to
acquire lands save within limits determined by negotiations
with the Indians. The plan was never carried into effect by.
^Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics .
2For the text of the plan, see Illinois Historical
Collections, X. , 273.

15
act of parliament. The proposed administration would have
necessitated a large annual expenditure, which it was designel
to meet by levying a tampon the fur trade, but the ministry
did not feel in a position to enact such a measure at the time
when the plan was formulated. Though the project was never
legally put into operation, the superintendents were instructed
to carry it out so far as possible in the administration of
their respective departments. John Stuart, of the southern
department, at once took steps to put its provisions into
operation, but Johnson did not do so until 1766, when news
came from the Illinois country that foreigners were monopo-
lizing the fur trade of the region."''
While the British ministry had been considering the
closely allied subjects of Indian affairs and the regulation
of the fur trade, effective measures had been taken on the
other side of the water to crush the revolt led by Pontiac.
During the trouble, the commerce of the Upper Country had prac-
tically ceased, but* after the uprising had been suppressed in
1764, there was a second rush of merchants into the Great Lakes'
2
region. Many Europeans, including large numbers of Scotch and
^"Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics ;
Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country
. 81; Alvord and
Carter, The Critical Period (Illinois Historical Collections,
X. )
,
273, note 2.
%Iany of the Indians who had formerly depended upon
French traders for their supplies had been reduced almost to
destitution by the disturbances which had been going on for
the past decade. Alexander Henry, writing of a voyage to
Chequamegon in 1765 says, "These people were almost naked, their
trade having been interrupted, first by the English invasion
of Canada, and next by Pontiac' s war." Travels . Bain ed. , 188.

16
Irish, came to Canada, lured thither by visions of the large
profits which they believed were to be obtained in the fur in-
dustry. As the newcomers were ignorant of the methods employed
in dealing with the Indians, they were obliged to make use of
French and English traders who acted as their agents, and many
of whom, according to Sir William Johnson, were of disreputable
character."^ These British merchants, however, were men of great
enterprise and ability and they began gradually to crowd out
the French traders who had been their predecessors in the field?
The British government had expected to derive great
benefits from the trade in the Illinois country, but it was
doomed to disappointment. The Conspiracy of Pontiac delayed
the occupation of Fort de Chartres by British troops until 1765?
and meanwhile French traders continued to carry on the commerce
of the region and incidentally to strengthen themselves in the
friendship of the Indians. In 1764, Pierre Laclede established
a post in Spanish territory which he called St. Louis, which
was to serve as a base for future trading operations.^ Immedi-
ately after the occupation of the region had been accomplished,
-'-Johnson's Report, 1767, li ew York Colonial Documents ,
VII., 961.
p
^Isaac Todd, Forrest Oakes, Richard Dobie, James Fin-
lay, and 3enjamin Frobisher, who played an important part in the
Canrdian fur trade, were all in the field by 1766. Memorial of
Merchants of Montreal, March 30, 1766, Canadian Archives , Indian
Affairs, series SJ Merchants to Carleton, September 20, 1766,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 4, p. 200.
^Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country , 82;
Alvord and Carter, The Critical Period (I. H. Col. Z. j , pp.
ZXIX-LVII.
4
Carter, Great Britainand the Illinois Country , 84-87.
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Pennsylvania merchants entered the field, two of the princi-
pal firms which extended their operations westward being
Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan; and Franks and Company of Phila-
delphia. The former concern went into the business on an ex-
tensive scale, claiming to have invested f 30 ,000 in the
enterprise, while in 1767 it was said that there were more
than three hundred boatmen on the Ohio in the employ of the
company. 1 But in spite of the efforts of the Pennsylvania
merchants, the French and Spaniards continued to send their
canoes and boats into all the eastern branches of the Missis-
sippi, where they met with a friendly reception from the
tribes of the Northwest who were by no means reconciled with
their new masters. In fact, these trans-LIississippi traders
enjoyed a great advantage over their rivals since the latter
were prohibited by royal command and their own fear of the
Indians from extending their operations beyond the garrisoned
posts. Operating from St. Louis as a base, the French traders
ascended the Ohio, Wabash, and Illinois rivers, crossed the
upper Mississippi into British territory, and even pushed
their commerce to the Great Lakes themselves, so that the
peltry from which the British had expected to reap a handsome
profit was sent down the Mississippi to market at New Orleans.
1
Ibid .
. 82, 83; Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in
British Politics .
2
Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country , 86-89;
Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics ; Johnson to
the Lords of Trade, November 16, 1765, New York Colonial docu-
ments, VII., 775; same to same, March- 22, 1766, ibid . , 816;
Journal of George Croghan 1 s Transactions With the Western In-
dians, November, 1765, ibid.
,
788; Johnson's Reoort, 1767 . jbid.,%5-
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Great Britain likewise failed to profit by the trade in which
her own merchants were engaged. The current of the Ohio River
was so rapid that it was much cheaper to ship furs to New
Orleans than to the Atlantic seaboard, and this became the
regular practice of the Philadelphia firms. While they floated
their furs down the river under pretense of sending them to the
English market by way of Hew Orleans, very few cargoes, as a
matter of fact, found their way to England. The high prices
offered in the Spanish market at Hew Orleans proved irresisti-
ble and British merchants took occasion to profit by the contra-
band trade. Various proposals were brought forward from time
to time in order to prevent this illicit traffic and keep
foreign traders out of the Illinois country but without much
success. British officials themselves, in view of the economic
conditions which prevailed, seem to have been convinced that it
was almost hopeless to try to alter the situation and furs con-
tinued to be disposed of at foreign markets by way of the
Mississippi River and Hew Orleans."'"
It was not until 1766 that Johnson organized the
northern department in accordance with the plan formulated by
the Lords of Trade in 1764, when news came from the Illinois
that commerce in that region was being monopolized by the French.
'''Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics ;
Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country
.
90-100. In 1721
for example the Lords of the Treasury endeavored to trace the
British ship "Florida Packet," which cleared from the Illinois
in July of the preceding year with a cargo of 1000 packs of pel-
try. The investigation led to the conclusion that the cargo had
been disposed of at some of the drench West India Islands.
Hillsborough to Lords of Treasury, January 18, 1771, P. R. 0.
Treas, I., 482, fo. 109; Stanley to Robinson, Llarc& 14, 1771,
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Places of trade were established at Niagara, Detroit, Oswego,
Michillimackinac , and Fort de Chartres, at each of which com-
merce was placed under the supervision of commissaries. Mi-
nute regulations were drawn up, the purpose of which was to
control the actions of the traders in their dealings with the
Indians and correct the abuses concerning which complaint had
so often been made.^" The commissaries were given strict orders
to allow no trader to open his packs and sell goods to the
Indians save at one of the designated posts, a measure which
aroused opposition on the part of the Canadian merchants. The
traders of Hew York and Pennsylvania did not particularly ob-
ject to the last mentioned regulation, as it served to offset
to a certain degree the advantages possessed by their rivals;
but they did not favor the idea of regulating prices by means
of commissaries, which was one of the provisions embodied in
the plan of the Lords of Trade. It was the restriction of
commerce to the posts, however, which caused the most trouble
and dispute. It appears that an ordinance was enacted in the
province of Quebec, whereby the trade was limited to certain
posts, for as early as February of 1765, the merchants of
Montreal addressed a memorial to Governor Murray, in whioh
they complained of the regulation. This restriction was a
ibid .
.
486; fos. 55,56; same to same, May 31, 1771 ibid . .486,
fo. 69; Treasury Minutes, July 23, 1771, P. R. 0., Treas. 29,
vol. 41, pp. 244-246; August 14, 1771, ibid . . 255, 256.
^Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics ;
Johnson's Instructions, Johnson MSS.
,
XV., 237.
2
Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics .
3
See next page.
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very marked departure from the custom which had been followed
during the French regime, and it was not unnatural that the
Canadian merchants should raise vigorous objections. ^ They com-
plained that such a restraint rendered it impossible to give
credit to the Indians and therefore greatly hampered the trade
of the merchants at the posts. Such a system was moreover apt
to cause dissatisfaction on the part of the distant tribes which
were obliged to make long journeys to the trade centers with
their peltry. Some of them, it was complained, lived so far away
that if the regulation were rigidly enforced, they would be
obliged to lose every other year's hunt by reason of the time
required to reach the posts. But one of the strongest objec-
tions put forward, especially by the merchants of Detroit, was
to the effect that the restriction of com~erce to the posts
was operating to deliver the trade of the region south of the
Great Lakes into the hands of their French and Spanish rivals
from beyond the Mississippi. This argument was used over and
over again by those who were in favor of allowing the traders
to go out into the Indian country and it is very likely that
£
it was not without foundation.
______ _ _ ____ *
Petition of Merchants of Montreal, February £0, 1765.
Canadian Archives, series S, Indian Affairs. It seems probable
that the governor and council imposed this restriction in ac-
cordance with the recommendations contained in the plan of the
Lords of Trade.
^"Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics
;
Johnson to Lords of Trade, October 8, 1766, New York Colonial
Documents, VII., 871.
^Memorial of Merchants of Montreal, March 30, 1766,
Canadian Archives, series S, Indian Affairs. Merchants of
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Sir William Johnson bitterly opposed the representa-
tions of the merchants who desired to be allowed to go into
the interior. He was above all suspicious of the influence
of French traders over the Indians and as many of thera were
employed by British merchants as factors or agents, he de-
clared that considerations of safety rendered it necessary
that they be confined to the posts in order to prevent their
political intrigues. Another reason for restricting the trade
to certain places was to prevent the abuses of which the mer-
chants were guilty when their conduct was not subject to rigid
inspection. If left to themselves in the Indian country, far
from the watchful eyes of the commissaries, they were only
too apt to cheat the savages and thus become a source of end-
less trouble and confusion. The eagerness of the Canadian
merchants for an unrestrained commerce he ascribed, possibly
with some justice, to jealousy of their rivals from New York
and Pennsylvania.
Governor Carleton, on the other hand, was inclined
Montreal to Carleton, September 20, 1766, Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol. 9, p. 200; Memorial of Detroit Traders to Hay,
September 4, 1767, Johnson MSS., XV», 57; Memorial of Detroit
Traders to Johnson, November 26, 1767, ibid . , 157.
'•Johnson to Lords of Trade, October 8, 1766, New York
Colonial Documents
,
VII., 871; same to same, January 15, 1767,
ibid., 894; Johnson to Carleton, January 27, 1767, Canadian Ar-
chives, series Q, vol. 4, p. 115; Johnson to Shelburne, May 30,
1767, New York Colonial Documents
,
VII., 929; same to same,
October, 1767, ibid . , 986; Johnson to Lords of Trade, October
20, 1767, ibid . , 987; Johnson to Shelburne, December, 1767,
ibid.
, 998,999; Johnson's Heport, 1767, ibid. , 964.
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to support the Canadian merchants in their opposition to
Johnson's policy. To the complaints of the latter with regard
to the French traders, he replied that while it might be well
to watch them rather closely, he had nevertheless seen no par-
ticular evidences of disloyalty on their part and he believed
that with good treatment they might be relied upon. He did not
favor the plan of restricting the trade to the posts, pointing
out that under the French regime, traders had gone hundreds of
leagues into the wilderness beyond Michillimackinac . In short,
Carleton looked at the whole question from the viewpoint of
the Canadian merchants.^ It would seem, on the whole, that
there was some ground for complaint against the -oractice of
restricting the trade to the posts, especially in the case of
those who dealt with the tribes living to the northwest of
Lake Superior, and Shelburne, convinced by the representatives
of Carleton, gave Johnson instructions that traders should be
allowed free access to the hunting grounds of the Indians
2living north of the Ottawa Kiver and the Great Lakes. Even
Johnson himself finally admitted that there might be some
reason for giving more latitude to the northern traders, though
he still believed that the more southern branches of commerce
should be confined to the posts. He was led to modify his
earlier position somewhat under the extreme opposition which
Carleton to Johnson, March 27, 1767, Michigan Pioneer
Collections
,
X., 222-224; Carleton to Shelburne, March 28, 1767,
ibid . . p. Ill; Carleton to Lords of Trade, March 28, 1767,
ibid . , p. 198.
2Shelburne to Johnson, June 20, 1767, Lansdowne MSS.
For note 3 see next page.
—
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he encountered, however. He had at first advised that the
trade be confined to Oswego, Niagara, Fort Pitt, and Detroit,
but came later to see that if his plan were to be at all prac-
ticable, the posts to which the merchants should be allowed to
resort must be more numerous. ^ In his report to the Lords of
Trade in 1767, he recommended that in addition to Detroit,
Michillimackinac
,
Niagara, Oswego, and Port de Ohartres, where
the trade was then centered, posts should be established at
La Baye, St. Mary's, at the entrance to Lake Superior, Sandus-
ky, St. Joseph's, Ouiatanon, and also on the Miami,* These
places had all been trading centers under the French regime
and Johnson expressed the conviction that if they were rees-
tablished, the merchants would have no further ground for com-
plaint at not being allowed to roam at will in the Indian
country.^ The restrictions which it was attempted to impose
°Johnson to Shelburne, New York Colonial Documents
,
VII., 998.
^•Johnson's rather extreme position in this respect was
probably due to his long connection with the conduct of Indian
affairs in the colony of New York, whose traders had not been in
the habit of penetrating the interior prior to 1763, but had
dealt with the Indians at Oswego. In suggesting the restriction
of the trade to the posts above mentioned, Johnson pointed out
that in earlier days, the Sioux, as well as the Christianaux,
from the neighborhood of Hudson's Bay, had often come to Oswego.
He further argued that while the Indians themselves thought
nothing of long Journeys, they did not make sufficient allow-
ance for the expnse of transporting goods to Michillimackinac
and the other posts. Johnson to Amherst, August 25 » 1763, New
York Colonial Documents
,
VII., 543.
^During the period under consideration! the river emp-
tying into the head of Lake Erie, and now known as the Maumee,
was called the "Miami," and it is by the latter term that the
stream will henceforth be designated in these pages.
In his remarks on the plan of the Lords of Trade in
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upon the merchants do not, indeed, seem to have been very ef-
fective, for Johnson's letters are filled with complaints
against those who make a practice of violating all trade regu-
lations by going into the interior without permission. The
merchants likewise complained at the enormous quantities of rum
which were sent into the Indian country from the colonies,
principally from Hew York it appears. They declared that in
conseouence of the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763 where-
by the trade was laid open to all, many persons of disreputable
character and little property had embarked in the fur traffic,
who dealt in nothing but rum. The result was that commerce was
being greatly injured and they proposed measures whereby the
sale of liquor might be restricted, but no effective measures
appear to have been taken as a result of their representations.^
Sir William Johnson's hopes for the establishment of
an imperial system for the regulation of Indian affairs, which
should be under the control of the superintendents of the
1764, Johnson had recommended that the trade be confined to
eleven posts, which he designated. By 1767, the only ones which
had been established were Detroit, Michillimackinac
,
Niagara,
Oswego, and Fort de Chartres. Alvord and Carter, The Critical
Period (I. H. Col. X. ) , 328; Johnson's Report, 1767, New York
Colonial Documents
,
VII., 973, 974; Johnson to Lords of Trade,
January 15, 1767, ibid . , 895; Johnson to Carleton, January 27,
1767, Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 4, p. 115.
Johnson to Shelburne, April 1, 1767, New York Colonial
Documents
,
VII., 915; same to same, May 30, 1767, ibid . , 929.
^Merchants and Citizens of Quebec to Carleton
-
[1767 ]
,
Canadian Archives, series S, Indian Affairs. Traders of Detroit
to Johnson, November 26, 1767, Johnson MSS., XV., 157.
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northern and southern departments, were doomed to disappoint-
ment. The Lords of Trade finally came to the conclusion that
the plan of 1764 was impracticable because of the expense in-
volved, and the result was that in 1768 the regulation of trade
was turned over to the colonies, as had originally been the
custom. The general organization of the Indian department was
retained, including the superintendents of the northern and
southern departments, but the commissaries were recalled and
all matters of trade supervision were turned over to the colo-
nial governments."*" The year 1768 also marked the establishment
of an Indian boundary at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, by which
settlers were excluded from the western country. Frontiersmen
were forbidden to cross the boundary and thus a vast area was
reserved to the savages, which could be entered only by traders
2
and Indian officers.
All efforts on the oart of the colonies to devise
effective means for the regulation of the fur trade were in
B
vain. A plan whereby commissioners were to be appointed by
each of the colonies principally interested in the trade, to
meet together and devise some means of regulation, had to be
abandoned, owing to the opposition of the King, who evidently
feared that the occasion would be seized upon to transact busi-
4
ness detrimental to imperial interests. It was apparent from
1
Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics .
2
Winsor, The Westward Movement , 16.
3
Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics .
4Colden to Hillsborough, July 7, 1770, New York
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the very first that the interests of the colonies concerned
were so divergent as to render it next to impossible to enact
any general measures for the regulation of the fur trade. At-
tempts were nevertheless made to come to some agreement and
in 1771, the New York assembly drew up a series of regulations
which v/ere submitted to the Council of Quebec. These proposed
measures among other things provided that a duty should be
levied upon all goods used in the trade and likewise suggested
that the sale of rum be confined to ^ase Niagara, Detroit, Port
Pitt, and the post of Carrillon, situated upon the Ottawa River.
The merchants of Llontreal opposed the levying of duties upon
merchandise used in the trade as well as the proposed restric-
tion upon the sale of rum. While they were favorable to the
total prohibition of the sale of liquor to the Indians, which
would be to the best interests of the savages as well as of the
traders themselves, they feared that any such half-way measures
as those submitted by the New York Assembly would only redound
to the commercial advantage of their rivals. The members of
the Council were at one with the merchants and this attempt to
regulate the Indian trade by an inter-colonial agreement came
to nothing.^" The ministry as well as the provincial governors
Colonial Documents
,
VIII., 216; Cramahe' to Hillsborough, October
31, 1771, Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 8, p. 82; Hills-
borough to Cramahd, July 19, 1771, Canad ian Archives Report ,
1890, p. 47; same to same, December 4, 1771, ibid .
^-Minutes of the Council of Quebec, January 10, 1772,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 8, p. 129; Llemorial of Sundry
Merchants Concerned in the Indian Trade, Upon the Proposals Sub-
mitted by New York, October 31, 1771, ibid . , 135; Hillsborough
to Cramahe', July 1, 1772, ibid . , 139. There had been evidences
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repeatedly endeavored to secure the enactment of colonial laws
for the regulation of the trade but the divergency of interests
was too great and all attempts were in vain. By 1777, Lord
Dartmouth had come to the conclusion that parliamentary action
would be necessary in order to remedy the situation."'"
The failure of the colonies to enact suitable measures
for the supervision of the fur trade caused a good deal of con-
fusion and even occasioned considerable dissatisfaction among
the Indians themselves. Enormous quantities of rum were sent
pinto the Upper Country, especially from Hew York; and so great
were the profits derived from its sale that many traders dealt
in nothing else, and the result was that the savages were great-
ly demoralized. Many of the traders who dealt in liquor were
themselves men of exceedingly disreputable character, being
guilty of many abuses in their dealings with the Indians; and
of jealousy between Quebec and New York for some years past.
In 1766, the merchants of Montreal had declared their belief
that the colony of New York desired the trade to be restricted
to the posts because of the superior advantages enjoyed by their
Canadian rivals. Memorial to Carleton, September 20, 1766,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 4, p. 200. Johnson, on the
other hand, believed that the traders of Quebec were apprehen-
sive because under the British regime, those of New York posses-
sed advantages equal to their own. Johnson to Shelburne, Decem-
ber 3, 1767, New York Colonial Documents , VII., 999.
^Circular Letter of Hillsborough, November 15, 1770,
New York Colonial Documents , VIII., 254; Dunmore to Hillsborough,
January 18, 1771, ibid . , 261; March 9, 1771, ibid . , 265; Hills-
borough to Johnson, December 4, 1771, ibid . , 287; Dartmouth to
Johnson, February 3, 1773, ibid . , 348.
p
The inhabitants of Quebec and Montreal usually refer-
red to the Great Lakes' region as the"Upper Country."
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more than once did the tribes in council with Sir William
Johnson complain of the failure of the colonial governments
to regulate the trade and protest against the lawless acts of
those who roamed in their midst and brought the rum which de-
bauched their young men. Johnson, while he sympathized entire-
ly with their point of view, was nevertheless obliged to defend
the acts of the government which he represented as best he
might. The results which he had foreseen when the British
ministry changed its policy with regard to the regulation of
trade had actually come to pass."'' He died in the summer of
1774; and his last days must have been filled with bitter dis-
appointment when he reflected that all his efforts to bring
about the establishment of a well-ordered system for the manage-
ment of Indian affairs had failed and that instead, confusion
and discontent reigned among the tribes whose welfare he had
so much at heart.
Conditions in the Indian country were growing intol-
erable. Crime and disorder became increasingly prevalent and
it was almost hopeless to expect that conditions should be im-
proved so long as there was no civil establishment by which
the affairs of the traders at the western posts might be regu-
lated. One reason for the passage of the Quebec Act was a de-
sire on the part of the British ministry to remedy this situa-
tion and to provide for the establishment of some sort of legal
"'"Johnson to Hillsborough, August 14, 1770, New York
Colonial Documents
,
VIII., 225; Johnson to Dartmouth, November 4,
1772, ibid . , 315; Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Six
Nations, April, 1773, ibid . , 354, 360; July, 1774, ibid . , 475,
477; Cramah£ to Claus, August 6, 1772, Claus Papers, I., 145.
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authority in the fur country. It has been recently pointed
out that the Quebec Act was not a measure enacted for the pun-
ishment of recalcitrant provinces, but "was the product of the
period of imperialistic thought and of kindly feeling toward
the colonies." The measure stood for an attempt on the part
of the ministry to extend the imperial power over a part of the
Mississippi Valley in order to do away with the chaos which
prevailed. ^
The Quebec Act is in fact of great importance from
the viewpoint of the fur trade, its most important provision in
this respect being the one which provided for the extension of
the boundaries of Canada so as to include the vast area lying
between the Ohio River and the Mississippi. The merchants of
Quebec who were engaged in the fur trade were naturally ex-
ceedingly anxious for the enlargement of the boundaries of the
province. Not only did they desire the establishment of a
government which should render secure the lives and property of
the traders in the Great Lakes' region but they were likewise
anxious that measures should be taken to stop the encroachments
of white settlers upon the Indians' hunting grounds. It was
for this reason that the London merchants interested in the fur
trade uniformly favored the extension of the boundaries of the
province, and that the ministry likewise had in mind the pre-
vention of western settlements is indicated by a statement of
V/illiam Knox, a man veryfamiliar with the purposes of that
^Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics ;
Coffin, "The Province of ^uebec and the Early American Revolu-
tion," University of Wisconsin Bulletin , I.
,
416, 417.
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measure, who declared that the territory now comprising the
Old Northwest was included within the limits of the province of
Quebec ''with the avowed purpose of excluding all further settle-
ment therein, and for the establishment of uniform regulations
for the Indian trade." 1
The views of the Canadians themselves are revealed
as early as 1769 in the report of a committee of the Council of
Quebec appointed for the purpose of taking into consideration
the meir.orials of certain merchants on the subject of their
trade. In this report, which was dated April 8, the members of
the committee took occasion to express their general views with
respect to the fur trade, preliminary to a discussion of the
matters referred to in the petitions of the merchants. They
pointed out first of all that the places at which the trade was
carried on were subject to no civil jurisdiction, having no
government of their own and not being annexed to any province
which did enjoy a civil establishment. While the superintendent
of Indian affairs had possessed power to regulate the trade at
the various -posts, it was possible for each province to compel
its own merchants to observe the rules which were established
for the control of commerce with the Indians. But now that
this plan was abolished there was no longer under existing con-
ditions any means whereby the trade might be rendered subject
to effective control, rhe com;.:itiee indicated the difficulty
of accomplishing anything by provincial legislation. If one
Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics •
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colony were to place its commerce under restriction its traders
would be at a disadvantage in their competition with merchants
from rival provinces, in case the latter did not see fit to
enact similar measures. It was perfectly evident from the ex-
perience of the past few years that any attempt at concerted
action on the part of the colonies engaged in the fur trade
was useless. As the only remedy for the situation, the com-
mittee believed that the western posts should be annexed to
one of the colonies and the natural corollary to this view was
the conviction that Quebec ought to be the favored province.
Her traders were more numerous than those of any other col-
ony and likewise disposed of more British manufactures in
the form of Indian goods than any other, it being pointed out
that New York sent little besides rum into the interior. In
addition to these considerations, the nature of the water com-
munications leading to the Upper Country made it desirable
that the fur-bearing region should be placed under the control
of Quebec in preference to any other colony. This statement
is especially significant inasmuch as the committee expressed
the desire that if its views met with the approval of Governor
Carleton, he should communicate them to his Majesty's ministers!
When it became known that the ministry was about to enact some
measure vitally affecting the province of Quebec, additional
efforts were made to bring about an extension of the boundaries
^"Report of Committee of Council on the Indian Trade,
April 8, 1769, Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 6, p. 84.
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of the colony. Two memorials were drawn up in December of
17 73, one by the French and the other by the English inhabi-
tants, which were signed by all the leading merchants and
among other things it was requested that the bounds of the
province might be extended so as to include the territory which
had been under the government of Quebec during the French regime^
A spirit of inter-colonial rivalry was undoubtedly
of considerable importance in determining the attitude of the
traders of Quebec. In October of 1773, Lieutenant Governor
Cramah^ transmitted to Lord Dartmouth a draft of the existing
boundary between Hew York and Canada and expressed the hope
that some alteration might be made before definite action should
be taken. The people of Quebec v/ere apprehensive lest the prox-
imity of the colony of Mew York to the St. Lawrence might lead
to some interference with the fur trade which they carried on
by means of that communication. They pointed out that the
merchants of Hew York had already obtained a considerable share
in the trade and that if the present boundary were confirmed,
they would be very likely to obtain full possession of it.
Such an outcome would work great injustice to the merchants of
Canada, as they could never interfere with New York in the con-
duct of the '.vest India trade, while the climate of their own
province was not such as to attract immigration. Their pros-
perity depended entirely upon the fur trade. 2 The opponents of
the Quebec 3ill, on the other hand, pointed out the injustice
to the other colonies in annexing the Indian country north of
^Shortt and Doughty, Constitutional Documents, 351,358.
-See next page.
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the Ohio to Canada. Lord Shelburne in the course of the
parliamentary debate protested vigorously against a measure
which he declared would place the entire fur trade "from Hud-
son's Bay to the forks of the Mississippi" under the control
of the province of Quebec.
The passage of the Quebec Act aroused a storm of
opposition, not only in the southern colonies but in Canada
as well. The English inhabitants were incensed because it pro-
vided for the establishment of French civil law in the province
and recognized Catholicism. This obnoxious measure was short-
ly followed by the passage of the Revenue Act, which among
other things provided for a heavy duty upon rum imported from
IT
the other British colonies in America. The traders were great-
ly alarmed since they imported nearly all their rum from iM'ew
York and there was also some apprehension concerning the duties
which might be levied upon other goods. In case the merchants
of Canada were obliged to break off commercial relations with
Hew York, their situation would be serious as it was reported
that goods were already twenty-five perjcent higher than they
had been prior to the disturbances in America.^ In brief, the
2
Cramahe* to Dartmouth, October 1, 1773, Canadian
Archives, series Q, vol. 9, p. 91.
-^Hansard, Parliamentary History
, XVIII , 673.
2Isaac Todd to Messrs. Rinkin and Edgar, August 26,
1774, Letters and Accounts of the northwest Co
. , 3; Coffin, in
his "Province of Quebec" carefully considers the attitude of the
Canadians with regard to the measure.
^Shortt and Doughty, Constitutional Documents , 406.
4McTavish to Ldgar, December 24, 1774, Letters and
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Quebec Act appears to have completely satisfied no one and so
great was the discontent of the merchants of Montreal that
there was fear in some quarters lest they might be inclined
to favor the rebellious colonies to the southward.
One of the principal objects of the ministry in ex-
tending the boundaries of Quebec was to provide a government
for the Indian country. The thirty-second article of Governor
Carleton's instructions, which were dated January 3, 1775, con-
tained some general recommendations concerning the regulation
of the Indian trade and the imperial plan which had been drawn
up in 1764 was enclosed, to be used by the Legislative Council
as a guide in enacting measures for the regulation of the com-
merce of the interior.^ The instructions likewise provided for
the establishment of inferior courts of criminal and civil
jurisdiction in the districts of the Illinois, Vincennes, De-
troit, Michillimackinac , and Gaspge, and ordered the appoint-
ment of a superintendent or lieutenant governor for each dis-
trict. Jhese courts, together with the lieutenant governors,
were to constitute the civil establishment for the Indian
country. 3
In accordance with his instructions, Governor Carleton
aiDDointed lieutenant governors for the various districts but
the outbreak of the Revolution prevented the enactment of the
Accounts of the Northwest Co
. , 15.
'Letter of Claus, October 21, 1774, Claus Papers, L,170.
2Shortt and Doughty, Constitutional Documents , 428.
3Ibid.
, 423, 428.
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measures necessary for the establishment of the courts provided
for in the plan.^- As Carleton said in a letter to Lieutenant
Governor Hamilton, "The Legislative Council is met, but the
times will not at present admit of any regulations being made
for distant or remote situations while the commotions continue,
the power of the sword is chiefly and indeed only to be trusted
to." The lieutenant governors at Detroit and i.dchillimackinac
were given commissions as justices of the peace and this seems
to have been the extent of the civil establishment at these
places during the devolution and the years immediately follow-
ing,^ The supreme authority over the Indian country was to all
intents and purposes vested in the governor general, and the
lieutenant governors at Detroit and liichillimackinae simply
carried out his instructions in the administration of affairs
at their respective posts. In the case of Carleton and Haldi-
mand, the governor general was likewise commander in chief of
his Majesty's forces within the province; and it seems probable
that this centralized and semi-military administration was the
best that could have been devised for the control of the Upper
Country during the Revolution and the troubled years which fol-
lowed.
^
"'"The superintendents appointed for Vincermes and the
Illinois country never actually took charge of affairs in their
respective districts.
2Carleton to Hamilton, February 2, 1777, i,Iichigan
Pioneer Collecti ons , LX,, 345.
^Instructions to Lieutenant Governor Sinclair, Art. 2,
-lichigan Pioneer Collections . IX., 517.
^These general conclusions concerning the character of
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The same causes which prevented the establishment of
courts in the Upper Country likewise delayed the formation
of- any general policy with respect to the regulation of the fur
trade. Like the Proclamation 1763, Carleton's instructions
provided that the commerce of the interior should be free and
open to all who secured licenses for the purpose from the pro-
vincial governor. The Legislative Council was to enact commer-
cial regulations designed to give every possible facility to
the trade consistent with justice to the Indians. It was rec-
eommended that a scale of prices for furs and goods should be
established and above all that the sale of liquor to the Indians
be restricted.^" The whole tenor of the instructions made it
apparent that the British ministry had gone back to the essen-
tial ideas which had been embodied in the imperial plan of 1764.
It is true that the idea of colonial regulation had not been
abandoned, but at the same time it had been centralized, inas-
much as the greater part of the fur-bearing region occupied
by the Indians of the northern department had been annexed to
the province of Quebec and conseouently the trade of the region
would be under the control of the legislature of that province.
On March 29, 1777, the Legislative Council passed an
act for the purpose of regulating the Indian trade, but inas-
.
much as the war rendered impracticable any attempt to formulate
a comprehensive system for the supervision of the commerce of
the Upper Country, the provisions embodied in the measure fell
the administration of the Upwer Country have been derived from a
study of the correspondence in the Haldiraand Collection.
^Shortt and Doughty, Constitutional Documents , 4£8.
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far short of the recommendations contained in Carleton's in-
structions. In fact, the ordinance appears to have embodied
an attempt to correct only the most obvious of the abuses which
had arisen during the past few years. Among other regulations,
it contained the following: (1) No liquor was to be sold to the
Indians without a license obtained from the proper authorities.
(2) No person was to purchase, receive in pledge, or in exchange
any clothes, blankets, fire-arms, or ammunition belonging to
any Indians within the province. (3) No one was to be allowed
to settle in the Indian country of the province without a
license. By these measures it was hoped to do away with the
evils complained of so often during the years immediately pre-
ceding the passage of the Quebec Act, namely, the unrestricted
sale of liauor to the savages, the frauds practiced upon them
by traders, and the encroachments of white settlers upon their
hunting grounds.
The general subject of the regulation of Indian
affairs is of some importance in any consideration of the fur
trade, an industry whose welfare depended absolutely upon the
friendship of the savages with whom it was carried on. The
French had established forts at various places in the Upper
Country, by means of which they exercised control over the
tribes living in their vicinity. Thus certain nations came to
be regarded as dependent upon certain posts, whither they re-
sorted to receive presents and hold councils with the repre-
sentatives of the French king, their father. When the British
Quebec Ordinances
,
1777-1786, p. 27.
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gained control of Canada, they naturally adopted the general
system which had been followed so successfully by their pre-
decessors. They did not, however, follow the plan of main-
taining troops at the smaller outposts. There were garrisons
at Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, and Michillimackinac f but the
smaller posts or "dependencies" as they were called became
simply the resorts of traders and Indians. The principal de-
pendencies of Detroit during the period under consideration
were Ouiatanon, Sandusky, St. Joseph's, Saginaw, Yincennes,
and the post on the Miami. The Wyandot
,
Ottawa, Chippewa,
Miami, and Potawatomi were some of the more important tribes
living in the region dependent upon this district."*" The prin-
cipal outposts of Michillimackinac were La Baye, Prairie du
Chien, St. Mary's, at the entrance to Lake Superior, and Grand
Portage, while among the tribes regarded as dependent upon the
post were the Sauk, Fox, Winnebago, Ojibway, Menominee, Sioux,
p
and numerous others.
During the period from 1774 to 1796, the Indian
department in Canada had no direct control over the trade. The
Legislative Council might enact measures for the regulation of
commerce, while the Governor of the province might and did
very often give orders concerning the conduct of the trade
which were carried out by his subordinates, the lieutenant
^"The names of the dependencies and Indian tribes
given above are taken from a paper entitled "Number of Indians
at Detroit & places depending thereon, 1782." Canadian Archives,
series S, Indian affairs.
^Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , IX,
X, XL, passim .
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governors at Detroit and Michillimackinac • The chief service
rendered by the Indian department was the maintenance of
friendly relations with the tribes dependent upon the posts.
It held councils and acted as the medium for the distribution
of presents; its blacksmiths and interpreters were placed at
the disposal of the savages, while everything possible was
done to preserve friendly relations between the traders and
the Indians and to ensure justice in their mutual intercourse.^
Political relations with the natives were under the supervision
of the commandants at the posts, who endeavored to carry out
the instructions of their superiors with respect to these
matters. In matters having to do with the regulation of com-
merce, the Governor and Legislative Council were supreme and
during the Revolution and the years immediately following, when
the times were not auspicious for the enactment of legislative
measures affecting the Upper Country, control over the fur
trade was exercised almost exclusively by the former.
The period between 1763 and 1774 was one of transi-
tion in the history of the fur trade of the region stretching
-kjntil 1791, every trader in the province of Quebec
who imported goods into the Upper Country was obliged to secure
a license from the governor. The lieutenant governors at De-
troit and Michillimackinac were authorized to decide who should
be allowed to go out into the Indian country from those posts.
^Standing Orders for the Posts in the Upper Country,
February 6, 1783, Canadian Archives, series B, vol. 115, p. 52;
Instructions to Sir John Johnson, February 6, 1783, ibid . , 56,
64; April 4, 1787, series S, Indian Affairs.
^The Haldimand papers contain numerous reports of
councils with the Indians, presided over by the commandant
at Detroit.

40
northwestward from the Ohio. The fall of French dominion in
Canada was followed by an influx of British merchants into the
field, who began gradually to crowd out their former rivals.
The changed political and economic conditions which resulted
from this new situation necessitated the establishment of a
system for the regulation of trade and Indian affairs, and dur-
ing these years, the 3ritish ministry strove to solve the pro-
blem with which it was confronted. The culmination of this
period of effort was reached in the passage of the Quebec Act,
which provided for a system that was in reality a combination
of the ideas embodied in the imperial plan of 1764 and the
colonial plan of 1768. What line of development the trade
would have followed under ordinary circumstances it is diffi-
cult to say, as immediately after the enactment of the measure
events took place which utterly changed the aspect of affairs
in the British dominions in north America.
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CHAPTER II.
The Revolution and the ?ur Trade
Lord Shelburne, denouncing the Quebec Act before
parliament in 1774, had declared that one of the immediate
effects of the measure would be to deliver the entire peltry
trade of the region extending from the Ohio River to the south-
ern limits of the Hudson's Bay Company, into the hands of the
Canadians. V'hether or not his r>rophesy would have been ful-
filled under normal conditions, it is difficult to say,
for shortly after the enactment of the measure, the storm
which had been gathering in the British colonies finally broke,
and a new epoch in the history of the Northwest and of the fur
trade began. The Revolutionary War was attended by momentous
consequences for the commerce of the Upper Country, and in
fact, the history of the northwest during this period is an
almost inextricable tangle of war, Indian politics, and trade,
on the side of the Americans as well as of the British. The
varying fortunes of war and a desire to promote the traffic
in furs in turn dictated the policy of the British with regard
to the control of the Great Lakes' region, and whatever restric
tions they may have imposed upon commerce from time to time by
reason of military necessity, it is certain that there was
ever present in their minds a desire to retain control of the
Hansard, Parliamentary History
,
XVIII., 673.
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Northwest for the sake of the valuable peltries which it yielded^
I'he Americans , as they must henceforth be called, v/ere less
vitally interested in the fur trade but there are indications
that they would not have been at all averse to taking advantage
of any commercial opportunities which the occupation of the
Northwest might have thrown in their way. Moreover, as in the
old days when the English and the French were struggling for
supremacy in America, the traders themselves played an exceed-
ingly important part in the wilderness warfare of the devolu-
tion. Their aid was invaluable when it came to enlisting the
sympathies of the Indians on one side or the other. Once more
was proved the truth of Wraxall'a assertion that Indian trade
and politics are inseparable.
Practically every commercial advantage, so far as
the Great Lakes' region was concerned, lay with the British
at the beginning of the struggle. Of supreme importance was
the fact that they v/ere in actual military occupation of the
fur country. Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, and Kichillimackinac
,
the principal posts controlling the Northwest, v/ere garrisoned
by troops which, though few in number, were of unquestioned
loyalty. So long as the British could continue to hold these
posts and their dependencies, control of the Indian nations of
the interior and of their trade was practically assured. Another
"^"British officers appear to have regarded the North-
west almost entirely from the standpoint of the fur trade, and .
their correspondencecoRstantly reveals a desire to preserve the
posts for the sake of the commerce which they controlled. Haldi-
mand to Bolton, April 18, 1779, Michigan Pioneer and historical
Collections
,
XIX, 396; Hamilton to Germain, September 25, 1779,
ibid. , X. , '361.
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decided advantage on the side of the British was the fact that
at the beginning of the war, they had a well-developed organi-
zation for the administration of Indian affairs. The depart-
ment had for years enjoyed the advantages of the wisdom and
experience of Sir William Johnson, who probably understood the
savage nature better than any other man who has ever lived.
He had in fact appointed several of the officers of the northern
department, who had served under him during his lifetime.''" The
number of officials in the Indian establishment was increased
after the outbreak of the war by recruits selected in many
cases from the ranks of the traders who, by reason of their
long experience in dealing with the savage, became most capable
officials. The colonies on the other hand were decidedly
handicapped in this respect, since they were obliged to create
an entirely new machinery for the management of Indian affairs
and trade, a matter which required time and considerable effort.
Thus, at the very outset, the British had a great advantage
over the Americans by reason of the facilities at their dis-
posal for retaining the friendship and trade of the Indians.
Still another circumstance which gave their merchants a tremen-
dous initial advantage over possible American competitors was
the fact that practically all the manufactured goods used in
the fur trade came from England. The outbreak of v/ar cut off
American merchants from London, which was not only the world's
fur market, but likewise the place from which the goods used
in the Indian trade were imported. The colonies could indeed
Return of Officers and other Appointments of the
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supply a certain amount of rum, ammunition, and tobacco; but
they lacked facilities for the manufacture of the blanlrets,
knives, and various other goods which were in great demand
among the Indians.
There -./ere on the other hand certain elements of
weakness in the British situation in the Northwest. First of
all, the loyalty of a large part of the trading class was not
above question. The Trench-Canadians were as a rule lukewarm
in their attachment to the British cause and were a constant
source of anxiety to the commanders of the northwest posts.
To this class belonged not only the voyageurs , engagers , and
petty traders in the Indian country, but also many influential
merchants of French blood located in the Upper Country; and
one of the difficult problems of the commanders at the upper
posts was to control their activities without arousing their
hostility. The British, moreover, had a tremendously long
line of communication to protect, extending, indeed, from
Xaskaskia in the Illinois country and the posts northwest of
Lake Superior, to London itself - a line which might be threat-
ened at two or three different points. Tort Pitt was a con-
stant menace to Letroit and Niagara while the route to Canada
by way of the Hudson River and Lake Champlain afforded a com-
paratively easy avenue of approach to Montreal, the great
Northern Department of Indian Affairs on the Peace Establish-
ment previous to the late rebellion in America. Montreal, Nov-
ember 20, 1766. Canadian Archives Transcripts, C. 0. 42, vol.18,
p. 124.
*ETen as early as 17 70, Sir William Johnson complained
of a scarcity of goods in New York as a result of the Non-Im-
portation Act, which occasioned considerable dissatisfaction
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emporium of the fur trade. The posts in the Upper Country
were at no time very strongly garrisoned, and British comman-
ders lived in constant dread of an American attack, while even
the trade fleets plying between London and Quebec must be con-
voyed during their passage of the North Atlantic.
New York and Pennsylvania, as has already been
pointed out, were the principal American colonies interested
in the fur trade at the outbreak of the war. The two principal
communications leading to trie Indian country were the route
from Albany to Oswego by way of the Mohawk River and Oneida
Lake; and the overland route from Philadelphia to Fort Pitt,
and thence to the Indian country either by pack horse, or by
boat down the Ohio River. The presence of a Jritish force at
Oswego, together with the hostility of the Six Nations, effec-
tually blocked the former route; and the fur trade of the
Great Lakes' region, so far as New York was concerned, was
ruined. To what extent the commerce of the Ohio valley de-
pending upon Fort Pitt continued after the outbreak of the
-.evolution is difficult to say; but it must have been greatly
restricted by war anu the uncertain attitude of the Indians.
The various circumstances which have been enumerated combined
to give to the 3ritish a monopoly of the fur trade dependent
upon the posts situated in the Upper Country. Their task was
simply to retain possession of that which was delivered into
their hands by force of circumstances.
Congress from the very beginning realized the impor-
among the Indians. Johnson to Hillsborough, July 12, August 14,
1770. New York Colonial Documents, VIII, £22, 225.

46
tanee of the political attitude of the savages and by a series
of resolutions adopted July 12, 1775, laid the foundations of
a system for the management of Indian affairs."*" Hand in hand
with the task of perfecting an organization for the supervision
of the various tribes and the preservation of their friendship
went the problem of establishing and maintaining trade rela-
tions with the Indians. Commercial intercourse was in fact
essential to the attainment of the former object. At a confer-
ence between the commissioners for the northern department and
representatives of the Six Nations, held at Albany in the late
summer of 1775, the Indians expressed a desire that the Ameri-
cans should open up a trade with them at Albany and at Schnec-
tady, as in former days, when if their people "came down with
only a few musquash skins, they went home with glad hearts."
The commissioners assured the Indians that a trade would be
established at these places, although they must have known
that such a promise was more easily made than fulfilled. 3
Congress did make an effort, however, to establish
commercial relations with the Indians, as the surest means of
preserving their friendship and alliance. A record of the
proceedings at Albany was submitted to a committee of Congress,
on the basis of which a report was drawn up and presented on
January 27, 1776; and on the same day, resolutions were adopted
1 Journals of the Continental Congress . IL, 174.
p
,'orce, American Archives , 4th series, IIL, 487. The
Six IJations had not yet declared their hostility toward the
Americans.
3Ibid., 489.
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outlining plans for the establishment of a trade with the In-
dians. It was provided, first of all, that £40,000 worth of
goods should be purchased abroad, and imported on the account
and risk of the United Colonies. The Secret Committee of con-
gress was empowered to contract with proper persons for the im-
portation of the merchandise, and for the exportation of colon-
ial produce to pay for it, while the goods thus obtained were
to be sold to traders under the supervision of the commissioners.
Congress also took this opportunity to lay down rules and regu-
lations for the governance of the trade. Ho person v/as to be
allowed to sell goods to the Indians without first obtaining
a license; traders were to dispose of their merchandise at
prices fixed by the commissioners; and they were to be fair
in their dealings v/ith the Indians, taking ano advantage of
their distress or intemperance.^ They were furthermore obliged
to give bond for the observance of these regulations upon re-
ceiving their licenses. Commerce with the Indians v/as also
restricted to such places as the commissioners might see fit
to designate. 2
The principal obstacle to the execution of this pro-
ject was the difficulty of obtaining merchandise. On April 10,
Congress instructed the commissioners to inform the Indians
that a plan had been determined upon for buying goods v/ith
,
The Indians complained of the exorbitant prices
charged them by American traders. Butler to Wilson, Force,
American Archives , 4th series, V: 816.
2 Journals of the continental congress
.
IV,, 96.
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which to supply their necessities. The problem appeared to he
no nearer a solution as time went on, however, for on April 19,
George Morgan, agent for the middle department, was directed
to tell the tribes that Congress had devised the best plan of
which it was capable for the importation of articles with which
to supcly their needs, and that every effort had been made to
secure them in good season. In case the goods should not ar-
rive as soon as they were wanted the savages were to be informed
that the British by obstructing commerce were to blame for the
sad state to which the trade had been reduced; but they were to
be urged to have patience, as relief was expected soon. Such
language, addressed to tribes whose friendship was at least
doubtful, reveals the straits to which the colonies were re-
duced in their efforts to maintain the Indian trade, upon which
g
so much depended. Notwithstanding the slight results obtained,
these attempts to open up a trade indicate that Congress fully
realized the importance of the relation between Indian trade
and politics.
^ Journals of the Continental Congress
.
IV., 267.
2 Journals of the Continental Congress
,
IV., 295; Ibid .
,
329, 330. The Pennsylvania convention adopted resolutions on
January 23, 1776, urging all persons owning powder mills to
manufacture ammunition as rapidly as possible. The necessity
for powder in the Indian trade was one of the reasons given for
the adoption of this resolution, I'orce, American Archives , 4th
series, L, 1169. The problem of securing goods does not appear
to have become less difficult as time went on. Congress attemp-
ted to purchase Indian goods in Pranee, but even after Clark's
invasion of the Northwest, the supply was totally inadequate.
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Projects for expeditions against Niagara and Detroit
v/ere occasionally discussed during the early months of the war,
but "none of them v/ere carried into execution.^ One of the early
military campaigns of the war, however, for a time threatened
the very existence of the Canadian fur trade. On November 17,
1775, the city of Montreal surrendered to General Montgomery,
leader of the American army which invaded Canada by way of
Lake Champlain. Certain of the proposals submitted by a com-
mittee charged with arranging articles of capitulation on be-
half of the inhabitants of the city are of interest. The com-
mittee suggested, among other conditions, that the trade which
Montreal carried on with the Upper country and with England
might continue without interruption, and that passports might
be granted allowing persons to proceed upon legitimate business.
In consideration of the weak state of the garrison, Montgomery
felt justified in rejecting these conditions as the basis of
a formal capitulation, he replied that in view of the hostili-
ties existing between the colonies anc the mother country, he
was unable to guarantee the continuance of commercial relations
with Great Britain. On the other hand, he -oromised that he
would protect the trade and grant pasr ports to the u-pDer Country,
in so far as the public interest should allow. 2 It is not diffi-
cult to understand how vitally the prospects of the merchants
xJournals o: the Continental Congress
,
IV«, 301, 318,
373.
c
Zings ford, :ii story of lanada, V., 470.
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were affected by the surrender of the city to the Americans.
Montreal was the great center of the Canadian fur trade, and
the interests of the merchants imperatively demanded that they
should have free access to the Upper Country and that they
should not be cut off from London, which was the market for
their peltry, and the source from whence they obtained their
goods
•
On March 4, 1776, while the Americans were still in
possession of Montreal, a memorial drawn up by certain merchants
of that city was laid before Congress and submitted to a com- '
raittee of five.''' Though a copy of the memorial is not available,
the subsequent action of Congress will serve to throw some
light upon its probable contents. The committee to which the
document was referred made a report on March 13; and a week
later, when the instructions to be given the commissioners ap-
pointed to go to Canada were being debated, certain additional
articles were drawn up, which were in all probability in the
nature of a reply to the merchants T petition to Congress. The
commissioners were ordered to encourage the Indian trade of
Canada, and to grant passports for that purpose in so far as
might be consistent with the safety of the troops and the public
good.^ They were also to inform the Canadians that their com-
merce with foreign nations should stand on an enual footing with
that of the United Ltates, an assurance which could not have
been a source of much consolation to those whose income depended
1 Journals of the Continental Congress
,
IV., 182.
p
The commissioners did as a matter of fact grant pass-
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upon a free intercourse with Gr«at Britain.^ It 1b evident
from these instructions that Congress was willing to make all
possible concessions in order to win over the Canadian trading
class, which constituted by far the most wealthy and influen-
tial part of the population. While no definite expressions
of opinion have been found, there can be little doubt that
their interests caused those who were engaged in the fur indus-
try to remain loyal to Great Britain. ^ £he American commission-
ers were able to give but little assurance that commercial in-
tercourse between Canada and England would be maintained; and,
had the Americans succeeded in holding the city, it is practi-
cally certain that trade with the mother country would have
ports to certain individuals to carry on the trade. Canadian
Archives, series Q, vol. 12, p. 22.
^-Journals of the continental Congress
,
IV., 200, 218.
Careful search has failed to disclose the text of the memorial
to Congress or the names of the merchants who signed it, though
the petitioners in this case were doubtless identical with
those whose names frequently appear signed to petitions and
memorials of later date. Sinclair, writing of this incident
a couple of years later, said "The North West society are not
better than they ought to be. Their conduct in sending an Em-
bassy to Congress in 76 may be traced now to matters more detri-
mental--! believe, to every one of the Provision Stores on the
communication." Sinclair to Jrehm, May 29, 1780. Michigan
Pioneer Collections
,
IX, 552. Sinclair's meaning is none too
clear, but he appears to have been of a naturally suspicious
disposition.
p
Among the conditions proposed by the citizens of
Montreal at the time of the capitulation of the city was one
to the effect that they should not be required to bear arms
against England. Zingsford, History of Canada , V., 470. It is
not at all unlikely that certain of the leading merchants of
Montreal were members of the committee delegated to treat with
Montgomery. The direction in which their interests lay is
plainly to be inferred from their anxiety not to commit any
act of hostility against the British.
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been cut off, at least during the war, The shutting off of
Canada from the world's great fur market and the source of
manufactured goods would have meant the utter ruin of the mer-
chants of Montreal, who were fully alive to the situation.
Their memorial to Congress v/hile the Americans were in posses-
sion of the city reveals their anxiety and their determination
to -prevent the loss of their trade if possible. It is perhaps
useless to speculate as to what might have been the consequences
if the Americans had succeeded in the conquest of Canada. As
has been said, the chief trade of the province would have been
ruined, but it is also likely that the destruction of the sole
commerce of the interior would have had a very important polit-
ical effect upon the Indian tribes inhabiting the Northwest.
In view of the fact that the Indians were dependent upon the
traffic in furs for many articles which had become necessities
of life, momentous conseouences must have followed a sudden
destruction of this mainstay of their existence, though it is
difficult to say whether the British or the Americans would
have become the objects of their resentment. The unsuccessful
attempt to conouer Canada had very little effect upon the
trade of the Great Lakes' region notwithstanding the fact that
a different outcome must have been attended by tremendous re-
sults. Of more importance, in its actual effect upon the com-
merce of the Upper Country, was the occupation of the Illinois
by George Rogers Clark in 1778*
"^"The capture of Montreal seems to have caused a tem-
porary shortage of supplies. James Bannerman, writing to William
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The fur trade of the Great Lakes' region a-opears to
have been on the increase during the years immediately pre-
ceding the expedition of the Virginians, due in considerable
measure to the enterprising character of the merchants who had
entered Canada following the Conquest."1" reference has already
been made in the preceding chapter to the confusion and dis-
order which prevailed in the interior during the years which
preceded the oassage of the Duebec Act. Conditions do not
seem to have improved much as time went on, for the prosperous
state of the trade attracted many lav/less individuals who, re-
leased from every restraint, committed all sorts of outrages
in the Indian country and became involved in broils with the
savages which not infrequently resulted in murder. Lieutenant
Governor Hamilton has left anything but a flattering picture
Edgar from Michillimackinac on June 23, 1776, said that goods
were very scarce in Canada owing to the fact that a Mr. Henry
(probably Alexander Henry) along with others had purchased
L15,000 worth of Indian goods in Montreal and carried them on
sleds to Albany. For what purpose the goods were to be used
is not indicated. The writer also says that "all the Powder
abt. 900 Barrels was last fall started overboard into the River
as there has no Canoes arrived since the 12th Ins. its imagined
they wait for Powder from Quebec." Letters and Accounts of the
IJorth-rest Co .
, 21.
•^Canadian Archives report , 1888. Calendar of Kaldi-
mand Collection, vol. IIL, p. 12. It is difficult to draw any
accurate conclusion from these tables, due to the fact that the
number of furs of different kinds exported varied greatly from
year to year, while of course the different varieties were of
very unequal value. It is impossible to make an accurate esti-
mate of the condition of the trade in the absence of informa-
tion concerning the market trices of the difierent sorts of
peltry. Hamilton to Dartmouth, August 29 and September 2, 1776,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 13, p. 212.
9
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of the petty traders who frequented the vicinity of Detroit in
the year 1776. He declared that they imposed upon the Indians
to such an extent that the very name "trader" had become a
synonym for "art-full cheat." The engages were many of them
fugitives from lower Canada and the colonies, who had either
fled from their creditors or the lav?, and then entered the
Indian trade, contracting debts and cheating all with v/hom they
came in contact. He complained, furthermore, of the evil in-
fluence which these irresponsible persons exerted over the
savages. In short, many of the traders in the Indian country
were unprincipled vagabonds v/ho required constant v/atching and
were a continual menace to the peace and cuiet of the Upper
Country, a circumstance which had important consequences when
the West at length became the theater of military operations."'"
Another source of danger to the British in the Great
Lakes' region was the attitude of the Spaniards v/ho occupied the
territory beyond the Mississippi. Attention has already been
called to the fact that French and Spanish merchants living in
Louisiana carried on an extensive trade within .British territory
and after the outbreak of the Revolution, there were still
further reports of Spanish interference with the Indian tribes
east of the Mississippi , intrigues which the British suspected
of being set on foot in order to secure control of the fur
^"Hamilton to Dartmouth, August 29 to September 2, 1776
Michigan Pioneer and Hi storical Collections , Z*, 267, Jealousy
between the "Hew So Old Traders," meaning the English and French,
was likewise the cause of much disorder. Letter to Basset,
August 12, 1773, ibid. , 253.
i«
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- trade while they were occupied in the struggle with the Ameri-
cans."
1
- British traders had, on the other hand, been encroach-
ing -upon the Spanish territory beyond the upper Mississippi
for some year6, and this fact did not serve to lessen the sus-
picion and distrust with which the officials of the two nations
regarded one another.
Thus there were elements in the situation at the out-
break of the war, which endangered the security of the trade in
the Great Lakes' region, and the British officers in control
of the Northwest considered il necessary to take measures to
ensure the maintenance of law and order. '.The necessity for
regulation became still more imperative after hostilities had
actually begun. It was difficult enough to preserve order in
time of peace, but upon the outbreak of war, the commanders at
the upper posts must have felt that they were living upon the
brink of a volcano, which was liable at any moment to burst
forth and destroy them. The problem which confronted the
British was to keep the good will of the Indians, protect the
posts and the line of communication against aggression on the
part of the colonies, and at the same time ensure with as little
interruption as possible the continuance of the fur trade, upon
which depended the friendship of the savages and the prosperity
of Canada.
-M/attas to Ealdiraand, June 16, 1773, Michigan Pioneer
and Historical Collections
,
Xli, 303; Letters of He Peyster,
unaddressed, June 4 and 6, 17 77, Michigan Pioneer and Histori -
cal Collections
,
X., 275.
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The ordinance passed by the Legislative Council in
1777 made no attempt to meet the situation resulting from the
war.-*- Before Clark's invasion of the Illinois country, however,
there arose a necessity for regulations very closely affecting
the trade of the Upper Country. On May £7, 1777, Governor
Carleton issued an order to the effect that no vessels were to
be permitted to navigate the Lakes, excepting such as v/ere
p
armed and manned by the crown. The arms and ammunition used
in the Indian trade were to be put aboard these vessels, and
no military stores whatever v/ere to be carried in open bateaux.
Merchants might send their other goods in the King's ships,
provided always that the service should be in no degree incon-
venienced thereby. The purpose of this order was to prevent
munitions of war from falling into the hands of the enemy, since
there v/as danger that the Americans might seize private vessels;
besides this, however, a great many of the traders could not
be trusted. Carleton considered the attitude of the people
who 'were engaged in commerce with the Indians as of much im-
portance and asked Hamilton for his opinion with regard to
those at Detroit; where their political sympathies lay, what
colonies they came from, and where they bought their goods be-
et
fore the outbreak of the war.
"^Carleton to Hamilton, February 2, 1777, Michigan
Pioneer collections , IX-. 3-C-5
.
p
Letter of carleton, May 22, 1777, Michigan Pioneer
Collections
,
IX, 348.
3Ibid.
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Such was the situation of affairs in the Great
Lakes' region when the occupation of the Illinois country by
George sogers Clark took place - an event of much importance
in connection with the northwest fur trade during the devolu-
tion. The territory occupied by Clark was itself of consider-
able consecuence from the commercial standpoint. Th& inhabi-
tants of Xaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes, as well as the
post of Ouiatanon on the Y.abash, were many of them engaged in
the Indian trade. These posts and the settlements surround-
ing them had since 1774 been regarded as dependencies of Le-
troit, and a number of the merchants living in the region had
business connections with the British posts, or directly with
Montreal. There was still considerable trade of one sort and
another with the Spanish posts at St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve,
and also with IJew Orleans. Llany furs were sent down the
Mississippi to New Orleans while others were carried to the
British posts, and thence to Montreal. In brief, the fur trade
of the Illinois country was of great value and importance and,
during the years preceding the -.evolution, had been regarded
as a prize well worth striving for, both by English and Spanish
merchants : and government officials.
Clark's invasion of the Illinois country appears to
have been occasioned by a variety of motives. The prevention
^Alvord, Cahokia P.ecords (I. H. Col. II.) , p. xvi.
^Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country , 94;
Defense of Thomas Bentley, August X, 1777, Alvord, Kaskaskia
Records (I. H. Col. V.) , 12.
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of Indian depredations upon the back settlements, the acqui-
sition of lands for future settlement, and the hope of dealing
a blow at J3ritish military power in North America, were each
of them motives which doubtless had a share in bringing about
the expedition of the Virginians. A desire to secure control
of the fur trade certainly cannot be regarded as an immediate
cause; but on the other hand, Clark's own words, as well as
subseouent events leave no room for doubt that in the minds of
those who were responsible for the expedition, the possibility
of getting control of a share of the fur trade was at least
regarded as one of the advantages incident to the occupation
of the region. In a letter written in 1777, probably to
Patrick Eenry, Clark called attention to the fact that the
possession of Kaskaskia would give the Americans command of
the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and thus enable them to obtain
supplies from the Spaniards and to carry on a trade with the
Indians."'" After the occupation had been accomplished, further
militarjr expeditions against the British were planned, defer-
ring in 1780 to a projected movement against Detroit, Jefferson
said in a letter to Clark, "If that Post [Detroit] be reduced
we shall be ouiet in future on our frontiers, and thereby im-
mense Treasures fo [sic] blood and Money be saved, we shall be
at leisure to know [throw] our whole force to the rescue of our
eastern Country from subjugation, we shall divert through our
own Country a branch of commerce which the European States have
•'
•Clark to Henry , undated. Probably written in 1777.
James, Clark Papers (I. E. Col., VIII.), 32.
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thought orthy of the most important struggles and sacrifices,
and in the event of peace on terms which have "been comtemplated
by some powers we shall form to the American union a barrier
against the dangerous extension of the British Province of
Canada and add to the Empire of liberty an extensive and fer-
tile Country, thereby converting dangerous Enemies into valuable
Friends. nl
The circumstances attending the occupation of the
Illinois country by the Virginians furnish one more illustra-
tion of the close connection between Indian trade and politics.
In order to secure the attachment of the northwest tribes to
the American cause, it was exceedingly desirable that trade
relations should be established with them as quickly as possi-
ble. On December 9, 1778, an act was passed by the Virginia
Assembly which provided for the organization of the county of
Illinois. Among other things, it empowered the governor of
Virginia, with the advice of the council, to take steps look-
ing toward the establishment of a commerce of some sort for
the benefit of the Indians and white inhabitants of the occu-
pied territory. This commendable object was to be attained by
''opening a communication and trade with New Orleans, or other-
wise," by some means, not indicated, which was to be under the
2
supervision of persons appointed by the commonwealth.
1
Jefferson to Clark, December 25, 1780, James, George
P.ogers Clark Papers (I. H. Col. VIII ), 490.
"V.lvord, Cahokia Records (I. H. Col., II), 11.
Henry, in his instructions to John Todd of December 12,
1779, says that the appointment of a trade agent for the
Illinois country is being contemplated. It vail be the duty of
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The proposed plan was at length put into operation
and the governor appointed J hn Dodge Indian trade agent. John
Todd' informed Clarl: of the appointment, adding that he hoped
the agent might be able to furnish goods to the Indians on
reasonable terms and yet not in such quantities as to injure
the trade of individuals."^ He need have given himself little
concern on the latter score, however. The appointment of an
agent did not, unfortunately, solve the problem of establish-
ing trade relations with the Indians. The savages were urged
to give good treatment to the American and French traders who
visited them and have nothing to do with the "bad people"
(meaning of course the English) who came among them with
presents or goods. But long years of commercial intercourse
With the white man had taught the savage to rely upon the traf-
fic in furs for many articles which had become almost essential
to his existence and if he were to discontinue his trade with
the English, he must have something to take its place. The
Americans were unable to supply his wants and the problem of
retaining his good will became increasingly difficult. The
the agent to superintend the establishment of a trade with the
white inhabitants and Indians of the region, and if the plan is
adopted, Todd is requested to give it every assistance in his
power. James, Clark Papers (I. H. Col., VIII.) , 87.
•^Todd to Clark, March 24, 1779, Alvord, Kaskaskia
Records (I. H. Col., V.), 75.
Joseph Bowman to the Chiefs of the Potawatomi, April
£0, 1779. James, Clark Papers (I. H. Col., VIII.) , 311.
3Todd to I'leming, August 18, 1779. Alvord, Kaskaskia
P.ecords (I. H. Col., V.), 110.
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whole situation, from the viewpoint ox the Indian, was well
summed up in a speech delivered by representatives of certain
tribes in conference with De la Balme at Port Pitt in the sum-
mer of 1780: "If our father is allied to the Americans, why do
these allow us to be in want of everything; must we die to-
gether with our wives and children while rejecting the offers
which the English make to us; we do not like them; we are ready
to strike, but our urgent needs will finally force us to lend
an attentive ear to their proposition, if you remain obstinate
in still refusing the help v/hich is absolutely necessary to us
now. The wild animals which ought to nourish us and procure
for us, by the exchange of their skins, clothing to which we
have been accustomed, are much more wild than they were before
we made use of fire-arms. We arc in need, therefore, of powder,
of weapons, of traps, instead of the burning liouors v/hich kill
our young people, for thai is all that is furnished to us.
Last year they made us a thousand promises at Philadelphia,
now these are not even thought of. On the one hand we are for-
gotten, abandoned; on the other hand we are solicited and at
times threatened by the English; in such a situation what can
we do, what ought we to do?"* Indeed, the situation from the
standpoint of the Americans seemed almost hopeless. Thomas
Jefferson wrote Clark that he saw no objection to allowing the
British to trade with the Indians and supply them with those
De la Balme to Luzerne, June 27, 1780, Alvord, Kaskas -
kia Records, (I. E. Col.,V.), 164.
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goods which the Americans were unable to furnish, provided
they should not reouire anything from the savages which might
lead them to abandon their neutrality. If the British were
unwilling to come to such an arrangement, the Indians should
be urged to break off relations with them and have nothing to
do with their agents and traders. Pie was of trie opinion that
it would be well to explain frankly to the Indians that the
Americans were v/ithout goods and assure them that as soon as
peace should be concluded, the trade would be placed upon a
more satisfactory basis. Lleanwhile , he felt that the Americans
must endeavor to supply th.em with ammunition, in order that
they might be able to carry on their hunting and clothe them-
selves with skins.- Jefferson could not have been well acquain-
ted with the management of Indian affairs, or he would have
realized the impossibility of retaining the political attach-
ment of the Indians while depending upon the British to supply
their trade necessities. It was out of the ouestion to estab-
lish Indian relations upon any such comfortable and satisfac-
tory footing. The Americans were thus seriously handicapped
in their efforts to gain the friendship of the Indians by the
same lack of merchandise which had so hampered their efforts
at the beginning of the war.
Clark himself made every effort to conciliate the
northwest tribes and win them over to the American cause, and
held councils which were attended by considerable success.
^"Jefferson to Clark, January £9, 1780. Alvord,
llaskaskia Records (I. K. Col., V.), 148.
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The capture of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton at Vincennes in
February of 1779 further increased the "orestige of the inva-
ders among the Indians, and Clark declared that American in-
fluence was soon extended almost to the walls of Detroit. The
French merchants were of considerable assistance in this re-
spect, for they worked among the Indians through their trading
correspondents, who persuaded several tribes to come to Cahokia
to make peace. The success of Clark's effort was only tem-
porary, however. The ruin of the trade of the Illinois country
and the general chaos which ensued under the government of
Virginia operated more or less indirectly to destroy the in-
fluence which had been gained at the cost of so much trouble
and a number of the tribes which had formerly been friendly
became hostile to the Americans.
The merchants and traders of the Illinois country
were generally well-disposed toward the Americans and gave
them much financial ascistance. Large Quantities of supplies
and credit were advanced to Clark T s government, and without
this help, the position of the Americans would have been pre-
2
carious indeed. Notwithstanding the timely aid which they
rendered, these merchants suffered severely as a result of
Clark's occupation. Commercial intercourse between L.askaskia,
Clark's Memoir, 1775-1779. James, Clark Papers (I.
H. Col., VIII.) , 242. Letter of Clark, June 26, 1783. calen -
dar of Virginia State Papers
,
IIL, 501.
^Hurray, La Croix, Gratiot, and LIcCarty were among the
merchants of the Illinois country who gave assistance to Clark's
government. Aid was also rendered by merchants and traders
residing at Vincennes and St. Louis. Alvord, Cahokia Records
(I. H. Col., II.), li.
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Cahokia, and Vincennes, and the British posts of Detroit and
lfiehillimackinac was interrupted, rendering it impossible to
obtain merchandise from the British ouarter, while delay in
fettling the accounts of those who had advanced supplies to
the invaders also added to the general business depression.
As a result of the disorder and impositions from which they
suffered under the government of the Virginians, several of
the French traders migrated to Spanish territory, among them
being Gabriel Cerre" and Charles Gratiot.-*- There was a good
deal of dissatisfaction among those who remained, some of
whom, it appears, would have welcomed a return to the British
flag. Lieutenant Governor Sinclair of kichillirnackinac sent
out agents in the summer of 1781 who were probably instructed
to negotiate some sort of a trade agreement with the inhabi-
p
tants of the Illinois country, but the plan miscarried. The
dissatisfaction of the traders of this region, due to the loss
of their commerce, continued after the close of the Revolution
Letter of Clark, June 26, 1783. Calendar of Virginia
State Fapers
,
IIL, 501; Alvord, Cahokia Records ( I . H. Col., XL],
n. lxxxiii; Gratiot drew his supplies from the firm of David
McCrae and Company. When he arrived in the Illinois country,
he found the Americans in occupation, but remained, carrying
on his trade, apparently by way of St. Louis, nis remittances
to the firm which he represented were interrupted, to its no
little anxiety. On one occasion he attempted to send a boat
load of furs and provisions to Prairie du Chien to be disposed
of, but the cargo was seized by an officer of the Canadian In-
dian department. Memorial of John Kay and David McCrae, Novem-
ber 12, 1780, Michigan Pioneer and His torical Collections , Z,
446.
2Girardin to Sinclair, November 3, 1781, Alvord,
Cahokia Records (I. H. Col., IL.) , 559.
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and was the occasion of memorials to Congress. It may be
truthfully said that the ruin of the trade of the Illinois
country which attended the occupation by the Virginians direct-
ly prepared the way for the British trade monopoly which was
extended to that region by the merchants of Michillimackinae
after the Revolution.
Attention has thus far been confined to the efiect
of Clark's invasion upon trade conditions in the region actual-
ly occupied by the Americans. Its influence upon the commerce
of the country which remained under jritish control was no
less marked. General Ealdiraand, who became governor and com-
mander in chief in 17 78, was confronted with the difficult
task of protecting the Greet Lakes' region from invasion while
at the same time preserving the fur trade so far as possible.
The problem was rendered even more complex owing to the fact
that the security of the posts depended in large measure upon
the friendship of the Indians, which in turn depended upon the
maintenance of the trade. Clark's efforts to secure the al-
liance of the northwest tribes have already been noted. The
British on their side exerted every effort to retain the good
Will of the savages, and in the various councils which they
held, threats were mingled with persuasion. Some of the argu-
ments employed by British officers are of interest in that they
reveal the important relation between Indian trade and politics.
Several tribes living in the Wisconsin country visited the post
of Michillimackinae in the autumn of 1778. Before their de-
parture, Major De Peyster, who was then lieutenant governor,
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gave them a belt which he reouested them to carry through the
different villages of the nations living under the protection
of the British. He urged them to remain quietly at home and
have no dealings with the "rebels" and particularly enjoined
them not to injure British traders. Should they misbehave dur-
ing the winter, he threatened to send back every canoe load of
traders' goods to Montreal the following season. This argument,
he said, had considerable force with the Indians. He also im-
pressed it upon them that the Americans were in no position to
supply them with the- goods which they needed, in which state-
ment he was indeed not far from the truth. The attitude of the
Sauk and Fox tribes caused considerable anxiety late in 1778
and in 17 79, when it was feared that Clark would move against
the posts on the Lakes. One Gautier was sent to them as an
agent in order to secure their attachment if possible. They
were inclined to make light of his threats to shut off their
trade if they continued to hold intercourse with the Americans,
De Peyster, however, who was in a position to know Indian
nature, expressed the opinion that they would view the situa-
o
tion differently if their trade were actually discontinued.
In the summer of 1779, representatives of a number
of tribes living in the vicinity of i/iichillimackinae visited
Quebec, and Haldimand warned them that unless they made an
efiort to keep their country clear of Americans, he would
-^De Peyster to Haldimand, September 21, 1778, Llichi -
gan Pioneer Collections
, IX, 371.
2Same to same, May 13, 1779, Liichigan Pioneer Collec -
tions, IX. 381.

deprive them of all trade; for he was not going to allow his
people to go into the Indian country unless they could do so
in safety, ^ But if a threat to stop the trade was an effective
argument with the Indians when they became restive, it was no
less important that friendly tribes should not suffer too much
from restrictions necessitated by the war. The Indians fre-
auently asked that traders be sent among them and to have re-
fused their reoueets without some good reason which could be
appreciated by the savage mind would have been the surest way
of alienating their friendship.
^
If the maintenance 01 the i'ur trade was essential
from the standpoint of Indian diplomacy, there were on the
other hand elements in the situation which rendered the very
existence 01 this commerce a menace to British authority in
the Great Lakes' region. The French traders in the Illinois
country, as has already been indicated, had taken the side of
the Americans, almost to a man. It was natural that the atti-
tude of those who still remained subject to British authority
in the Uoper Country should have been a source of much anxiety.
The;/ lived in considerable numbers at the posts and were also
scattered throughout the interior, where they exercised great
influence over the Indians, and the British colanders needed
to exert the utmost vigilance in order to prevent them from
Speech to the Indians, July £, 17 79. l.lichigan
Pioneer and Historical collections
,
XIX, 444.
pSee, for example, Be Peyster to cine lair, .-..eptember
17, 1780, Michigan Pioneer Collections, IX, 617.
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spreading treasonable reports among the tribes which were
wavering in their loyalty.-1- There v/as also grave danger that
in case the Americans were to attack either Detroit or Llichilli
mackinac, the French traders would themselves rise against the
garrisons,^ though there was on the other hand some reason
to expect that their business connections with Llontreal might
3
nrevent them from undertaking hostilities against the British,
Another source of danger was the possibility that
goods might be carried to the Americans in the Illinois country
under the guise of the fur trade. Large quantities of ammuni-
tion and merchandise were annually carried into the Indian
country, and there was considerable apprehension lest some of
these supplies might reach the Americans by accident or other-
wise. At first glance it v/ould appear as though the amount of
ammunition or other goods which might fall into the hands of
the invaders would be so small as to be of liutle consequence.
^"It is doubtful whether the traders actually drawing
their supplies from the 3ritish posts carried on any very con-
siderable intrigues among the Indians but the activities of
those living in the region occupied by Clark caused much ap-
prehension. Clark himself speaks of the effective aid rendered
by French traders in securing the friendship of the Indians.
See ante, p. 63 ; De Peyster to Haldimand, June 27, 1779, Llay 17
1780, August 31, 1780, Michigan Pioneer Collections
, 3X, 389;
X., 395, 424.
2Michigan Pioneer Collections
,
IZ, 367.
3De Peyster to Haldimand, May 13, 1779. MioMgfua
Pioneer Coll ections
,
IX, 381. Sinclair compelled all traders,
British and Canadian, who resorted to the post of Michilli-
mackinac, to take an oath of allegiance before going into the
Indian country. Sinclair to Brehrn, October 7, 1779, ibid . , 526.
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It should be remembered, however, that the forces of both sides
in the Northwest were comparatively small, Clark's army of oc-
cupation numbering but two hundred men. To a force of that
size, a very few canoe loads of goods would be of the utmost
8ervice. Guns and ammunition were the most important articles
employed in the fur trade and the Americans would of course
welcome an opportunity to secure supplies of this sort. The
British commanders also feared that any accumulation of mer-
chandise at the posts in the Upper Country might lead to an
attack by the Americans.^
This situation rendered it necessary to subject the
commerce of the Great Lakes' region to most stringent regula-
tion. Early in 1778, even before Clark's expedition, Lieuten-
ant Governor Hamilton considered it advisable to call in the
traders from Sandusky, because he suspected they were communi-
cating with the Virginians. He proposed to allow only respon-
sible persons to go out among the Indians "and gradually to
withdraw all petty traders from every post as a trifling ad-
vantage or a scurvy bribe can generally purchase their sordid
souls." Carleton's order of 1777 prohibiting all vessels save
those armed and manned by the crown has already been mentioned.
This policy of prohibiting the navigation of the lakes by pri-
vate vessels was continued throughout the war. Governor Haldi-
mand also exercised great care in granting passports for the
"^Haldimand to Bolton, December 25, 1778, Michi gan
Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XIX, 367.
^Hamilton to Carleton, April 25, 1778, Michigan Pioneer
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transportation of merchandise to the Upner Country and British
officers had orders to be on the alert when there was any doubt
as to" the ownership or destination of a cargo of goods,"'"
Hamilton's unfortunate expedition to Vincennes, to-
gether with the uncertain state of affairs in the Upper Country,
led Haldimand to defer the granting of passports for the trade
in the spring of 1779. ^ Commanders at the upper posts had orders
to stop any trader attempting to pass without a license and
seize his goods, in accordance with the provisions of the or-
dinance of 1777. The instructions were rigidly enforced in
the case of one Joseph Ho?/ard, a merchant who arrived at Llich-
illiraackinac without a pass in the spring of 1779. These re-
strictions, however necessary they may have been from the mili-
tary standpoint, were nevertheless attended by serious incon-
venience to commerce. Jhe merchants trading to the northwest
of Lake Superior were accustomed to send provisions in sailing
vessels to the traders and engage's living in that region; but
the regulations concerning the navigation of the lakes made
this exceedingly difficult to do.^ The merchants of Detroit
Collections
,
IX., 433; Hamilton to Haldimand (undated), ibid., 468;
same to same, September 16, 1778, ibid . , 476.
^-Haldimand. to Bolton, December 25, 1778, Michigan
Pioneer and Hjsto rical Collections
,
XIX, 367.
^Haldimand to De Peyster, April 18, 1779, l.iichigan
Pioneer Collections
, IX, 357.
3
De Peyster to Haldimand, June 14, 1779, Ilichi gan
Pioneer Collections
,
IX., 383.
Petition from the IlorthWest Traders, May 11, 1780,
Canadian Archives Report
, 1888, p. 51. Haldimand to Brehm, May 7,
1779, I.li c hi gan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XIX, 403.
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also complained of the delays which they suffered from the
transportation of their goods in the King's ships. Military
store's took precedence over merchants 1 goods , with the result
that the latter accumulated at the carrying places at Garleton
Island or Niagara where they were exposed to the weather and
occasionally stolen. ^ While Haldimand regarded the safety of
the posts as of more importance than the welfare of the fur
trade, still he granted the merchants such liberty as was not
inconsistent with military necessity and sought at all times to
obtain accurate information concerning the general character
of the trade, in order that it might be hampered no more than
2
was absolutely necessary.
When the V.est became the theater of military opera-
tions, the commandants at Detroit and Michillimackinac were
obliged to exercise the greatest care in granting permission
to go out into the Indian country, in order to prevent the
savages from being tampered with and to keep traders from re-
sorting to the enemy. As soon as news of the American invasion
of the Illinois country reached Lieutenant Governor De Peyster
at Michillimackinac, he ordered the traders who were cescending
the Mississippi to turn back. Commerce with the Illinois
^"Petition of the Merchants of Detroit, January 5,
1780, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , XIX, 492.
2See report of Charles Grant, dated April £4, 1780,
drawn up at the request of Haldimand and describing the trade
of the U^per Country. Canadian Archives P.eport , 1888, p. 59.
Lieutenant Governor Sinclair, commandant at Michillimackinac,
appears to have had but little sympathy with the representations
of the merchants and traders, most of whom he regarded with dis-
trust. Sinclair to Haldimand, (undated), Michigan Pioneer Col -
Continued on next page.
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country was of course shut off altogether while that carried
on in the region of the upper Mississippi was greatly restric-
ted. Writing in August of 1780, Lieutenant Governor Sinclair
said that he should be obliged to prevent anyone from going into
the country south of Lake Superior for some months, in order to
prevent disaffected Indians from being supplied with goods.
The following spring, Haldimand considered it practicable to
relax a little from the strict regulations of the preceding
year and instructed Sinclair to further the trade to the North-
west by way of Lake Superior so far as possible. The comman-
dant was to continue to use his own discretion with regard to
granting permission for the Mississippi trade. * Equal care was
necessary in the country dependent upon Detroit. De Peyster.,
lections
,
IX., 562; Sinclair to tfrehm, May 29, 1780, ibid . , 552.
^De Peyster to Haldimand, October 7, 1778, Michigan
Pioneer Collections
,
IX., 373.
Sinclair to Haldimand, August 2, 1780; Michigan
Pioneer Collections
,
IX., 570. After Hamilton's capture at Vin-
cennes, x)e Peyster was transferred from Llichillimackinac to
Detroit, while Sinclair became lieutenant governor at the latter
post •
^Haldimand to Sinclair (undated) though clearly
written in the spring of 1781. Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collections
,
X., 477. Certain Prench-Canadian traders resorting
to the post of Michillimackinac protested to Haldimand against
the partiality which they claimed was shown the traders resort-
ing to the northwest of Lake Superior. It is apparent from
this memoriali which was probably drawn up in 1780, that there
was some feeling still existent between the Prench, and the
English and Scotch traders. "Plan d'un iiemoire a presenter a
Son Excellence par les Voyageurs Canadiens dans la partie ^u
Sud des Pais d'En haut," Canadian Archives, series B, vol. 99,
p. 173.
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who had been transferred to that post after Hamilton had come
to grief at Vincennes, proposed in 1780 to recall all but one
trader from the Miami Indians, the favored individual who was
to remain being one Beaubin "whom the people of Post Vincent
wish to hang.""*- In spite of the restrictions which were con-
sidered necessary, it v/as constantly recognized that the In-
dians could not be entirely deprived of their trade without
danger of losing their friendship. The necessity for some
means of controlling the activities of those going into the
Indian country led to the establishment of a general store at
KicMllimackinac on July 1, 1779, Persons properly qualified
to carry on the trade of the interior were chosen by the mer-
chants subject to the arroroval of the commandant at the post.
The nlan seems to have been successful, for De Peyster said
that it enabled him to send out of the Indian country all un-
reliable traders, including those who failed to pay their debts
and were suspected of wanting to go over to the Americans.
Aside from the restrictions which were imposed by the
British officers commanding in the Upper Country, the outbreak
of hostilities and the disorder and confusion which followed
had a very direct influence upon the fur trade. Both sides
"^De Peyster to Haldimand, November 16, 1780. Michi -
gan Pioneer and Historical Collections
, X* 449.
In 178C, Be Peyster gave it as his opinion that un-
less the Potawatomi were given traders, they would either be-
come estranged from the 3ritish or else become a burden to the
government, Le Peyster to Sinclair, September 17, 1780, Michi -
gan Pioneer Collections
, I&* 617.
^Articles Relative to the Bstablishraent of a General
Store at Michillimaekinae f July 1, 1779, Mich ;.gan Pioneer and
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organized war parties and raiding expeditions In which they
enlisted the aid of the savages. 'Jhis circumstance very mater-
ially afiected the trade, inasmuch as the Indians refused to
hunt while at war and depended upon the government for sub-
sistence. Haldimand even complained that they desired to pro-
long the strife in order that they might continue to live in
indolence. ^ The part played by the traders themselves in the
forest warfare of the revolution is not without interest.
Possessed of great influence among the Indians, their assis-
tance was indispensable to the carrying out of the minor ex-
peditions which the Americans and British organized from tine
to time, while their adventurous lives admirably fitted them
for the guerilla warfare which played a prominent part in the
Revolution in the West.
It will be impose ible even so much as to mention all
the raids, participated in by Indians, traders, and militia,
which harried the Northwest during the closing years of the
..evolution. One or two of the more important expeditions de-
serve mention, however. Spain had declared war on Great Bri-
tain on May 8, 1779, and the following year, Lieutenant Governor
Sinclair organized two bands, one of which was to descend the
Lliseicsippi and capture St. Louis, while the other was to
Historical Collections
,
X, 305; Le Peyster to Haldimand, Octo-
ber 5, 1779, ibid . , Ii, 398.
Le Peyster to Haldimand, June 1, 1779, Michigan
Pioneer Collections, IX., 383; Haldimand to Germain, September 17,
1780, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , X* 431.
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invade the Illinois country "by way of Chicago. The traders
resorting to the Mississippi country were active in assembling
the Indians while a great many of them also accompanied the
expedition themselves, along with their engage's. Sinclair
hoped that the reduction of the Spanish post at St. Louis would
throw the rich fur traffic of the Missouri country into the
hands of the British, and he held up this prospect before the
traders in order to induce them to take part in the expedition.
All those who should assist in the capture of the enemy posts
and in garrisoning them throughout the winter, he proposed to
reward by granting a monopoly of the trade of the Missouri,
and he promisee to forward their canoes from Michillimackinac
•
Sinclair likewise expected that the prospect of the booty to
be captured at St. Louis, as well as the memory of injuries
which the traders had sustained at the hands of the Spaniards
in upper Louisiana would furnish an additional incentive.*' 2he
attack on St. Louis was a failure and the expedition which
invaded the Illinois country met with no better success. though
the outcome was disastrous from a military standpoint, Sinclair
professed to see certain minor benefits resulting from the ex-
petition. In the first place, the Indians taking part were
"hvinsor, narrative and critical History of ^merica , VL,
738. Sinclair to Haldimand, February 15, 1780, Michigan Pioneer
Collections
,
IX, 544; Sinclair to Jrehm, February 15, 1780, ibid .
,
54£; Sinclair to Haldimand, February 17, 1780, ibid . , 546. This
expedition was to cooperate with a .British force which it was
planned should ascend the Mississippi from New Orleans and
formed part of a general scheme to wrest control of the river
from the Spaniards.
p
Sinclair to Haldimand, February 17, 1780, Kiel igan
Pioneer Collections
,
IX., 546; same to same, Hay £9, 1780, ibid. , 549.
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thereby more firmly attached to the British cause. 1'hen too,
the traders who refused to aid in the enterprise could no longer
find fault with the restrictions to which they were subject,
so long as the enemy occupied the Illinois country, The last
was apparently a rather important consideration in the ej/es of
the commandant, who was annoyed by the importunities of the
traders who desired permission to go into the interior.
-
The region south of the Great Lakes was the scene
of various raids in 1780 and 1781. A detachment from Illinois
and Tincennes under De la Balme sacked the trading post on the
Miami in the fall of 1780 but was shortly afterward attacked
and defeated by the Indians living in that quarter. A few days
later, a party of Cahokians under Jean Baptiste Hamelin fell
upon the British post of St. Joseph's and started back to the
Illinois country with some fifty bales of goods and several
captured traders. Lieutenant Lu Quindre who had been stationed
in that quarter by Le Peyster, gathered the Indians in the
vicinity and started in pursuit of the Cahokians. The marauders
were overtaken and the captured traders recovered, along with
their merchandise. To General Haldimand the incident simply
furnished one more proof of the undesirability of allowing goods
to be carried into the more remote parts of the interior, where
they could not be urotected by 3ritish troops. This was in
fact just the sort of occurrence that the severe regulations
complained of by the merchants were designed to prevent.*^
^Sinclair to Bolton, June 4, 1780, ilichigan Pioneer and
Notes 2 and 3 on next uage.
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This raid ras the fore-runner of a more pretentious
expedition, participated in by Spaniards and Cahokians, which
plundered St. Joseph's in February of 1781. A number of traders
V7ere again captured and their merchandise divided among the
Indians living in the vicinity. Du Quindre endeavored to re-
peat his previous exploit, but the Potawatomi refused to move
and the invaders made good their escape. Whatever may have
been the object of the expedition, the British regarded the
event simply as an irritating occurrence, of importance only
in its relation to trade and Indian affairs.^ In a council
held the following month at Detroit the Potawatomi endeavored
to explain to De Peyster their conduct in allowing the enemy
to plunder the post. The commandant adopted a stern attitude
toward them, reminding them that he had often spoken on the
subject of their traders and the goods entrusted to their care.^
Historical Collecti ons , XIX, 529; Sinclair to Ealdimand, July 8,
1780, Michigan £ ioneer Collections , IX, 558.
p
De Peyster to Powell, November 13, 1780, Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collecti ons
,
XIX, 581.
Wisconsin his torical Collections
,
XVIIL, p. xxi;
Missouri His torical Review
,
April, 1908, p. 205; ±)e Peyster to
Powell, January 8, 1781, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collec-
tions
,
XIX., 591; Haldimand to De Peyster, April 10, 1781, ibid .
,
X, 465.
•
^Missouri his to rical .-.eview
,
April, 1908; Be Peyster
to Powell, March 17, 1781, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Col-
lections, XIX., 600. Jor a discussion of the origin and motives
of the exnedition, see also, Missouri Historical Review, July,
1911.
Indian Council at Letroit, March 11, 1781, Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections, X., 453.
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Then the Potawatomi a little later requested traders, Haldimand
instructed Sinclair to use his own discretion in the matter, but
to inform them that if they again allowed those who came to them
to "be pillaged, their commerce would be discontinued.^
It is rather difficult to say precisely what effect
the v/ar had upon the volume of commerce in the Great Lakes'
region. Returns of the licenses issued during the years from
1777 to 1785 show some variations that are of interest, however.
So far as may be judged from the quantity of goods transported
to the Upper Country, the high water mark of the trade during
the period of actual hostilities was reached in 1778. In that
year licenses were issued for 152 canoes and 574 bateaux, with
goods valued at L191,015 currency. This was a considerable
advance beyond the record of the preceding year, when 155
canoes and 512 bateaux departed for the Indian country with
goods to the value of £176,665. The year 1779 saw a tremendous
decline in the quantity of merchandise sent to the Upper Coun-
try. Passes were granted for but seventy-seven canoes, with
cargoes valued at 141,355. Clark's invasion of the Northwest
was responsible for the iron-clad regulations which were the
cause of this decline. Returns for 1780 are lacking, but those
for the ensuing three years show a steady annual increase in
the volume of commerce. The value of the goods sent up from
Montreal in 1785 was greater than for any other year of the
Ealdimand to Sinclair, May 51, 1781, i.Iichi gan Pioneer
and Historical Collections
,
X, 486.
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war for which returns are available. The cessation of hos-
tilities and the prospect of an early peace were largely re-
sponsible for this increase."'"
The returns of furs exported from the province of
Quebec during the Revolution bear little relation to the amount
of merchandise sent up from Montreal, nor do they reveal any
fluctuations which can be traced to the varying fortunes of war.
There is no indication that the fur traffic as a whole suffered
greatly from hostilities, for the returns from 1775 to 1783 are
uniformly greater than for the seven years which preceded the
Revolution. In spite of the disorganization of trade which
Clark's invasion necessarily occasioned, the commerce of the
Great lakes' region does not appear to have suffered material
injury, if the returns of furs exported to Great Britain are
any indication of the true state of affairs.^ It is certain,
however, that the returns would have ben larger if the country
had remained at peace. Clark's invasion drove the British
traders back toward the military posts in the Great Lakes'
Returns of Indian Trade Licenses . It is probable
that the valuations given in these returns are in pounds, Hew
York currency.
p
These returns, however, include the peltry gathered
in the country northwest of Lake Superior, which v/as unaffected
by the war. Then, too, it must be remembered that prior to the
Revolution, many furs from the Great Lakes' region found an
outlet by way of Schenectady and Albany and were carried to
Hew York. The war diverted all this trade through Montreal,
'••'hich may to a certain extent account for the large returns
from the -province of Quebec during this period.
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region and, as has been pointed out, the disorder which ensued
necessarily had its effect upon the commerce of the region.
Even the ruin of the trade of the Illinois country, however,
was not a dead loss to the British inasmuch as a considerable
part of it had found its outlet in the Spanish market at New
Orleans. The trade appears in fact to have suffered more from
the precautionary measures adopted by the British than from
actual hostilities. Though the returns in peltry would doubt-
less have been larger if there had been peace instead of war,
it is at the same time true that British commerce in the Great
Lakes' region did not languish. In fact, this period saw the
origin of both the l.Iichillimackinac and North-US est Companies.
The British succeeded remarkably well in perform-
ing the task which confronted them in the Northwest upon the
outbreak of the Revolution. They were able to hold the posts
and the long line of communication extending from Montreal to
the Upper Country, and at the same time to preserve the fur
trade and with it the friendship of the Indian tribes. Though
the Virginians occupied the Illinois country and Vincennes,
the position of the British upon the Great Lakes was unim-
paired at the close of the war. The history of the fur trade
during the Revolution illustrates remarkably well the close
relation between Indian trade and politics. American agents
were hampered in their dealings with the savages by a lack of
goods with which to open a trade. The fact that the British
were able to maintain commercial relations with the Indians
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of the Northwest accounts in large measure for their ascendency
over them during the war and the years which followed. The
foundations of the British monopoly of the fur trade were laid
during the period of the Revolution.
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CHAPTER III.
The Treaty of 1783 .
The year 1782, in which the provisional articles of
peace were signed, saw the position of the British in the
Great Lakes' region practically unchallenged. Clark's invasion
of the Northwest had indeed threatened their supremacy in the
U'oper Country, but at no time did the authority of the Virgin-
ians extend to the lakes themselves, and Oswego, Niagara, De-
troit, and Michillimackinac
,
along with numerous lesser posts
?nd dependencies, remained under British control.! The pros-
pects of the Canadian merchants were indeed "brighter at the
close of the war than they had "been at its outbreak since
their commerce had suffered no material injury and the compe-
tition of the southern colonies was a thing of the past.-"
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
those engaged in the fur trade hoped and indeed expected that
the future position of Great Britain in the Northwest should
be determined by the military status quo as it existed in 1782.
•'"It is probable that the authority of the government
of Virginia did not extend beyond the Illinois River, or far
beyond Ouiatanon on the Wabash. There were in fact no definite
bounds to the territory which Clark may be regarded as having
occupied. Alvord, Cahokia Records
, (I. H. Col. II.), p. lii.
^In 1782, licenses were granted for 120 canoes and
250 bateaux, loaded with goods for the Indian trade valued at
£184,055, currency (v). Returns of Indian Trade Licenses . It
is very probable that the valuations given in these returns
are in pounds, New York currency.

I83
But the merchants into whose hands the war had delivered a
monopoly of the peltry trade were doomed to disappointment.
Though the Treaty of Paris did not so much as mention the fur
trade, it contained provisions which those who were interested
therein firmly believed meant their ruin. Notwithstanding the
fact that the traffic in furs was the staple commerce of the
Great Lakes' region, their interests appeared to have been com-
pletely ignored.
In the negotiations which preceded the Treaty of Peace,
political and diplomatic considerations dictated the policy of
engaged
the British ministry rather than the interests of those who were A
in the Canadian fur trade. The overthrow of Lord North and the
accession of Shelburne, who first became secretary of state for
the southern department and later prime minister, revolutionized
British policy with regard to the Americans. Shelburne desired
above all else to conciliate the former colonies and thus separate
them from Prance, to attain which end he appeared willing to make
almost any concessions which might be necessary.
Early in 1782, Richard Oswald was sent to Paris by
the ministry to sound the American commissioners with regard to
2
the basis upon which they would be willing to treat for peace.
On July 10, Franklin, who was one of the commissioners conducting
negotiations on behalf of the United States, outlined the condi-
1?hillips, The V.'est in the Diplomacy of the American
Revolution
, 216.
2 Ibid.
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tions which he "believed might be made the basis of peace as well
as of future amicable relations between the two countries. Among
the conditions enumerated as being absolutely essential to an
understanding between the United States and Great Britain, he
included the restriction of Canada to the boundaries which it had
possessed before the Quebec Act. He even went further and sug-
gested that the cession of all the northern province would be
very desirable. Oswald made no particular objection to these
proposals and caused them to be transmitted to ohelburne. A
little r?ter, in August, Franklin again urged the advisability of
ceding Canada to the United States and his arguments were so
effective that Oswald was persuaded to advise the acceptance of
his demands. Franklin pointed out that Canada was of no value
to Great Britain except for the fur trade and that it would be
the part of wisdom for the ministry to surrender any advantage
which might be enjoyed in that respect for the sals of winning
the friendship of the Americans and preventing them from forming
2
an alliance with some other nation. Even before receiving
Oswald's recommendations, the British ministry determined to
accede to the conditions which Franklin had on July 10 enumerated
as being essential to a peace. The independence of the colonies
was recognized and, while the cession of all Canada was refused,
iFitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne
,
II., 165-167; Phillips,
216,217. p
Notes of a conversation between Mr. Osv/ald and Dr.
Franklin. Lansdowne MSo. , vol. 87, pp. 183,184.
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it was agreed that its limits should be confined to what they
were before the passage of the Quebec Act.^" The ministry a
little later endeavored to stipulate that a portion of the North-
west should be reserved for loyalist settlers, but the American
commissioners would consent to nothing less than the uncondition-
2
al cession of the territory in question.
Finally, on Ilovember 20, the preliminaries of peace
betv/een England and the United States were signed. 3 The terms
of the provisional treaty are too familiar to require any extend-
ed discussion. The articles which were of most importance to
those interested in the fur trade haa to do with the drawing of
the boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi. 4 The second
article, defining the boundary between Canada and the United States,
ceded to the latter the region south of the Great Lakes including
the posts of Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, and Michillimackinac , which
had for years controlled the fur trade of the Upper Country.
Grand Portage, which was situated at the western end of Like
Superior and had become the great rendezvous of the trade to the
far Northwest, was by the terms of the treaty given up to the
'•Fitzmaurice, IL, 173; Phillips, 218. Townshend's
dispatch to Oswald outlining the concession of the ministry was
dated September 1, 1782.
"Phillips, 222; Fitzmaurice, IL, 192; Winsor, Westward
Movement
, 218.
3Phillips, 226.
For the text of the provisional articles, see Malloy,
Treaties and Conventions
, L, 580.

86
United States.'*- The eighth article provided for the free navi-
gation of the Mississippi River by both England and the United
States. This was a provision of much importance to those en-
gaged in the fur trade since the stream formed one of the great
commercial highways of the Northwest; but as nothing was said
concerning a free communication between the Great Lakes and the
Mississippi, British traders regarded this guarantee as of little
value
.
Thus the greater part of the territory dependent upon
the posts of Detroit and Michillimackinac, the trade of which
had an annual value of thousands of pounds, was given up to the
Americans. The region northwest of Lake Superior included the
most important fur-bearing area which, according to the terms
of the treaty, v/as to remain under British control.^ There were
other considerations besides the value of the ceded territory
which the merchants regarded as very closely affecting their in-
terests. By the boundary provisions of the treaty, the United
States was to be given possession of Oswego, Niagara, .Detroit,
and Michillimackinac , which guarded the routes leading from Albany
and Montreal to the Upper Country, liven the merchants who con-
^There was some ambiguity in the description of the
extreme northwestern boundary, due to lack of -accurate geographi-
cal knowledge; at the same time there was little doubt that Grand
Portage fell within American territory.
2
The country north of Lakes Erie and Ontario yielded a
good many furs but with the exception of the posts beyond Lake
Superior, the most important places of trade were within the
territory ceded to the Americans.
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fined their trading activities to the far Northwest, which still
remained under the British flag, felt that their interests were
seriously threatened because the line of communication between
Montreal and the field of their operations might be controlled by
the Americans, ^ The terms of the treaty were moreover of parti-
cular importance to the traders because of the situation of
Indian affairs. The friendship of the savages was absolutely
essential to success in the trade; and by the treaty, the terri-
tory occupied by the most important nations of the Northwest
was surrendered. If the Indians should become detached from
British influence and pass under the control of the Americans,
the interests of the Canadian merchants would be very seriously
compromised.
The general arguments for and against the proposed
boundary, as well as the position assumed by the government with
regard to the commercial considerations involved in the cession of
j
a large fur-bearing region to the United States, are most clearly
set forth in the report of the parliamentary debate on the pro-
visional articles of peace, which took place on February 17, 1783.
The opposition attacked the treaty from every possible angle and
naturally the boundary provisions contained therein were bitterly
assailed. It was pointed out that the treaty surrendered the
most valuable part of the fur trade to the Americans and delivered
the friendly Indian nations of the ceded territory into the hands
Frobisher to Mabane
,
April 19, 1784. Canadian Archives
Report
,
1888, p. 63.
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of their enemies. Lord North deprecated the surrender of the
v/estern posts, upon which such vast sums of money had been spent
and which were so essential to the control of the commerce of
the Northwest."1" The Earl of Carlisle urged that the drawing of
such a "boundary virtually surrendered all Canada to the Americans,
for of what value could Montreal and Quebec alone be, since they
were only ports for the commerce of the region which was ceded
to the United States? He pointed out that all Lake Michigan
was given up, out of which came two thirds of the fur trade of
Canada I The article stipulating for the free navigation of the
Mississippi was ridiculed because no provision was made for a
communication between that river and the Great Lakes which should
lie within British territory. Viscount Townshend declared that
the American commissioners had been too cunning for Oswald.
"Why," he asked, "could not some man from Canada, or respectable
Canadian merchant, well acquainted with the country, have been
thought of for the business which Mr. Oswald had been sent to
negotiate?
"
4
Thomas Townshend, in his defense of the treaty in the
House of Commons, seems to have correctly stated the position of
the administration when, referring to the loss of the fur trade
^•Hansard, Parliamentary History, XXIIL, 450.
2
Ibid
. ,
377, 378. The Earl of course greatly over-es-
timated the importance of the trade carried on by way of Lake
Michigan.
5
Ibid
. ,
382, 400, 451.
4 Ibid. , 391.
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complained of by the opposition, he said that while those parti-
cularly interested might raise a clamor against the treaty on
that ground, yet the interests of the whole people must be taken
into account. This indeed appears to have been the position of
the administration and of Lord Shelburne in particular. Continu-
ing, Townshend pointed out that the trade was not so greatly in-
jured by the drawing of the boundaries as some were fain to be-
lieve. Enough of Canada was left to insure the preservation of
a considerable part of the trade to England; and, moreover, the
most valuable furs came from the territory to the north of the
boundary, which had not been given up. Replying to the charge
that the treaty surrendered the posts which had been erected and
maintained at so great an expense, he declared that the building
of these forts had been one of the great follies of Lord Worth's
administration.
Lord Shelburne 's defense of the treaty is of particular
interest in any consideration of the boundaries and the fur trade.'
He argued that the commerce of the region was not worth the ex-
pense involved in retaining it. The annual value of the exports
Hansard, Parliamentary History ,, 465. with regard to
the comparative value of the trade within American territory,
anything approaching an accurate statement is impossible. James
McGill,~of^ the firm of Todd and HeGill, estimated the total value
of the Canadian fur trade in 1785 at £.180,000 currency, of which
£100,000 came from territory on the American side of the line.
There is reason to believe that this was an attempt at a reason-
able estimate. McGill to Hamilton, August 1, 17b5, Canadian
-.rchives Report ,• 1890, p. 56.
2Hansard, Parliamentary History , XXI II, 408-410.
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from England to Canada he estiinated at £140,000 sterling while
the value of the imports from Canada to England, which would of
course include all the furs which the country yielded, he placed
at only £50,000. He declared that the preservation of this im-
port of £50,000 annually cost the nation £800,000 and that he
could prove his statement by vouchers which he carried in his
pocket. Thus, he said, England would annually gain £750,000 by
the surrender of the territory against which the opposition were
crying out. The statistics submitted by ohelburne cannot be
accepted without reservation."'" He was arguing the whole question
of the treaty from the political standpoint and there is no doubt
that he underestimated the value of the fur trade in order to
strengthen his case, just as the opposition overestimated its
value. Thus Lord V/alsingham declared that England annually
shipped to Canada goods to the value of £500,000 v/hile he esti-
mated the imports from Canada to England to be nearly half that
amount. The real value of the Canadian trade was somewhere
between these two extremes. The returns of Indian trade licenses
clearly indicate that the total annual exports to Canada exceeded
1 xxm.,
Hansard, Parliamentary History
,
409 . In studying these
figures, one is almost tempted to conclude that Shelburne had in
mind only the exports from that part of Canada which had been
ceded to the Americans. But the language of his speech as reported
in the Parliamentary History leaves little room for doubt that he
was considering the trade of Canada as a whole. At least his
colleagues understood that to be his meaning. See remarks of
Lord Loughborough, ibid
.
, 423.
2 Ibid. , 383.
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£140,000, while the value which Shelburne placed upon the imports
from that province was altogether too low."*" Moreover, the com-
parison instituted between the value of the trade and the ex-
pense involved in preserving it was hardly a legitimate one, for
it is altogether likely that the prime minister made his estimate
of the expense of maintaining the western posts on the "basis of
conditions as they had existed during the war. Still, it is im-
possible to say in contradiction to his argument, that the fur
trade really was worth the expense of preserving it, without
more evidence than is available. Shelburne 's defense of that
portion of the treaty which concerned the boundaries was of a
rather superficial character and his statements should not be
taken too seriously. They were simply convenient arguments used
in an attempt to silence for the time being the opponents of the
terms of peace. It would appear on the other hand that Lord
Hawke stated the case of the administration more fairly and much
more effectively when he asked whether a monopoly of the fur trade
was after all of so much importance when it might not only cause
another war, but would be sure to alienate the people whose good
will had been purchased at the price of independence. &
Some notes outlining an argument in favor of the treaty,
found in the Shelburne papers, are of interest in this connection.
^"According to the return of licenses granted in 1782,
the value of the goods exported to the Indian country for the
?urpose of trade alone was something over £184,000 currency,
hese goods by no means included all of the exports from Great
Britain to Canada.
2Hansard, Parliamentary History
, yirm ,
:
38 9.
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whether or not they are Shelburne's own arguments they doubtless
oorae nearer indicating his true sentiments with regard to the
value of the commerce of the ceded territory than his speech in
parliament. 1 According to the brief contained in these notes,
the fur trade was an industry of a temporary nature and one in
which it was difficult to prevent competition. It would be im-
possible and absurd to endeavor to maintain any trade by means
of forts, naval establishments, or presents, particularly that of
Canada; and, moreover, no merchant would be willing to accept the
province and its trade on condition that he bear the expense in-
cidental to the war. With regard to the value of the exports
from England to Canada, the gross amount including all branches
of commerce had only been about £200,000 annually for the eleven
years preceding the war. If the amount of this outgoing trade
had increased during hostilities, it was only because of the
supplies which the presence of the army and the naval establish-
ment in the Y/est demanded. During the war, moreover, Canada was
the only channel for the Indian trade, while the restoration of
peace would open other routes through the American colonies, and
^Lansdowne MS3. , vol. 87, pp. 224, 225; 209-214.
There are two papers containing notes on the treaty, one of which
is endorsed "Particular Arguments," while the other is entitled
"Remarks on ye American Preliminaries." The latter is included
in a bundle of papers labeled "Arguments for the Peace. Notes
for a Speech." It is very likely that these are Shelburne's own
rotes. Their general import is similar to his argument in
parliament, though there is some difference in detail.
Compare this estimate with Shelburne's declaration in
parliament that the annual value of the exports from England to
Canada was only £140,000. Ante, p.90.
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whatever the boundaries of the province might be, the Indians
themselves would seek the market which they should find most
advantageous. On the other hand it was very probable that Brit-
ish traders would be allowed free access to the territory of the
United States, it being even possible that their commerce might
be carried on through the communication by way of the Hudson
River. The arguments outlined in these notes seem to have been
based upon conviction and sound judgment and are interesting
inasmuch as they serve to indicate the views of the administration
with regard to the probable future status of the fur trade under
the terms of peace.
The views of the opposing political parties with re-
spect to the boundary provisions of the treaty are quite apparent
from the debate in parliament. The opponents of the measure
pointed to the commanding position occupied by British forces in
the Great Lakes' region and denounced what they regarded as the
needless surrender of a vast territory,- the source of a rich
and profitable trade which was then flourishing as never before.
On the other hand, the government of which Lord Shelburne was the
leader and spokesman regarded the possible conciliation of the
former colonies as far outweighing any commercial benefits which
might otherwise accrue to British merchants from the ceded terri-
tory. Eis position is nowhere more clearly stated than in a
letter written years later to William Jackson, in which, referring
to the surrender of the western posts, he says, "I cannot express
to you the satisfaction I have felt in seeing the forts given up.
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I may tell you in confidence what may astonish you, as it did
me, that up to the very last debate in the House of Lords, the
Ministry did not appear to comprehend the policy upon which
the "boundary line was drawn, and persist in still considering
it as a measure of necessity not of choice. Hov/ever it is
indifferent who understands it. The deed is done; and a strong
foundation laid for eternal amity "between England and America." 1
Before the parliamentary debate took place, news of
the terms of the provisional articles had called forth vigorous
protests from the merchants engaged in the fur trade, as well
as British officers who were familiar with the region which had
been ceded to the Americans, the purpose of which was to per-
suade the ministry to adopt measures which should guarantee the
commercial welfare of Canada. In October of 1782, even before
any definite news could have reached him concerning the probable
terms of the treaty, Haldiraand sent a letter to Townshend in
which he urged that in case peace were concluded with the colon-
ies, Niagara and Oswego might be retained by Great Britain in
order to ensure control of the fur trade. Haldiraand was of the
opinion that as soon as the war was over, the Americans would
make an effort to turn the trade into the old route by way of the
Mohawk River and Albany.
The British merchants who were engaged in the Canada
"'"Shelburne to Jackson, March 5, 1727. Extract in
Fitzmaurice, Life of Sherburne
,
IL, E01, note 2.
^Haldiraand to Townshend, October 25, 1782, Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections, X. , 668.
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trade took care that the ministry should not neglect their
interests "because of any ignorance of the degree to which their
commerce would he affected by the treaty. Late in January of
1783 a memorial signed "by six merchants trading to Canada was
sent to Lord Shelburne;^- it enumerated the forts and carrying
places that were given up according to the terms of the treaty
and called attention to the fact that the article stipulating
for the free navigation of the Mississippi was of little value
"because no provision was made for free communication "between that
stream and the Great Lakes and no permission was given British
traders to land goods on either the Spanish or American hanks of
the river. The effect of the treaty they declared would he to
cut off entirely the fur trade from the province of Quebec.
At about the same time, the London merchants likewise
conferred with Oswald, who had conducted the treaty negotiations
2
on behalf of Great Britain. They made the same representations
to him as were contained in the memorial to Lord Shelburne, add-
xRepresentation of Canada Merchants to Lord Shelburne,
Lansdowne MS3. , vol. 72, pp. 459-462. The memorial was signed
by the following "Committee of Canada Merchts:" Messrs. Rash-
leigh, Strahan, Elliot, Sansom, Todd, and Paterson. The Todd and
Paterson whose names appear were probably identical with the
Montreal merchants of that name who were engaged in the northwest
trade, for the names of Isaac Todd and Charles Paterson were
signed to a memorial drawn up a few days later. They appear to
have been in England at this time, working with their London
correspondents to secure a change in the boundaries.
*An account of this interview, apparently in Oswald's
own words, is to be found in the Lansdowne MS3., vol. 87, pp.
215-218 and in the Chatham MSS. , Bundle 343. The manuscript in
the former collection bears the following endorsement: "Sundry
Observations on ye American Treaty, 6th February, 1783."
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ing that they had about £200,000 worth of merchandise in the
Indian country which according to the terms of the treaty was
left at the mercy of the Americans, inasmuch as the latter v/ould
be able to prescribe the conditions under which it should be sold.
Oswald replied that there was nothing in the treaty which could
operate to shut off the trade of the British merchants, as the
Indians might carry their furs to market on either side of the
boundary and the Americans could not prevent them even were they
so inclined. As to the carrying places which v/ere pointed out
to be within the American line, there was nothing in the treaty
which could prevent the British traders from making free use of
them. So far as the goods of the merchants were concerned, they
v/ere in no more danger than if they were in England.
Oswald's reply on the subject of the posts is of parti-
cular interest, as he seems to hint at the possibility of England's
retaining possession of them, notwithstanding the terms of the
treaty. Perhaps it will be well to quote his memorandum upon the
subject, in which he says, "The Forts are garisoned by Troops
from Quebec: being designed for the Security of the Merchandize
at those Depots, the Americans will be thankful to be saved the
Expence of those little Garrisons; and cannot grudge the benefit
of common protection to the English-or we may carry the Garrisons
to our Side the Lake or Water passage,- if we think proper to re -
move them ."1 From this statement it is clear that Oswald, at
1 Italics my own.
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least, even before the signing of the definitive treaty, regarded
the retention of the frontier posts as a possibility,
After outlining the objections of the merchants to the
treaty and his own replies thereto, Oswald continued in his mem-
orandum as follows: "In some such manner as above, I replied to
the Sundry Objections of the Canada Merchants • And I took the
liberty besides, in the way of conversation to tell them, That I
was sensible their Trade would take a different turn hereafter
—
as the peace would let in many competitors upon them, as well
Americans as English; and so as their Furs would cost them at
least 50 p cent more; As soon as it was known in America that the
War was over, and the people in Hew York & Philadelphia were sup-
plied in merchandize fit for the Indian Trade. But this was all
fair—They (the Americans) had no view to a monopoly--They could
not maintain it, any more than we could, as the Indians could go
to either side at their pleasure with as little difficulty, as
one may go out of Middlesex into Essex." Oswald reported that
the American commissioners, in all the conversations he had had
with them, professed a strong desire that friendly commercial re-
lations might subsist between the English and the Americans. He
informed the merchants that the first plan of a treaty, sent over
in October, contained a clause declaring that, with regard to com-
mercial privileges, an Englishman in America should be considered
as an American, and an American in England as an Englishman, but
that the ministry had thought proper to leave the matter to be
settled by a treaty of commerce. He showred the merchants a du-
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plicate of this original proposal, with which they professed to "be
satisfied although at the same time suggesting that Oswald carry
a memorandum stating their wishes to the American commissioners
at Paris, in order that the latter might recommend Congress to
enact measures which should ensure the safety of their property
in the Indian country. Oswald promised to take charge of their
memorandum and to call the attention of the commissioners to the
matters contained therein. He proposed, however, to make the
recommendation as coming from himself rather than from the mer-
chants, in order that the commissioners might not receive the im-
pression that the English people doubted their good faith. Oswald
says that the merchants promised to inform "the Minister," doubt-
less meaning Lord Shelburne, that they were perfectly satisfied.
The replies of both Shelburne and Oswald to these repre-
sentations served to convince the merchants that there was no
possibility of securing a change in the boundary line between the
United States and Canada. In spite of their professions to
Oswald, they do not appear to have been completely reassured con-
cerning the safety of their effects in the Indian country. Very
soon after the conversation which has just been described, a group
of merchants interested in the Canada trade met at the New York
Coffee House in London and drew up another memorial to Lord Shel-
burne."1" Along with the petition they submitted certain proposals
Canada merchants tc Lord Shelburne, February 6, 1783,
Lansdowne MS3. , vol. 72, pp. 455-458. The memorial was accompan-
ied by a paper entitled "Regulations proposed by the Merchants in-
terested in the Trade to the Province of Quebec to secure and
withdraw their property dispersed throughout that part of the
Province now about to be ceded to the United States of America."
Ibid
. , vol. 72, pp. 463-466.
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which they wished to be inserted in the definitive treaty with
the United States, or, if that were impossible, to be made the
subject of a separate treaty. The first proposal was to the
effect that the western posts should be retained by Great Britain
for a period of three years, in order that British traders might
have time to settle their affairs and withdraw their goods and
property from the Upper Country. The merchants urged this meas-
ure on the ground that if the posts were surrendered at once,
there was grave danger that the Indians, led by hope of plunder
and by a feeling of resentment toward the British for having
given up their lands, would fall upon the traders and their pro-
perty. They incidentally pointed out that on this account it
would be to the interests of the Americans themselves not to
try to take possession of the posts at once. The second article
proposed that after the withdrawal of the garrisons, both British
and Americans should enjoy equal privileges in the transportation
of goods across the different carrying places and in tne naviga-
tion of the lakes and rivers in the Indian country.
The appeals and protests of the merchants who were in-
terested in the fur trade awoke little response in Shelburne,
who belittled the importance of the ceded territory in Parliament
and evinced a strong desire to conciliate the United States,
even though to do so might involve British commercial interests
to a certain extent. He was in all probability the less dis-
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posed to give serious heed to their representations since he must
have felt that he was losing ground before the attacks of the
opposition. On February 21, four days after the debate in parlia-
ment, a vote of censure on the articles of peace was carried in
the House of Commons 207 to 190. ^he cause of the ministry was
lost and on February 24, Shelburne resigned. A few days later,
on April 2, the new ministry was called to power, the Duke of
Bedford becoming nominal head of the government, though the real
control of affairs rested with Fox and North, who became secre-
taries of state. The new ministers were men of very different
political principles from those to which Shelburne subscribed.
Lord North, in particular, had never been famed for any desire to
conciliate the former subjects of Great Britain, and it has al-
ready been noted how he protested in parliament against the sur-
render of the posts on the Great Lakes, upon which so much money
had been spent and which were so essential to the control of the
2fur trade.
The new ministry apparently listened more vvrillingly to
the proposals of the merchants interested in the Canada trade
than did that of Shelburne. Very soon after coming to power, Fox
sent to David Hartley, who was then conducting the negotiations
at Paris on behalf of Great Britain, a copy of the memorial sub-
mitted by the merchants, with instructions that the consent of
winsor, Narrative and Critical History of Amer ica , VI L,
162; Hunt, Political History of England
,
1760-1801, pp. 244,245.
2Ante., p. 88-
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1
the American commissioners be obtained if possible. These pro-
posals were practically identical with those which had been sub-
mitted to Shelburne, suggesting that the posts be retained by
Great Britain for a period of three years, and stipulating for
the free use of the water communications and carrying places after
their surrender. A third article was added, however, to the effect
that no tax or impost should be laid upon any articles passing
through the Indian country. Hartley was directed to obtain the
consent of the American commissioners to all or any of these three
proposed regulations. He undertook the negotiations in accordance
with his instructions and on June 19, delivered to the American
commissioners a series of proposals which he called "Memorandums
for the definitive treaty."^ These memoranda embodied six articles
which were to be considered with a view to incorporation in the de-
finitive treaty. Three of the articles dealt with the matters
treated of in the memorial of the merchants. They provided for
free participation in the carrying places and free navigation of
the lakes and streams along the boundary; the retention of the
posts for a period of three years by British garrisons in order to
ensure the safety of the traders and their effects against Indian
depredations; and a free and open trade in the Indian country,
1 F. 0.,
Fox to Hartley, April 10, 1783. P.R.0. A class 4, vol. 2,
p. 17.
2 FHartley to Fox, June 30, 1783. P.R.O.^ class 4, vol. 2,
p. 191.
For the text of the articles submitted by Hartley, to-
gether with the reply of the American commissioners, see Sparks,
Diplomatic Correspondence
, X t 518, 519.
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unrestricted by any duties upon the goods used therein. In formu-
lating his memoranda, Hartley went beyond what the merchants had
requested of Lord Shelburne. He added two articles which guaran-
teed to the inhabitants of the border posts the enjoyment of their
civil rights and the privilege of pursuing unmolested their
respective occupations. These articles were of course designed
to protect the merchants of Detroit, and enable them to carry on
their trade after the terms of the treaty had been fulfilled.
The American commissioners were unwilling to concede all
these demands. They agreed to the free navigation of the lakes
and rivers by the subjects of both countries, but suggested that
regulations concerning roads and carrying places, as well as the
matter of duties on goods, be left to a commercial treaty. They
would only agree to allow the posts to be garrisoned by the Brit-
ish until Congress should give notice to evacuate and send an
American force to occupy them. They agreed to Hartley's proposals
concerning the civil rights and commercial privileges to be en-
joyed by the inhabitants of the posts; but the concession was to be
temporary, only two years being allowed the merchants for settling
their affairs after they were given notice to leave. Negotiations
concerning the supplemental articles which it was proposed to in-
corporate in the treaty dragged on for another month at Paris, but
without result. Franklin and Jay, referring to this subject in a
dispatch to Robert Livingstone dated July 27, 1783, said, "And
we are of opinion, that finally we shall find it best to drop all
commercial articles in our definitive treaty, and leave every
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thing of that kind to a future special treaty, to be made either
in America or in Europe, as Congress shall think fit to order.
Thus - the question as to the status of the fur trade was left
open for future settlement.
The definitive treaty was signed September 3, 1783, its
provisions being identical with those of the preliminary articles
with the exception that the separate article relating to the
2boundary of ".-eat Florida was omitted. Two months later Hartley
submitted to Fox a schedule of the articles which had been under
consideration during the negotiation of the definitive treaty,
3but which had been left for future settlement. Three of them,
designated "P," "Q, " and "H" had to do with the questions affect-
ing the status of the fur trade which have just been discussed.
Article provided for the free navigation of the lakes and
rivers along the boundary by subjects of the United States and
Great Britain and for free use of the carrying places located on
either side the line; "Q Tt provided that all persons residing in
places within the borders of the United States which were occupied
by the British during the war, or having property there, should
remain unmolested in the enjoyment of their civil rights; "R"
was to the effect that British garrisons should be allowed to re-
^Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence
,
V,, 526.
o
For the text of the definitive treaty, see l.lalloy,
Treaties and Conventions
,
I, 586.
<* F. 0.,
Hartley to Fox, November 1, 1783. P.H.0.A class 4, vol.2,
p. 477. The articles under consideration are found in ibid., p. 481
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main in the frontier posts until Congress gave them notice to evac-
uate and American garrisons arrived in order to protect the lives
and property of the settlers against possible Indian depredations
In concluding his letter to Fox accompanying these memoranda, Hart-
ley said, "I have only one remark to add, which is, that two of
the Articles, viz Q and R, seem to require some speedy settlement,
for the purpose of giving immediate security to the persons, pro-
perties, & rights of the british merchants, now engaged, or like-
ly to be engaged in the trade to Canada and upon the waterline of
division, between the territories of G Britain, & those of the
United States. By any unnecessary delay in negotiating these arti-
cles, we may loose an opportunity of recovering very material ad-
vantages in the fur trade of Canada, and of the neighbouring
Countries.
"
Thus the definitive treaty left unsettled a number of
matters very closely affecting the interests of the merchants en-
gaged in the Canadian fur trade. it will be readily understood
that it was of great importance, from their viewpoint, that Brit-
ish garrisons should remain in control of the Great Lakes until
these matters had been satisfactorily arranged with the government
of the United States, whether the British ministry had any defi-
nite policy with regard to the northwest posts when the definitive
^The third article, Hartley said had been originally sub-
mitted by himself and agreed to by the American commissioners; but
it will be noted, however, that his proposal was that the British
should retain the posts for a period of thrje years.
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treaty was signed, it is impossible to say with authority. On
the other hand, it is extremely probable that the ministry never
for a moment contemplated the evacuation of the posts until the
status of affairs in the Northwest had been clearly defined by
treaty. In view of the critical state of the Indian situation
and the vigorous representations of the merchants concerning the
probable consequences of an early evacuation, it is practically
certain that the British government intended to retain the posts
until the security of the fur traders and their effects had been
assured. The controversy over the frontier posts which played
such an important part during the following decade may very pro-
perly be said to have had its origin in July of 1783, when it was
decided to exclude articles defining the status of the Northwest
from the definitive treaty, and to leave the matter to a commer-
1
cial convention.
Robert Hunter, one of the most prominent of the London
merchants engaged in the fur trade, makes some rather illuminating
statements in a letter to Haldimand, dated March 27, 1783. He says,
"The shamefull terms of peace that have been submitted to will
particularly affect your Province—no person had the most distant
Idea that tho Americans wou'd ask, or that we shou'd give them the
principal part with the Fur trade—as soon as this Article came to
the knowledge of the Merchants, we applied to the Ministry for re-
dress.— & have been told that the Boundary line cannot be alter 'd
—
but that an equal participation of the Lakes carrying places &c
will be allowed the British Subjects with those of the United
States— of this, however I am very doubtfull. They have also prom-
is* d that the garrisons shall not be withdrawn from the Upper Posts
for two years that the Merchants may have time to settle their
Affairs--& bring away their Effects." Canadian Archives, series B,
vol. 75-1, p. 43. Thus as early as March, 1783, the retention of
the posts was regarded as a probability, though at that time it was
doubtless expected that the matter might be settled in the defini-
tive treaty.
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Mention has been made in the preceding pages of the crit-
ical situation of Indian affairs in the Northwest , as a result of
which those who were engaged in the Canada trade manifested great
anxiety concerning the course which would "be followed by the
tribes in the Great Lakes' region when they should learn the terms
of the treaty. r^he merchants had just cause for alarm; their
goods were distributed in remote parts of the Upper Country, far
from the possibility of aid in ease of trouble. Pontiac's Con-
spiracy had taught them what to expect in case the savages should
be aroused to hostilities; in case of a general Indian war, the
situation of the larger posts themselves would be none too secure.
The Indians on the other hand had good. reason for anxiety, since
they had for years been alarmed at the encroachments of settlers
from the seaboard colonies upon their hunting grounds. The
treaty of Fort Stanwix, concluded in 1768, had been designed to
establish a modus vivendi between the Indians and the whites, and
had reserved to the former a vast area in which they were to be
allowed to live and hunt unmolested. Consequently, when rumors
of peace between tie Great Britain and the United States began
to arrive in America, the Indians at once displayed considerable
apprehension concerning their status under the new treaty. Sarly
in 1783, the Wyandot s in a speech to the commandant at Detroit
expressed the desire that if a treaty were being negotiated, they
might be remembered therein.-*- British officers realized the
"'"Indian Council at Lower Sandusky, April 19, 1783.
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , XI. , 354.
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justice of the Indians' complaints and expressed regret that Os-
wald had not been instructed to inform the American commissioners
that Great Britain had no power to dispose of the lands reserved
for the natives "by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix.^ When the Indians
heard the terms upon which peace would probably be concluded, they
felt that they were being delivered into the hands of their enemies
and the result was a wave of resentment against the British, for
whom they had fought throughout the war. 2 The ministry was fully
aware of the gravity of the situation, from the representations of
the merchants already referred to. On February 28, 1783, Townshend
instructed General Haldimand to take all necessary precautions in
order to ensure the safety not only of the officers of the Indian
3department, but also of the traders and their property.
When news of the provisional articles arrived in America,
the first task of the British was to turn the minds of the Indians
from war to more peaceful occupations. A messenger was sent to
Prairie du Chien in 1783 to endeavor to persuade the tribes in that
quarter to devote themselves to their hunting, and a trader was
4
sent down among the Wabash Indians for the same purpose.
1
Glaus to Blackburn, June 14, 1783. Claus Papers , IIL, 223.
2 Indian Council at Detroit, June 28, 1783, Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XL, 370; McKee to De Peyster,
September 8, 1783, ibid . , 385; Robertson to Mathews, September 7,
1784, ibid., 453.
3Thomas Townshend to Haldimand, February 28, 1783, Cana-
dian Archives, scries B. vol. 50, p. 117.
4P.obertson to McBeath, April 25, 1783, Michigan Pioneer
and Historical Collections XL, 360; De Peyster to Haldimand, May 3,
1783, ibid. , 363.
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Haldimand made strong efforts to allay the fears of the Indians
while awaiting the news of the definitive treaty. Sir John John-
son was instructed to send one Calve" , an interpreter in the Indian
department, with a message to the tribes in the neighborhood of
Michillimackinac
,
assuring them that the King still regarded them
as his children and allies and would continue their intercourse
with his traders. A similar message was to be carried to the
tribes dependent upon Detroit. 1 Haldimand himself assured Joseph
Brant
,
who represented the Six Nations, that their interests
2
would not be forgotten. Johnson carried a message to the Six
Nations in July, informing them that there was no intention, accord-
ing to the terms of the treaty, of depriving them of the lands
which had been reserved to them by the Treaty of ITort Stanwix; nor
did he believe the Americans would make an attempt to take their
3
hunting grounds upon any pretense of having conquered them.
Alexander McKee also delivered a message of similar import to the
4Indians in the neighborhood of Sandusky. The removal of certain
of the tribes to Canada was contemplated as one way out of the
difficulty, and Lord North authorized Haldimand to allow any
friendly Indians to withdraw from the United States and occupy
"^Haldimand to Johnson, May 26, 1783, British Museum,
Additional MSS.
,
29237, fo. 36; Claus to Mathews, July 7, 1783,
Claus Papers, IIL, 231.
2
Haldimand to Brant, May 27, 1783, Claus Papers 111,243.
Johnson to the Six Nations, July 23, 1783, Claus
Papers IIL, 245.
^Transactions with Sandusky Indians Relative to Peace,
August 26, 1783. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections ,
2X, 174 et sea,.
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lands within the province of Quebec. Prom thence it was hoped
that they might he able to hunt on their old grounds, returning
to Canada with their furs, where they might carry on a trade with
British merchants free from all interruption. 1
The summer of 1783 passed without any serious disturbance
on the part of the Indians, but late in the year, Haldimand re-
garded the situation as still critical. In a letter to Lord North
he expressed a belief that there was still danger of an Indian war.
He believed that the surest means of averting such a castrophe
would be to allow the posts to remain for some little time in the
hands of the British. He strongly recommended that the territory
reserved by the Treaty of Port Stanwix be set aside for the
Indians, that settlers from both the United states and Canada be
excluded therefrom, but that the traders of both countries be
p
allowed to go where they pleased. These three suggestions of
Haldimand 1 s, the retention of the posts for an indefinite period,
the establishment of an Indian barrier, and free commercial inter-
course with the Indians, were prophetic of British policy with
regard to the Northwest throughout the following decade and dur-
ing the negotiations which preceded the Jay Treaty.
North to Haldimand, August 8, 1783. Canadian Archives,
series B, vol. 45, p. 115.
2
Haldimand to North, November 27, 1783. Canadian
archives, series 3, vol. 56, p. 199.
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CHAPTER IV.
British Trade Monopoly
,
1783-1796.
Yfheri rumors of peace between Great Eritain and the
United States began coming to the ears of General Haldimand in the
spring of 1783 he grew more and more suspicious concerning pos-
sible designs of the Americans upon the posts and the fur trade -
his idea apparently being that the latter would endeavor to ex-
tend their authority as far as possible into the Indian country
so as to be in a position to negotiate a treaty which should se-
cure them commercial advantages in the Great Lakes' region.
Several months before the signing of the definitive articles, he
warned Major Ross, the Eritish officer in command at Oswego, to
be on his guard against attempts to gain possession of that post,
which it was to be feared the Americans would make in order to
secure control of the Albany communication to the Upper Country.^"
Though there is little indication that the United States govern-
ment was entertaining hostile designs against the posts at this
time, Haldimand 's forebodings with regard to the desire of Ameri-
can traders to enter the Northwest were not without foundation.
On August 1, 1783, three bateaux from Schenectady arrived at
Niagara loaded with rum to be traded at the upper posts, the ap-
pearance of which occasioned a vigorous protest from the merchants
at that place who saw in the event the beginning of a dangerous
3
competition."* It is hardly necessary to say that the commander
Italdimand to Ross, March 11, 1783. Canadian Archives, series E,
vol. 124, p. 83; Haldimand to De Peyster, March 12, 1783,
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XL, 351.
^Memorial of Niagara Merchants, August 1, 1 7 83. Canadian Archives,
series B, vol. 96-2. p. 365.
,
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at Niagara refused to allow these traders to proceed to the
Upper Country, and when Haldiraand learned of the event a couple
of weeks later, he issued orders to the effect that all persons
corning from the United States to treat with the Indians or to
trade with them should be turned back." In the latter part of
1783, American traders likewise appeared in the Genesee country
south of Lake Ontario, but the Iroquois residing in that region
were advised by Erant and other chiefs in the vicinity of Niagara
to have no dealings with the newcomers until peace had been con-
cluded between the Americans and the Indian nations. Meanwhile,
General Haldimand was anxiously awaiting definite instructions
from England which should determine what commercial intercourse
might be allowed between the upper posts and the United States. "'
The Americans lost not a moment in making an effort to
secure the surrender of the forts which according to the terms
of the provisional articles of peace were included within their
boundaries. In July of 1783, even before the signing of the
definitive treaty, Washington at the request of Congress opened
negotiations with Haldiraand, when General Steuben was sent to
arrange the transfer of the posts on behalf of the United States.
Haldimand refused to take any measures looking toward their
Maclean to Haldimand, August 1, 1783, Michigan Pioneer and Hist -
oric al Col lecti ons
,
XT., 158; same to same, September 13, 1783.
Canadian Archives, series B, vol. 103, p. 353; Mathews to
Harris, August 15, 1783, ibid. , vol. 128, p. 133,
^Hoyes to Mathews, January 5, 1784, Canadian Archives, series B,
vol. 103, p. 419; Mathews to Hoyes, March 29, 1784. Michigan
^ioneer and His torical Collections ; XX,, 215.
*J ef ferson in 1791 enumerated the following posts within American
territory as being garrisoned by British troops: Michilliraacknmc
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evacuation on the ground that he had received no instructions from
England1 . In the absence of any authority and especially since
the definitive treaty had not yet been signed, his action was
very proper, although it is evident that he was personally very
loath to surrender the posts to the Americans. Writing to Lord
North in August of 1783, he pointed out that the longer evacua-
tion should be delayed, the better opportunity would be given the
traders in the Upper Country to secure their property and with-
draw, while at the same time the Indians might be reconciled to the
terras of the peace, concerning which they were very indignant.
He naively assumed the position that it would be advantageous to
the Americans for the British to continue in possession for awhile,
in order to avoid the dane-er of an Indian war: but that his mo-
tives were not altogether altruistic is evinced by his calling at-
tention to the effort of the Schenectady traders to enter the
Northwest, an attempt concerning which he was the more indignant
as he believed it had the official sanction of Washington.
The first indication that the Fritish ministry had for-
mulated anything like a definite policy with regard to the question
Detroit, Niagara, Oswego, Oswegatchie, Point au Fer, and Dutch-
man's Point, ~Jef ferson'to Hammond, December 15, 1791, American
State Papers, foreign Pelations, L, 190. There were numerous
trading posts, dependencies of those above enumerated, in which
1
no regular garrisons were maintained.
-Washington tc Haldimand, July 12, 1783, Miohl gan Pione er and
Historical Coll ections, XX, 141; Steuben to" Haldimand, August 3,
1783, ibid., 161 Haldimand to Washington, Auaust 11, 1783, ibid
P
165.
~
2Haldimand to North, August 30, 1783, Canadian Archives, series E,
vol. 56, p. 135.
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of evacuating the posts appears in a letter written by Lord Sydney
on April 8, 1784, in which he expressed his approval of Haldi-
mand' s conduct in refusing; to surrender the posts to Steuben the
preceding summer and continued: "The seventh article stipulates
that they should be evacuated with all convenient speed, but no
time is fixed, and, as America has not, on her part, complied with
even one article of the treaty, I think we may reconcile it in
the present instance to delay the evacuation of these posts, at
least until we are enabled to secure the traders in the interior
country and withdraw their property.""^ It will be noted that this
decision relative to the pests was in line, not only with Haldi-
mand's suggestion of the preceding fall, but also with the
recommendations of the London merchants interested in the Canada
trade, discussed in the preceding chapter. Hartley had suggested
to Fcx, by implication at least, that before the evacuation of
the posts, some treaty arrangement should be made with the Ameri-
cans for determining the status of the traders in the ceded terri-
tcry. There appears to be no question that almost from the very
beginning, the British ministry had determined not to evacuate
the posts until a treaty had been negotiated. But in spite of the
apparent anxiety of both Haldimand and the British ministry con-
cerning the welfare of the traders and their effects in the event
that the posts should be evacuated, no effort was made to induce
those who were in the Indian country to wind up their affairs or
Sydney to Haldimand, April 8, 1784, Canadian Archives, series B,
vol. 45, p. 139.
An t
e
, p. 104.
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to prevent additional goods being sent up from Montreal. The
negotiation of a treaty would necessarily involve considerable
delay, • so there was no particular necessity for ordering the
traders to withdraw until such time as the whole matter should be
settled, there being nc reason why Great Eritain should not con-
tinue to enjoy the benefits of the fur trade so long as possible.
The fact that the Americans on their part had not fulfilled the
terms of the Treaty of Peace afforded a plausible excuse for not
evacuating the posts ; and moreover, it should be remembered that
the ministry which refused to surrender the posts in 1784 was not
actuated by the same motives and ideals as that of Lord Sherburne,
which had negotiated the provisional articles two years previously.
It was no longer a part of the policy of the Eritish government
to conciliate the former colonies.
1The practice of issuing licenses to traders, permitting them to
carry goods to posts within American territory, continued just as
before the arrival of news of peace negotiations. The value
of the goods for which passes were issued in 1783, when there
wae such great apparent anxiety concerning the welfare of the
traders, was £326,922 currency, as opposed to a little over
rl84,055 the preceding year. Returns of Indian Trade Licenses .
It would appear that Haldimand either anticipated that the
posts would be occupied by the Eritish ffer some time to come, or
else he desired to create an additional pretext for delaying
their evacuation.
& \rcLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the Eritish Debts", American
Histor ical Association Fepo rt
,
1894, p. 418.
irhile it is true that the coalition ministry led by North and
Fox had concluded the definitive treaty, still North had opposed
the provisional articles. The fact is that neither the coali-
tion ministry nor that of Pitt which followed, was so inclined
to conciliate the United States as the government of Shelburne
had been.
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Early in 1784, the Senate of New York expressed uneasi-
ness concerning the effect which the retention of the posts by
the British might have upon the trade of that state^; and in the
following March, Governor Clinton sent Colonel Fish to Quebec
to request Haldimand that as soon as instructions were received
from England, he should notify the state of New York of the in-
tended evacuation of the posts situated within its borders which
included Oswego and Niagara, the keys to the northwest fur trade.
General Haldimand, however, had no difficulty in evading this re-
quest. c One more demand was made for the evacuation of the posts
in June of the same year, when General Ifnox, secretary of war,
sent a letter to Ealdimand by Colonel Hull, who was empowered to
negotiate the transfer. 3 This demand being refused, no further
efforts were made to effect the surrender of the posts except by
diplomatic representations to the British ministry itself, which
will be the subject of a later chapter.
By autumn of the year 1784, it had become apparent to
the British authorities in Canada that the western posts would
4probably be retained for an indefinite period, and consequently
the strictest measures were taken to ensure a continuation of the
fur trade monopoly which British merchants enjoyed at the close
The Senate declared that it would be vain to hope that the posts
would protect the frontier settlements " A our Fur Trade,
which Const i tut es^Valuable Branch in our Remittances''. Answer
of the Senate of Tew ^ork to Governor Clinton's Speech, from
the Independence Gazette, January 39, 1784, Canadian Archives,
series B, vol. 175, p. 235.
CMcLaughlin, "The Western Po3ts and the British Debts", Amer ican
Histor ical Association Pen or!
> 1894, p. 415.
3June 13, "1784, Michigan Pione er and Historical Collections, XX, S30.
4nathews to ^obertsont August 13, 1784, ibid. , 343".
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cf the war. Though it is extremely probable that the Americans
looked with longing eyes upon the rich commerce of the Great Lakes'
region, from which they had been excluded for so long and which
the terms of the treaty had led them to expect would soon be opened
to them, there is on the other hand little question that Eritish
officers exaggerated the danger that their southern neighbors
might attempt to seize tire northwest posts, particularly those which
controlled the Hudson Fiver and Schenectady route to the Upper
Country. Considerable anxiety was displayed, especially in 1784
and 1785, concerning what were thought to be the sinister designs
of the Americans.* On the other hand, the Eritish precautions
are not surprising when it is remembered that prior to the Revolu-
tion the Albany and Mohawk Fiver route to the Upper Country had
rivalled the communication by way of Montreal and the St. Lawrence.
Pome persons were even of the opinion that the former route pos-
eee6ed superior advantages, since it was open to navigation in the
spring nearly a month sooner than the latter; and the belief was
expressed that if American traders were permitted to carry goods
to the Upper Country by way of the Mohawk, they might reach the
Haldimand to DePeyster, October 15, 1784. Canadian Archives, se-
ries F, vol. 65, p. 52; Haldimand to St. Leger, November 14,
1784, series Q, vol. 24-1, p. 148; St. Leger to Hamilton, Decem-
ber 2, 1784, series S, Indian Affairs; same to same, December 9,
1784, ibid. ; St. Leger to Sydney, May 7, 1785, series Q, vol.
24-2, p. 326.
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market ahead cf their Canadian rivals.
The utmost vigilance was exercised in order to prevent
merchandise from being carried into the Upper Country from the
United States either by British or American merchants, and in
1785, Lieutenant Governor Hamilton considered it necessary to es-
tablish a customs officer at Oswego to prevent any trade from be-
3
ing carried on by way cf the Mohawk River. This southern gate-
way to the Northwest remained tightly closed, and when John Long,
a Eritish trader who had operated in the Great Lakes' region for
a number of years, requested permission in the summer of 1785 to
pass the fort at Oswego with a cargo of goods obtained at New
York, he was refused and informed by the commanding officer that
he had better turn back if he wished to avoid the seizure of his
gcods. Long's own words bear rueful witness to the vigilance of
the British in watching the communication: "Notwithstanding this
friendly advice, I was determined to run the risk, and, to my
"'emoranuums of the presert Political sentiment of the United
States of America, with some remarks, on the Navigation of the
St. Lawrerce and Hudeons Rivers to the Upper Lakes, and
general Observations on The Petition for a House of Assembly
from the Province of Quebec." Endorsed, "Canada Affairs, [c.o,42,
from Major Poss,R.May 2, 17851' Canadian Archives Transcripts '
vol. 17, p. 38.
St. Leger to Sydney, May 7, 1785, Canadian Archives, series Q,
vol. 24-3, p. 326, Canadian merchants at various times at-
tempted to import goods into the Upper Country by way of the
New York communication. Undated memorandum concerning the
trade of Quebec, Lansdowne MSS., vol. 88, 1785-1789, p. 67;
Minutes of the Executive Council of Quebec, April 4, 1786,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 26-1, p. 263; Elliceto
Mathews, February 16, 1784, series B, vol. 75-2, p. 06.
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sxtreme mortification, they [his goods] were all seized by the
custonhouse officers, by them deposited in the king's warehouse,
and afterwards condemned. 1,1
Of scarcely less importance to British commerce than the
exclusion of foreign traders and their goods from the Indian
country were the measures taken to prevent furs from being sent
to the United States. The most effective of the regulations de-
signed to prevent this evil was the one which prohibited private
merchant vessels from navigating the lakes, thus compelling trad-
fters to transport their effects in the King's ships. During the
Fevolution, this rule had been enforced for the purpose of pre-
f ro-m
venting suppliee and munitions of war falling into the hands of
the enemy; now it was considered necessary in order to prevent
peltry from being carried to the American market. While the
measure appears to have been reasonably effective in preventing
the smuggling of furs into the United States, it was on the other
hand a very serious inconvenience to the trade, because the King's
vessels seldom afforded adequate transportation facilities, and
as a result, there were very considerable delays, which involved
the merchants in serious losses. Their goods often lay for months
upon the carrying places at Niagara and Carleton Island, being
Long's Journal, 1768-1782, in Thwaites, Early West ern Travels
,
IL, 312, 213.
Kaldimand to the Merchants of Montreal Trading to the Upper
Country, August S, 1784, Canadian Archives, series B, vol.
64, p. 131; "Memorandums Respecting Public Matters in the
Province of Quebec." Submitted to Lord Sydney by General
Haldimand, March 16, 1785, series Q, vol. 25, p. 295.
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sometimes delayed sc long that they could not be sent out to the
more remote trading postsuntil the following season. This aggra-
vating state of affairs was made the subject of repeated represen-
tations on the part of the merchants, particularly those who were
concerned in the trade at Detroit.^ Those operating in the region
beyond Lake Superior were likewise inconvenienced as they de-
pended largely upon provisions carried on the lakes in sailing
2
vessels. Haldimand turned a deaf ear to all requests of the
traders that they be allowed to navigate the lakes in their own
vessels, but in the summer of 1785, while he was in England, there
was some relaxation from his orders, the merchants being given
permission to carry their goods in canoes and bateaux from Montreal
to Niagara, though their ships were not allowed to sail Lake Erie.
3
x
^ee, for example, the petition of the merchants interested in
the Detroit trade, addressed to Lieutenant Governor Hay, July
15, 1784, Michigan Pioneer and Hist or ical Collections, XL, 434;
?£einorial of Merchants of Montreal to Hamilton," July 11, 1785,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 35, p. 89; Petition and Repre-
sentation of the Merchants of Detroit, July 16, 1785, Michigan
Pion eer and Historical Collections, XL, 459. The merchants
of Detroit declared that owing to the late arrival of their
goods, m-re than one thousand packs of furs which under ordi-
nary circumstances would have been brought to market at that
place, were carried to New Orleans. A
sMoGill to Hamilton, August 1, 1785, Canadian Archives Report,
1890, p. 56; McGill to Finlay, August 8, 1785, ibid . , 58;
Eenjamin Frobisher to Finlay, August 8, 1785, ibid . , 59.
^For Kaldimand's views, see "Memorandums Respecting Public Matters
in the Province of Quebec", March 16, 1785. Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol. 35, p. 395. The merchants made application to
Lieutenant Governor Hamilton for relief. Hamilton referred
the matter to the Legislative Council, which in turn left the
decision tc Erigadier General St. Leger, who was in command of
the military establishment in Canada during Haldimand's absence.
St. Leger to Sydney, May 7, 1785, Canadian Archives, series
Q, vol. 34-2, p. 336; same to same, July 35, 1785, series Q,
vol. 35, p. 156.
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The restriction imposed by Governor Carleton was not entirely-
removed until 1788, when an ordinance was passed by the Legis-
tive Council of Quebec, authorizing the merchants to transport
goods and peltry in their own sailing vessels.*
But regulations affecting navigation were not the only
measures considered necessary in order to preserve to Great Britain
her monopoly. While peace negotiations were yet in progress, the
London merchants showed considerable apprehension lest a large
share of the fur trade which was then carried on by way of Canada
should be diverted to New England and New York. It is likely
that a considerable part of the peltry obtained in the Northwest
would have found its way to the United States instead of the Lon-
don market if prompt measures had not been taken by the British.
The former colonies would have afforded a convenient and profita-
ble market as is shown by the fact that after the signing of the
provisional articles of peace, numerous requests were made for
permission to ship furs to the United States, which it is needless
to say were uniformly refused. In 1788, the Legislative Council
passed an ordinance expressly forbidding the exportation to the
United States of furs of all sorts
,
but the utmost vigilance
Queb ec Ordinances, 1787-1790, p. 45.
"Observations on the Trade which before the late War subsisted
between Great Britain and that part of North America now com-
posing the United States with such Regulations as appear proper
to be adopted for the Recovery and Retention of a considerable
Part of that Conr.erce. n Amer ican Histor ical Review, XVIII., 774.
Quebec Ordinances, 1787-1790, p. 38.

on the part of the British was necessary in order to prevent
smuggling, as the court records for the district of Montreal
indicate. 1 Considerable peltry wa3 carried south by way of Lake
Champlain, even so considerable a firm as that of Robert Ellice
and Company of Montreal being concerned in this illicit traffic.*5
Nothing will better serve to illustrate the character
of the British monopoly of the fur trade and the effectiveness
of the measures taken to preserve it, than to compare the feeble
effortsof the United States to establish commercial relations
with the Indians during the years from 1783 to 1796, with the
flourishing trade carried on by Canadian merchants in the North-
west during the same period. As ha3 been indicated, the trade
of the northern colonies was practically ruined. by the war, the
hostility of the Indians and the impossibility of obtaining suf-
ficient quantities of goods having proved an insuperable obstacle
to the maintenance of any important commerce with the savages.
The close of the Revolution found British merchants in almost com-
plete possession of the fur trade of the Great Lakes' region, a
situation which there was no indication would soon be altered,
since the route leading from New York to the Upper Country was
cut off by the British post at Oswego, while the unsettled state
"Proceedings relative to seizure of smuggled furs, King 1 8 Fench
,
Regi ster of Common Pleas , Archives of Montreal. In 1794, Lieut.
Governor Simcos declared that the smuggling of furs into the
United States was rapidly increasing. As they were largely
used in the manufacture of hats, he urged that hat manufactures
be introduced in Canada, as the only means of putting a stop
to the contraband trade. Simcoe to the Lords of Trade, Decern-
ber 30, 1794, Canadian Archives, series 0, vol. 281-1, p. 180.
^Mathews to Jordan, July 31, 1783, Canadian Archives, series B,
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of affairs in the region northwest of the Ohio prevented the
development of any extensive American trade in that quarter. The
commerce which the French inhabitants of the Illinois country
had enjoyed prior to the Revolution had been almost destroyed
during the period of disorder which had attended the occupation
of the region by the Virginians. 1 Notwithstanding the unfavora-
ble aspect of the situation at the close of the war, the govern-
ment of the United States realized the importance of trade as a
means of maintaining friendly relations with the Indians. In
1786, Congress turned its attention to the matter and an ordinance
was enacted dividing the Indian department into two districts, a
southern and a northern, the former including the tribes living
within the territory of the United States south of the Ohio River,
while the latter comprised all the remaining tribes, dwelling
north of the Ohio and west of the Hudson. A superintendent was
to be placed in charge of each district, with authority to appoint
deputies who were to take up their residence in such places as
might be most convenient for the regulation of the trade. Ey the
terms of the ordinance, the privilege of carrying on commerce
vol. 61, p. 153; Mathews to Messrs. Ellice & Co., February 2,
1784, ibid., vol. 63, p. 70; Mathews to Frobisher, May 10, 1784,
ibid .
, p. 280; Haldimand to the Merchants of Montreal, August
9, 1784, ibid . , vol. 64, p. 131; Campbell to Mathews, September
12, 1784, ibid., vol. 134, p. 355.
j-St. Clair to the President, Smith, St. Clair Papers, II., 168.
*The ordinance was passed August 7, 1786, American "State Papers,
Indian Affai rs, I, 14. A similar act was approved July 22,
1790. Though it differed in certain details from the ordinance
of 1786, the essential provisions were the same. Annal s of
Congress, 1st Cong., 2241.
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with the Indians was restricted to citizens of the United States
and no one was to be permitted to trade without first obtaining
a license.
Article 7 of the treaty at Fort Farmar, which was con-
cluded on January 9, 1789, between the United States and the
Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Sauk tribes,
contained provision for the establishment of a trade. These
Indians promised to give protection to all traders licensed to
come among them and also to have no dealings with any persons who
should come among' them without licenses. The government of the
United States had from the beginning looked forward to the estab-
lishment of commercial relations with the Indians at such time
as the posts should be surrendered by the Eritish, and at the
treaty of Fort Mackintosh, concluded between certain tribes and
the Americans in 1785, reservations of territory in the Indian
country were made, which it was intended should become sites for
trading posts and these reservations were renewed at the treaty
of Fort Harmar in 1789.
1
Though there were a few American traders scattered
throughout the country northwest of the Ohio, by far the larger
share of the trade of the region was engrossed by the Eritish, who
continued to enjoy the political ascendancy over the tribes of
this region which had been won during the Revolution. The United
States government realized that vigorous measures must be taken
in order to counteract the influence which the Eritish possessed
American Stat e Pap ers, Indian Affairs, I., 7; Winsor, Westward
Move ra en t , 368.

over the Indians by reason of their commercial ascendancy, Fash-
ington in particular emphasizing the importance of the whole
matter. In his message of November 6, 1793, he dwelt upon the
necessity of establishing a trade with the Indians upon a scale
equal to their wants and under such regulation as might protect
them from fraud, and he called attention to the matter again in
1793 in even stronger terms. He declared that next to a rigorous
execution of justice upon those who violated the law, the estab-
lishment of a commerce with the various tribes on behalf of the
United States was the measure most likely to secure their attach-
ment, and recommended that the government itself undertake the
building up of the trade, on the ground that while individuals
would not engage in it unless a profit were to be obtained thereby,
the government would be satisfied if it were merely reimbursed
for the expense incident to such an undertaking."1- Eills were
at different times introduced in Congress looking toward the estab-
lishment of government trading houses, without success; but a
step in that direction was taken in 1795, when Congress enacted
that a sum not exceeding fifty thousand dollars should be appro-
priated to the purchase of goods for the Indian trade, the mer-
chandise to be sold under the direction of the President. 3 The
trade which was opened up in accordance with this act had to be
confined to the southern tribes, however, as peace had not yet
American Stat e Papers, Fore ign Relations, I., 19, 22.
Annals of Congress , 3rd Cong. 1532.
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been established with those northwest of the Ohio and the disorder
which prevailed precluded any trade experiments in that quarter. 1
After General v?ayne had succeeded in breaking the power of the
Indians at the battle of Fallen Timbers, he emphasized the neces-
sity of measures providing for the Indian trade in the strongest
terms, declaring that the Eritish would retain their ascendancy
over the savages until such time as the United States should estab-
lish trading houses, by means of which they could supply them with
goods with as much facility and at as reasonable rates as their
rivals. The forts which the Americans had built in the course
of the recent campaign against the Indians would be convenient
for the establishment of the proposed trading houses; and if in
addition, posts were built at the mouth of the Miami and at San-
dusky, he believed that the same degree of influence as was then
possessed by the British could be obtained by the Americans. Con-
tinuing, with regard to this matter, he said:
"If my recollection serves me, the President has, more
than once, recommended this measure to the serious attention of
Congress; and without it is adopted, we can never expect a perma-
nent peace with, or fidelity from the Indians.
"
"Could I, with truth and propriety, pledge myself to the
hostile tribes, that this measure would be adopted, and that they
would, with certainty, be supplied in this way, in the course of
the ensuing spring, as well as in future, I am confident we should
draw them over to our interest, notwithstanding every effort of
^Report of the Secretary of ^"ar on the measures taken for opening
a trade with the Indians, December 12, 1795, Amer ican State
Papers
, Indian Affairs, I., 583.
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the British to prevent it; In the negotiations between General
Wayne and the Indians preceding the treaty of Greenville, there
were frequent references to commercial matters. Wayne promised
the Indians that measures would be taken to supply their wants,
o
for which they expressed their thanks.
Finally, in 1796, Congress consented to try the plan
which had been repeatedly urged by both Wayne and Washington and
passed a bill providing for the establishment of trading houses
3
among the Indians. Those who favored the measure commented upon
the little headway which American merchants had succeeded in making,
handicapped as they were by competition with the powerful com-
panies of Canada and due also to the fact that there were so many
opportunities for speculation in the United States that individuals
were unwilling to enter upon the Indian trade, where they were at
such a tremendous disadvantage. Governmental participation in
the trade was considered necessary in order to gain the friendship
of the Indians and deprive the British of the ascendancy which
they enjoyed and which the Americans feared might be again used to
arouse the northwest tribes to hostilities. 4 The enactment of
J^ayne to the Secretary of " Tar, December 23, 1794, ibid. , L, 548.
^American State Papers
,
Indian Affairs
,
L, 578.
3Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 3889.
4 Annals of Congr ess, 4th Cong., 239-233. It is exceedingly diffi-
cult to form anything like a correct estimate of the volume of
trade carried on by the Americans in the Northwest bstween 1783
and 1796. Some furs were used in the manufacture of hats in cer-
tain states along the Atlantic seaboard, some of which, however,
may have been smuggled in from the Great Lakes. A small amount
of peltry was also exported from New York and Pennsylvania
during this period. Ibi d., 3rd Cong., 478; American State Papers ,
Comm erce and Navigation," L, 160.
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the law providing for the establishment of government trading-
houses by the United States, together with the evacuation of the
posts, was the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the
northwest fur trade. It raarkedthe beginning of a struggle be-
tween the Americans and the Eritish for political and commercial
supremacy in the Great Lakes' region which did not end until after
the Tar of 1812. The relative insignificance of the fur trade
which was carried on by subjects of the United States during this
period bears witness to the strength of the monopoly which the
British succeeded in establishing at the time of the Revolution
and in holding during the years which followed.
In addition to the official measures which the British
took to ensure the preservation of their commerce, they possessed
certain other advantages over their American and Spanish com-
petitors, the first and perhaps the greatest of which consisted
in the fact that they enjoyed the friendship of the Indians, which
was always so essential to the welfare of the fur trade. Of
scar c ely less importance, however, was the inestimable advantage
of an efficient and highly developed business organization, the
product of the enterprise and ability of the merchants who had
entered Canada after the Conquest, which in itself would have ren-
dered effective competition almost impossible. But even the
British fur trade between 1783 and 1796 was exposed to many vicis-
situdes, for Indian wars, unrestrained competition, and the
uncertain state of the European market all caused those who were
engaged in it a great deal of anxiety; while there was the addi-
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tional uncertainty as to when the posts might be surrendered,
though that fact does not appear tc have deterred the merchants
from making up outfits of the usual size for the Indian country
each year.
The northwest fur trade as carried on by the British
may, when regarded as a whole, be said to have consisted of three
rather clearly defined branches; there being the part which de-
pended upon Detroit; the commerce of which Michilliraackinac wa3
the center; and the trade carried on to the far Northwest by way
of Grand Portage. It is possible, on the basis of two reports
concerning the state of the fur trade, one compiled in 1784, and
the other in 1790, to determine approximately the relative impor-
tance of the three branches which have been enumerated. 1 The report
of 1784 placed the annual value of the Detroit trade at about
£65,000; that of Michillimackinac at £64,000; while the trade to
the northwest of Lake Superior was estimated at £35,000. The re-
port compiled in 1790 valued the commerce dependent upon Detroit
at M0, 800; that of Michillimackinac at £60,400, while, the furs
annually carried in from the far Northwest were estimated to be
worth £40,000. The first report placed the value of the trade
below Montreal, together with that of the country north of the
"Canada, its Indian Trade with Observations thereon." London.
Dec. 28, 1784, Canadian Archives Transcripts, CO. 42, vol. 16,
p. 122. "Statement Concerning Trade at Detroit and Other Posts",
Mich igan Pion eer and Hist orical Collections, XXIV., 686. The
second estimate was compiled in 179^ the average annual value
of the trade for the preceding decade being the basis for the
figures quoted. These estimates may hereafter be more conven-
iently referred to as "Trade Estimate, 1784" and "Trade Estimate,
17SC". It is very likely that these reports somewhat over-
estimate the value of the commerce falling within American terri-
tory, as they were both apparently compiled with the idea of show-
ing what effect the surrender of the posts would have upon the
trade.
,
-
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lakes at 146,000, while that of 1790 estimated the furs gathered
in these regions to be worth i.S0,C0C.'5'
The area dependent upon Detroit included the territory-
south of Lake Erie; the Miami and Wabash region together with
that part of the Illinois country which was reached by way of the
Wabash; and a portion of what is now the state of Michigan. There
were posts at Saginaw and Sandusky which drew their merchandise
from Detroit, but the most valuable returns came from those on the
2Miami and Wabash Fivers. The region dependent upon Detroit,
especially that part of it lying south of the lakes, did not enjoy
great commercial prosperity during the period under consideration.
Almost immediately upon the cessation of hostilities between the
United States and Great Eritain, American settlers began pcuring
into the country northwest of the Ohio, while the Indians, alarmed
and angered by these encroachments upon their hunting grounds, re-
sieted, thus precipitating an era of war and general disorder.^
The resentment of the Indians was of course directed primarily
against the Americans, but the trade of the British merchants was
nevertheless very materially affected, as the attention of the
Indians was diverted from their hunting, while in the brawls which
were constantly occurring, British traders did not always escape. 4
Iwar and the onward march of the settler had caused the practical
disappearance of the trade formerly carried on at Niagara.
cTrade estimates of 1784 and 1790*
S^'insor, The Westward Movement
f 243; Ealdimand to Sydney, October
24, 1764, Canadian Archives, series E, vol. 58, p. 14.
4 Letter from a Mr. Park, "ay 17, 1786, Michigan £ioneer and Hist-
orical Collections, XXIV., 29.
^'
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The Indians when roused did not at all times distinguish between
the British and the Americans; and they moreover harbored a cer-
tain degree of resentment against the former for having as they
thought given their lands to their enemies. The trade of Detroit
was at low ebb during 1785 and 1766, the situation being reflected
in a letter of Alexander Henry in which, commenting to a friend
upon the bad state of affairs, he says, "I don't either prtty the
Indians nor blame the Americans, but I feel for you and my friends
at Detroit, who hats large connections in that country. The
firm of Todd and McG-ill, writing to John Askin of Detroit at about
the same time, was inclined to look with disfavor upon the trade
in that quarter, especially in the Wabash country, inasmuch as it
was feared that there would be interruptions by reason of Indian
disturbances for some time to come, a prophecy which proved only
too true.*5 Lord Dorchester gave instructions that the Indians
were to be reproached for their violence to British traders, but
3
all efforts to maintain order were practically useless. " In
1789, the Detroit trade was still in a state of decline and the
number of packs of furs which it yielded in that year was reported
to be 500 less than for the preceding year. 4 The invasion of the
Henry to Edgar, November 12, 1786. Lett ers and Accounts of the
Northwest Co., 77; see also Henry to Edgar, June 23, September
1, 1785" and March 5, 1786, Ibid.
,
65, 67, 71.
2Todd and McGill to Askin, December 20, 1786, Eurton Manuscript
Collection, vol. 1, p. 217.
"Dorchester to Johnson, November 27, 1786. Michigan Pioneer and
Hist orical Collection's, XXITC, 39.
•Richardson to Port ecus, September 23, 1789, Canadian Archives,
,r
,
852; Forsyth to Porteous, November 24, 1789, ibid.
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Miami country by General Harraar in 1790 resulted in considerable
losses to the merchants, for as the Indians retreated before the
Americans, they burned their houses along with those of the trad-
ers in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the
enemy. The Miami village was destroyed, and although the traders
living there saved most of their movable goods, their corn was
burned and they were forced to give their ammunition to the Indians;!
The situation at Detroit did not improve as time went
on, since Indian wars with their attendant confusion continued
to injure the trade and a fall in the price of furs on the London
market caused the merchants increasing anxiety. John Askin, who
was one of the most prominent merchants of that post, met with
very different success in his commercial ventures during this
period, and Lieutenant Governor Simcoe reported in 1793 that the
trade of Detroit was totally ruined by hostilities between the
Americans and the Indians. Only after Wayne* a victory over the
Indians at the battle of Fallen Timbers were peace and order fin-
ally restored to the Indian country. In addition to the Indian
wars and general chaos which prevailed in the region south of De-
troit, unrestrained competition and the consequent flooding of the country
^Letter of Major Smith, October 16, 1790, Michigan Pion eer and
Historical Collections, XXIV., 103; Extract from letter of
officer commanding at Detroit, October 16, 1790, ibid . , 104;
Major Smith to Captain Le Maistre, October 20, 1790, ibid. ,107;
Richardson to Porteous, April 23, 1790, Canadian Archives, M. S33
-Todd to Askin, August 10, 1792, Eurton Manuscript Collection,
vol. 2, p. 58; Simcoe to Hammond, August 24, 1793, Michigan
Pion eer and His torical Col lections, XXIV., 599.
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with merchandise during the years which followed the Fevolution
had a very harmful effect upon the trade, and led to the establish-
ment of the Miami Company, which will be considered in more detail
in a later chapter. The Detroit merchants were also at a certain
disadvantage because of the accessibility of foreign markets.
Traders in the Indian country who were indebted to persons at that
post for their outfits occasionally carried their furs to New
Orleans or to the American market, and thus the collection of debts
was apt to be somewhat precarious. The situation of affairs
with regard to Detroit and its dependencies during this period also
serves as a good illustration of the fact that the fur trade
was but a transitory sta^e in the industry of any given region.
Before 1800, it was coming to be apparent that the trade in that
quarter was doomed to disappear before the ever-advancing wave of
settlement, ar. outcome which Kenry Hamilton, a man of remarkably
clear perception, accurately foretold in a letter written in 1785:
"The Western Indians must in a very few Years have the
Mississipi for their Eastern boundary, in which case the Beaver,
Deer, and Buffaloeskin trade will decline so fast that it will
scarcely be an object worth attention throughout all that district
which they now occupy*- The active and avaricious Americans having
driven the Indians and exhausted the hunting Country, will become
planters-
"They must force a trade for their Lumber, Maiz, Cotton
Todd pc IfcGill to Askin, December 20, 1786, Purton Manuscript Col-
lection, vol. 1, p. 217; Dorchester to Sydney, October 14, 1788,
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 38, p. 164.
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and Tobaco~. The vast range of natural meadows which fed numerous
herds of Buffaloe,wilj furnish such an abundance of forage, that
the raising herds of Cattle will be no expence, and demand few
hands- nl
Eut if the fur trade of Detroit between 1783 and 1796
had begun to show evidences of decline, that of Wichillimackinac
during the same period was in its heyday and nothing better illus-
trates the vigor and enterprise of the Fritish merchants than the
manner in which they extended their operations during this period,
holding the field against all competitors, and even pushing beyond
the Mississippi into foreign territory. It is on the other hand
true that the Michillimackinac trade suffered from some of the
same influences which proved detrimental to that of Detroit. The
importation of enormous quantities of goods iramedialely after the
Revolution led to a state of disastrous competition which rendered
some form of cooperation imperative and the outcome was the
establishment of a General Store in 1785. This enterprise met
with rather mediocre success at the outset, due in part, it 3eems,
to the inexperience of some of the clerks employed, which involved
certain of the merchants in considerable losses. 2 The General
^Hamilton to Sydney, April 7, 1785, Canadian Archives, series Q,
vol, 24-1, p. 247. The figures in the trade estimates for 1784
and 1790 are significant in this connection. The value of the
Detroit trade in 1784 was estimated at £60,000, while in 1790
the average annual returns were placed at only £40,800.
2Jean Eaptiste Perrault, who is authority for this statement, says:
"The death of mr. patersonne, had upset the calculations of Many
Clerks, who not having sufficient Judgement, had managed their
business badly, so that the deficit was so great that Many of the
traders went into Bankruptcy, which caused such Confusion in the
affairs of The company that it broke up. " Perrault Narrative,
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Colle ctions, XXXVIL, 545.

Store was originally established for a period of but three years
but the agreement appears to have been renewed and there came
into existence the organization which went by the name of the
Mackinac Company."
The places resorted to by the merchants of the General
Store included St. Joseph's, Chicago, Milwaukee, T.a Eaye, and
Prairie du Chi en, all names famous in the history of the fur trade
besides many smaller posts of lesser renown. Immediately upon the
close of the Revolution, the traders of Michillimackinac began
to swarm like so ma,ny bees; and down they went into the Illinois
country and beyond the Mississippi into Louisiana, despite the
complaints of the store-keepers at Cahokia and the fuming of
Spanish commandants, until at length they were in possession of
virtually all the trade of the upper Mississippi Valley. Not a
moment was lost and in the summer of 1783, even before the defini-
tive treaty had been signed, a merchant named Marchessaux had
opened a trading house at Cahokia. Ey 1786, the French inhabi-
tants of that village were complaining bitterly that the merchants
from Michillimackinac had established a store which was engroesing
all their Indian trade and it was even reported that they were
considerably disaffected toward the United States for allowing
such a state of affairs to continue.
See pest.
, p. 174 eise^.
Perrault Narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections,
XXXVII., 516.
Memorial of the French faction to Congress, June 2, 1786, Alvord,
Kaskaskia Records, (I.H. Col. V), 382; Edgar to Clark, October
23, 1786, ibid., 395; Parker to St. Clair, October 2, 1787, ibid.
410.
i
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It is very probable that a majority of the goods which
were sent down to the French villages from Michillimackinac by
way of- the Chicago portage and the Illinois Fiver were not traded
directly with the Indians by Eritish merchants but were sold to
the Spaniards on the other side of the Mississippi. For example,
the outfit which Marchessaux carried down to Cahokia in 1783 was
u
sold to Auguste Cho^eau, a St. Louis merchant, who operated in
the Missouri country, the goods being furnished tc him at an
advance of 137 l/2 per cent on their first cost, payable in furs.
In April of the following spring the returns from the Missouri
came in, the British traders settled their accounts with Mr.
u -i
Cho^eau, and in May departed for Michillimackinac.- This transac-
tion is typical of the trading operations which were conducted
by the Eritish merchants in the Illinois country throughout this
entire period. They carried their goods from Michillimackinac
by way of Chicago to the region at the mouth of the Illinois
Piver, sold them to Spanish traders on the west bank of the Missis-
sippi, and carried back the furs which they received in exchange
by the same route. It is true that this was an illicit trade,
all commercial intercourse with the east side of the Mississippi
being forbidden by Spanish law, but the regulations were never
adequately enforced, the goods being either smuggled into Spanish
Perrault Narrative, Michi gan Pioneer and Historical Coll ections,
XXXVI L, 516-518.
8
The English merchants appear to have had a marked advantage over
the Spaniards in the matter of coarse woolen manufactures,
which were in much demand by the latter .lieutsnait ^cvemc^ fey to Nep-
ean, September 1, 1784., Michigan Pioneer and Historical Col-
lections, XXIV., 19.
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territory from Cahokia or else introduced by means of a secret
understanding with the Spanish commandant . The following ex-
tract from a letter written in 1793 by Captain Doyle, commander
at Michillimackinac, throws some interesting sidelights on this
trade
:
"There is also a considerable trade carried on from
hence, to the Spanish Post of Pain Court, (or St. Louis) upon the
Mississippi, which is considerably in cur favor, Hit cannot be
depended upon for two reasons, first, the admission of goods from
this Post, being contraband tho' not rightly observed; Secondly,
should an enterprizing Merchant, send Goods from New Orleans, up
the Piver, he could under sell the Traders from this Post; but this
traffic which has been open to them for years, they have never
attempted.
"
"The present Commanding Officer, at St. Louis Captain
Trudot, is highly spoken of by the Eritish Traders; He has in many
instances rendered them essential Services. The Arrival of some
Spanish Merchants, this summer to trade, has enabled me to convince
them, I was hot insensible of Captain Trudots politeness."^ Not
only did Eritish merchants carry their goods into Louisiana, but
Spanish merchants themselves resorted to Michillimackinac in order
1
St. Clair to the President. Peport of the Official Proceedings
in the Illinois Country from March 5th to June 11th, 1790.
Smith, St. Clair Papers
,
II., 174.
^Extract of a letter from Captain Doyle, commanding at Michillimack-
inac to lieutenant Cbvernor Simcoe, July 38, 1793. Canadian Archives,
series 0, vol. 280-2, p. 373.
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to obtain supplies for their trade, as is shown "by the extract from
Captain Boyle's letter.
The Americans were naturally desirous of obtaining this
lucrative commerce for themselves and when General Arthur St.
Clair became Governor of the Northwest Territory, he took into
consideration the possibility of establishing posts at Prairie
du Chien and the mouth of the Illinois River in order to secure
control of the trade; but neither plan was practicable as the dis-
tance of the former situation would have rendered the maintenance
of a pest very difficult while there was no suitable site for an
establishment at the mouth of the Illinois. Peoria was suggested
as an ideal spot for a post should it ever be considered advisable
to interrupt this trade which was carried on by the merchants of
Canada.^ St. Clair suggested, however, that an impost be placed
upon all goods imported into the Illinois country, not only for
the sake of the very considerable revenue which might be derived
therefrom, but also for the purpose of turning commerce up the
Ohio Piver to the markets of the United States. c That such a
1 Pt . Clair to the President, 1790. Smith, St. Clair Paper s, II,
174, 175. Though the United States migh~t be justified in in-
terrupting this trade, St. Clair believed that it would be
poor policy to do so without supplying something in its place.
The shutting off of communication with Canada would have de-
prived the inhabitants of the Illinois country, the Spaniards,
and the Indians, of a very necessary commerce.
2 Ibid. , It seemed to be the fate of the Illinois trade to be en-
grossed by foreigners. This proposal of St. Clair's was almost
identical with that of Ceorge Morgan in 1767, who suggested that
if a duty were levied upon the commerce of the Illinois country,
sufficient revenve might be raised to support the garrisons
in that region, while foreign competition would be excluded.
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trade was practicable he declared had already been proved by
Vigo, a merchant who had imported goods from Philadelphia and
placed, them upon the market in the 'Vest at more advantageous
terms than had been offered by British traders, and that notwith-
standing the fact that these goods were subjected to an impost
from which British merchandise was exempt. 1 No effective measures
were taken, however, and Canadian merchants continued to engross
the trade of the Illinois country for a number of years after the
surrender of the posts.
The merchants of Michillimackinac also carried on a
profitable commerce with the Indians living west of the Mississip-
pi in Spanish territory. Prairie du Chien was the great rendez-
vous for the traders resorting to both sides of the upper Missis-
sippi, at which post they congregated with large numbers of Indi-
ans each spring and fall. Ascending the Des koines and St. Peter's
^ivers, they penetrated deeply into Spanish territory, some of them
pushing even as far as the region of the upper Missouri. ^ This
trade had in fact been carried on almost from the time when the
British had entered the threat lakes ' region, and one of the most ab-
sorbing bits of all the literature dealingwith the fur industry is
Smith, St. Clair Papers
,
II, 175. The Ohio River, however, never
appears to have been the natural channel for the fur trade of
the Illinois country, and the situation after the Revolution
was in many respects identical with that which existed after
the British occupation of the region in 1765.
Cargo manifests in volumes 744, 745 and 746 of the Eurton Manu-
script Collection throw a great deal of light upon the later
activities of the Michillimackinac Company in the Illinois coun-
try.
Smith, St. Clair Papers
,
II, 175. The traders resorting to the
St. Peter's Piver also used a more northern route, by way of
Lake Superior and the St. Croix River, '"insor, We stward Move-
ment, 438.
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that portion of a journal of Peter Pond which recounts the story
of a voyage up the St. Peter's Piver just before the outbreak
of the Revolution.^- When Spanish officers took charge of the
administration of upper Louisiana in 1768, the Governor- General
ordered that all English traders be excluded from the western
branches of the Mississippi? These instructions do not appear
to have been carried out for in 1770, Galvez, the Spanish governor
at New Orleans, recommended the establishment of a fort at the
mouth of the Des Moines River in order to exclude the traders
who were ascending that river to the headwaters of the Missouri.
Nothing came of this proposal and the British continued to carry
on their trade with the Iowa, Sioux, and other tribes living
I
beyond the Mississippi. ^ Again, in 1793, the Spaniards tried to
persuade the Indians living within their jurisdiction to have no
dealings with the British traders, but with no better result. ^ In
the following year, however, Carondelet, who was Governor of
Louisiana, having determined to enforce a more vigorous policy,
recommended that forts be established at the mouth of the St. Peteli
Piver and at the mouth of the Des Moines in order to keep out the
-ritish traders who he declared were monopolizing the commerce of
xJournal of Peter Pond, riaconsin Historical Col lections, XVIII.,
314-354.
a
Van der 7se, "Fur Trade Operations in the Eastern Iowa Country
Under the Spanish Regime", Iowa Journal of History and Politics
XII, 357.
~~
3 Ibid. , 361.
4Fouck, Spanish Regime in Missouri
,
II, 50.
j
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the upper part of the province. He likewise urged that the
Spanish merchants of St. Louis be allowed to enjoy a free trade
with New Orleans in order that they might more effectively meet
the competition of their Canadian rivals."^"
The Spaniards now began to adopt more vigorous measures,
and in 1794, Andrew Todd, a trader operating from Michillimackinac,
was stepped in the Missouri country and his goods seized. Lord
Dorchester protested to Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana, who in
turn called attention to the fact that Eritish merchants had long
been carrying on an illicit trade within Spanish territory.
Carondelet now made up his mind to fight fire by means of fire;
if Spanish merchants could not carry on a successful trade on their
own initiative, he proposed to enlist the aid of the Canadians
themselves. To this end he granted to the very Todd whose goods
he had seized, a pass giving him the exclusive right to the trade
of the upper Missouri in consideration of the payment of a tax
of six per cent, it being his hope that Todd might enter into ef-
fective competition with the traders from Montreal. The plan was
put into operation and during the two years following the grant
of the monopoly, Todd imported goods by way of New Orleans and
Robertson, Loui s iana
,
L, 335. Peport of Carondelet, November 24,
1794, The Spanish governor, emphasizing the richness of the
trade, declared that notwithstanding the enormous distance which
the British merchants were obliged to carry their goods, they
nevertheless reaped a profit of one hundred per cent. It is
not unlikely that Carondelet exaggerated somewhat.
^Van der 7se, op. cit . Iowa Journal of Hi story and Politics, XI L,
366; Dorchester to Carondelet," "August 21, "1794, Canadian Ar-
chives, series Q, vol. 74-3, p. 234; Canadian Archives Report,
1891, Calendar of series Q, p. 114.
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shipped tack furs in exchange. He was planning to enlist the aid
of Canadian engages > but his project was cut short by his death
in 1796, and the British remained in practically undisputed posses-
tion of the field for some years after the evacuation of the north-
west posts.
1
This trade within Spanish territory, while not without
interest in itself, is remarkable from the fact that it illustrates
how marvellously efficient was the business organization of the
Canadian fur traders. It indeed speaks well for the ability and
enterprise of these men, that they were able to send goods all the
way from Montreal to the Mississippi, invade foreign territory,
and, in spite of all efforts on the part of Spanish officials,
undersell their competitors and win the trade and friendship of the
Indians. A most remarkable tribute to the ability of the British
traders is contained in the words of Jean Baptiste Truteau, who
in 1795 led an expedition to the upper Missouri which was sent out
by the Commercial Company for the Discovery of the Nations of the
Upper Missouri, an organization formed at St. Louis the preceding
year. Truteau complained in his journal of the difficulty of
carrying on a trade with the Indians, due to the high price of the
goods furnished by the Company, which led the savages to sell their
Juan Trentura Morales to CJardoqui, December 1, 1796, Missouri
Hi
3
torical Col lections, IV., 13; Van der 7ee, qp.cit., Iowa Jour-
nal of History "and Politics, XI I., 366. For further information
respecting the activities of British merchants in Spanish terri-
tory, see Houck, Spanish Regim e in Missouri, II., 187, 354, 255.

-=
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furs to the traders from Canada. 1 Continuing, he says, "One thing
is certain; if the English merchants, who are unquestionably much
more enterprising than those of Illinois and Louisiana, were in
possession of this river (the Missouri) on which from its mouth
to its source navigation is so easy for the largest pirogues,
having no cataracts or portages, they would establish a large trade
j
with all the nations, those which are known to us as well as those
which are still unknown, and obtain from them a great quantity
of fine peltry; a thing which these gentlemen, the merchants from
the Illinois, have never dared and may, perhaps, never undertake,
because of the reluctance they have always had and still have of
making expenditures, and because of their fear of failure, they
being too easily disheartened by the first obstacles and losses
which are encountered; things which have never stopped the English
S I
in their commercial ventures". The efficiency of the Canadian
I
I
,
engages was likewise admi t ted. Spanish merchants were accustomed
to hire Canadian traders and hunters to carry on their traffic
with the Indians and the practice developed to such an extent that
3
in 1787, Cruzat published an ordinance prohibiting the custom.
Truteau said in 1795, however, that the engages of the company he
4
represented came for the most part from Caisda.
^Truteau's Journal, Missouri Historical Collections, IV., 32.
3 Ibid
.
, 33.
3Kouck, Spanish Regime in Missouri, IL, 248.
4 Truteau»s Journal, Missouri Historical Collections, IV., 34.
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^Tiile traders from Michillimackinac were pushing down
into the Illinois country and across u,he Mississippi into Spanish
territory, the merchants of the NorthAVest Company were extending
their commerce farther and farther into the vast region beyond
Lake Superior. Efficient business methods, the native ability
of the founders, and the occupation of a territory comprising what
was probably the richest fur-bearing region in North America all i
contributed to the success of the Company and its affairs prospered
almost from the very outset. Anything like a detailed account
of the trading operations and the explorations carried on by the
organization during this period would require much more time than
can be allowed here.^ Put some idea of the geographical extent
of the Company's activities may be gained from the fact that in
1789, the erection of Fort Chippewean was begun upon the shores
2
of Lake Athabasca. Hand in hand with the commercial exploitation
of the Northwest went the discovery of new lands, lakes, and
rivers; and high in the list of North American explorers stands
the name of Alexander Mackenzie, first a bourgeois^ and afterwards
a partner in the "Great Company". 4
The organization was composed of some of the most power-
ful of the merchants of Montreal, men who not only put forth
mighty personal efforts in order to ensure the success of their
commerce, but used every political influence of which they were
lThe history of the NorthVest Company will be more fully discussed
in the following chapter.
2Mas son, Eourgeois de le Compagnie du Nord- Quest J.,37, 41.
lThe clerks in "the employ of the North-v.'est Company were called
"bour^eci s "
.
4 See Mackenzie's Voyages, passim. In 1793, Mackenzie succeeded
in reaching the Pacific Ocean.
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capable in order to build up a monopoly which should be safe
from all rivals, foreign as well as domestic. Soon after the
founding of the Company in the winter of 1783-4, certain of the
partners turned their attention to the matter of the trade com-
munication with the country beyond Lake Superior. According to
the terms of the Treaty of 1783, there was some doubt regarding
the northwest boundary of the region ceded to the United States;
but it was nevertheless quite evident that Grand Portage, the
great rendezvous of the Company on the west end of Lake Superior,
was within American territory, a circumstance which gave the mer-
chants no little uneasiness. Apprehensive lest upon the surrender
of the posts their communication with the far Northwest might be
cut off, they proposed to seek out a new route to take the place
of that by way of Grand Portage; but fearing that their effort
might be unsuccessful, they requested that if the posts were sur-
rendered, it should be stipulated that both Eritish and American
traders should be free to use the old carrying place at Grand
Portage, saying that there was no trade on the American side of
the boundary which they would not gladly relinquish in return for
such a privilege, thereby displaying remarkable consideration for
the interests of the Michillimackinac and Detroit merchants.
^
However, if a new route should be discovered, they desired that
Frobisher to "abane, April 19, 1784, Canadian Archives Peport
1888, p. 63.
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they be given exclusive rights to its use. They likewise proposed
to explore at their own expense the vast region between 55 and
65 degrees north latitude, stretching westward to the Pacific
Ocean, asking in return that they be given a monopoly of the trade
northwest of Lake Superior for a period of ten years. A new
route from Lake Superior to the water communications of the North-
west by way of Lake Nipigon was actually discovered in the summer
of 1784. Haldimand, nevertheless, did not feel authorized to
grant either of the requests for special privileges preferred by
the merchants, but promised to lay their case before the British
ministry. Apparently nothing came of the petition as no exclusive
trade privileges seem to have been granted the petitioners. 1
All signs point to the continued prosperity of the
North-West Company. The enterprise seems in fact to have enjoyed
almost phenomenal success throughout the years following the
Treaty of Peace, for in 178? it absorbed a group of rival traders,
while in 1798, the number of shares was increased from twenty
to forty-six. 2 The value of the furs annually obtained from the
country beyond Lake Superior was in 1790 placed at f 40, 000, while
according to an estimate which was probably made in 1794 or there-
abouts, their value had increased to i 100,000. Another statement
"Memorial of the North-West Company, October 4, 1784. Canadian
Archives Report, 1890, p. 48; McGill to Hamilton, August 1,
1785, ibid
.
,~ 56; Mathews to TTrobisher, October 11, 1784, ibid.,
1888, pT~7"2.
3
Post
. ,186.
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made at about the same time declared that the northwest trade had
greatly increased of late and that its value was supposed to have
doubled during the past two years. During the last quarter
of the eighteenth century were laid the foundations of the great
organization which was able to hold the field against one rival
after another, until at length it was able to challenge the
supremacy of the mighty Hudson's Bay Company.
From what has been said in the preceding chapters, it
is apparent that the Canadian fur trade underwent a remarkable
development during the years between the outbreak of the Revolu-
tion and the surrender of the frontier posts, a change which is
reflected to a certain degree in an ordinance concerning naviga-
tion and trade enacted by the Legislative Council of Quebec in
1791.2 By the terms of this act, practically all restraints were
removed from the traffic in furs. Traders going to the Indian
country were no longer required to take out licenses, not even
for the sale of liquor, and thus the most important provisions of
the ordinance of 177? concerning commerce with the Indians were
repealed. The instructions given Lord Dorchester in 1786 when he
became Governor of Quebec were identical with those which had
been transmitted to him in 1775. 3 But the committee charged
* Observations by Isaac Todd and Simon McTavish, Merchants,
Michi gan Pione er and Historical Collections, XXIV., 684; State-
ment Concerning Trade at Detroit and Other Posts, communicated
by Mr. In 3:1 is of Mark Lane, ibid . . 686.
^Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collect ions
,
XXIV., 304, 205.
3shortt and Doughty, Constitu tional Documents, 559.
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with the task of framing a bill dealing with the commerce of
the western country gave these instructions little more than a
perfunctory consideration." It was pointed out that the charac-
ter of the industry had changed utterly since the Lords of Trade
had formulated their plan in 1764. Seven of the principal mercan-
tile firms of Montreal submitted their views with regard to the
2
whole matter in a memorial dated October 26, 1790, and their
recommendations that the trade be freed from all restraint were
adopted almost to the letter. It is scarcely an exaggeration
to say that this ordinance passed in 1791 marks an epoch in the
history of the Canadian peltry trade. Under the skilfull manage-
j
ment of that exceedingly able and enterprising group of men known
as the "merchants of Montreal", the fur industry had become a power4
ful and well organized institution, one which could be left free
to manage its own affairs with safety to the province instead
of being subjected to the paternalistic regulations of the govern-
j
ment. In the following chapter an effort will be made to indicate
some of the economic aspects of the commercial development which
has just been mentioned.
xMichi gan Pione er and Fistorical Collections, XXIV., 109-121.
2 Ibid. , 111.
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CHAPTER V.
Traders and Trading- Companies .
The British merchants who controlled the commerce of the
Northwest during the Revolution and the years which followed were
accustomed to regard the fur trade as a commercial asset from
two points of view: first, as the source of valuable returns in
the shape of peltry annually carried to England; and secondly, as
an outlet for British manufactures. Estimates as to the value of
the furs annually exported from Canada to the London market during
the period from 1774 vary considerably, but it is very likely,
taking one year with another, that during the period following the
Revolution, the annual returns did not fall far short of £.200,000
sterling. 1 Of this amount, by far the larger share came from
what has been referred to as the Upper Country, which probably
p
yielded nearly five sixths of all the furs exported from Quebec.
~
This is probably not far from the correct figure for
the decade from 1780 to 1790. One estimate, made up in 1790,
gave the average annual value of the returns for the preceding
ten years as £200,000, while another, based upon the returns for
the five years preceding 1789, placed it at the same figure.
Statement concerning trade communicated by Mr. Inglis of Mark
Lane, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XXIV., 686; Im-
portation of Skins from Canada 1788 and sold in January, February
and March 1789. Canadian archives, series Q, vol. 43-2, p. 826.
There seems to have been a rapid increase in the value of the
returns after 1790, for Todd and McTavish, in a report compiled
probably about 1794, estimated the average annual value of the
returns for the preceding five years at £250,000, Michigan Pioneer
and Historical Collections
,
XXIV., 685.
p
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XXIV., 686;
"Canada, its Indian Trade with observations thereon, London,
December 28, 1784," Canadian Archives, C. 0. 42. vol. 16, p. 122.

149
The quantity of goods used in the trade from year to year shows
more var iation than the returns in furs. A fair estimate of
their amount is to be obtained from the returns of trade licenses
issued in the province of Quebec, which indicate the value of the
goods carried into the Indian country for the period between 1777
and 1790, with the exception of the years 1780 and 1784. The
returns vary from £41,355 currency in 1779, to 5.226,922 in 1783.
1
From out the vast range of territory over which the
British trader extended his operations were annually carried hun-
dreds of thousands of furs of many varieties, including those of
the beaver, marten, otter, mink, fox, muskrat, raccoon and cat,
2
along with the skins of the deer and the bear."" The merchandise
for which the Indian exchanged his peltries included articles of a
great many different sorts. Rum was an indispensable part of every
trader's outfit, without which he would never think of going into
the Indian country, while guns, or fusils, as they were commonly
called, along v/ith powder and shot, were very important articles
of tr&de, as they furnished the savage with the means of carrying
on his hunting. The "dry goods" which usually formed a part of
the equipment included a great variety of manufactured articles,
such as blankets, strouds, cotton cloth, kettles, knives and tools
^Returns of Indian Trade Licenses .
2Returns of furs exported from the province of Quebec,
Canadian Archives Report , 1888. Calendar of Haldimand Collection ,
vol. III., p. 12.
Returns of Indian Trade Licenses.
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of many sorts, as well as trinkets of all kinds,- looking-glasses,
beads, arm "bands, etc. Practically all the dry goods as well as
the guns and ammunition used in the Canada trade v/ere of British
manufacture
During the days when the fur trade flourished there
was thus a continuous interchange of commodities involving goods
and furs to the value of thousands of pounds. Manufactured
articles were being constantly transported from Great Britain to
the innermost depths of the American forests, over distances
aggregating thousands of miles, while the peltries obtained in
exchange were carried back by the same routes to London, the great
fur market of the world. A trade which involved transactions of
such magnitude, and in which such tremendous distances v/ere in-
volved, naturally required highly developed business methods.
The romantic nature of the contact between the Indian and the
wilderness trader has furnished the principal theme for many a
writer who has undertaken to describe the history of the peltry
2
trade. The actual bartering for the furs, which took place in
the depths of the forest, thousands of miles away from civilization,
does indeed constitute an important and withal a most fascinating
aspect of the subject, but on the other hand, it should be remem-
bered that this wilderness traffic v/as but one incident in a long
Wisconsin Historical Collections
,
XIX, £16-233. These
accounts and inventories give a good idea of the kind of goods
employed in the Indian trade.
cThe journals and reminiscences of those who actually
participated in the trade, upon whioh most descriptions are based,
almost invariably emphasize the romantic and adventurous side of
tiie trader* s life.
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series of transactions which were necessary in order that the
furs gathered In the forest might be placed upon the world's
market. The most important and at the same time the most neg"-
glected aspect of the whole subject of the fur trade consists
in that complex mechanism of distribution which was gradually-
developed, the economic function of which was to effect an ex-
change of merchandise . for peltry and place the latter upon the
market. It will be the purpose of the present discussion to
consider the organization of the British fur trade as a factor
in economic distribution and to call attention to the various
influences which affected the industry as a business institu-
tion.
The term "fur trader" has often been employed indis-
criminately to designate anyone who v/as commercially interested
in the traffic in furs. The expression is a generic one, how-
ever, and should include several classes of persons, all of whom
were interested in the fur trade, it is true, but who bore
little resemblance to one another, either socially or indus-
trially. At the top of this complex business organization were
the great London firms, as for example, those of Robert Hunter;
7/atson and ^ashleigh; iyer, Allan, & Co.; lirickwood, Pattle, and
Company; and Phyn, Ellice, and Inglis. An enumeration of the
London firms interested in the northwest fur trade would in-
clude the names of some of the great merchants of the United
Kingdom, men who did not hesitate to apply to his Majesty's
ministers, in their own interests or those of their correspon-
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dents on the other side of the water.
Next in order came the great mercantile houses of
Moiitreal - firms often collectively referred to as "the mer-
chants of Montreal," whose business was the backbone of Cana-
dian commerce. A list of the merchants of -Montreal would in-
clude the names of men famous in the history of the Great Lakes'
region, such as Isaac Todd and James UcGill, of the firm of
Todd & McGill, Benjamin and Joseph i'robisher, David McCrae,
Alexander Henry, William Grant, Simon McTavish, William Xay,
p
and a score of others. Many of the great fur barons of Montreal
were Scotchmen, who had rapidly gained a footing in Canada
after the Conquest and gradually crowded out the French mer-
chants who had hitherto reaped the benefits of the peltry trade
of the Great Lakes' region. While the origin of these Scotch
merchants is obscure, their steady rise to wealth and power
may be readily traced in the history of the industry which at-
tained such marvellous development at their hands.
A step farther down in this commercial hierarchy were
the merchants who carried on their business at the posts of
Llichillimackinac and Detroit - men of lesser means, usually,
than the members of the Montreal firms, though it is impossible
to draw an absolutely clear-cut line of demarcation between the
The names of several of the London merchants engaged
in the fur trade may be ascertained from the rnemorieJ-s addressed
to Lord Shelburne. Lansdowne MSS., vol. 72, pp. 455-458, 459-452.
The names of the principal London firms, including those enumer-
ated above, have been gleaned here and there from correspondence
bearin- upon the trade.
2 These names appear in a list appended to a memorial
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two groups, certain partners belonging to the Montreal houses
were in the habit of spending a part of their time at the upr>er
posts, superintending the business which they carried on in
those quarters; but at the same time there were numeroiis in-
dividual traders who had their headquarters at Michillimacki-
nac and Detroit, whose only business connections at Montreal
were the houses with which they corresponded.
Finally, there were the small individual traders,
French-Canadians, many of them, who trafficked with the savages
at the dependencies of the u~nper posts, living among them at
their hunting grounds, and. often taking Indian wives. ij the
time of the English occupation, there had arisen a great class
of coureurs de bois
,
or wood rangers, who roamed the forests
and lived ver;/ much like the savages about them.-'- But here,
likewise, it is impossible to distinguish sharply between the
merchants who had their headquarters at the upper posts and
the traders who wintered in the Indian country, as many of
those who had capital invested at Michillimackinac or Detroit
went themselves into the Indian country to spend the winter
and bargain for furs, but it is likely that a majority of the
addressed to Sir John Johnson, dated April 4, 1786. Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XL, 484. It is very likely
that the Returns of Indian ?rade Licenses include the names of
practically all the merchants of Montreal engaged, in the fur
trade between 1777 and 1790.
In a list of passes granted by Lieutenant Governor
Hamilton of Detroit between July 2 and August 15, 17 77, appear
the names of twenty-four traders, twenty of whom, from their
names, appear to have been French-Canadians. Canadian Archives,
series S, Indian Affairs.
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petty traders simply came in to the posts to dispose of their
peltry and to secure new outfits.''' On the other hand, many of
those who wintered among the Indians were hired clerks or
agents of the traders at the posts, who were paid a certain
stipulated wage for their services and had no financial interest
in the goods they carried out with them or in the furs which
p
they brought back to the posts.
Though it is possible to enumerate roughly four
classes of "fur traders," as has just been attempted, only in
the case of the London merchants is it possible to say with
any degree of accuracy that they formed a class apart. The
great firms of Montreal, the merchants stationed at the upper
posts, and the traders who actually went out into the Indian
country did not form three separate and distinct classes, but
rather blended into one another. On the other hand a classi-
fication such as the one attempted, while not strictly accurate,
is still convenient to bear in mind when considering the busi-
ness relations between the various groups of merchants engaged
in the fur trade. Such a division also serves to emphasize
the fact that the expression "fur trader" is capable of being
used in more than one sense, for there was a wide gulf, socially
''"John Reeves, who had his headquarters at Michilli-
mackinac and drew his supplies from Grant, Campion, and Company
of Montreal, sometimes wintered among the Indians. Reeves to
Grant, Campion, and Company, July 9, 1794. Baby M3S. The corre-
spondence of John Reeves with Grant, Campion, and Company con-
tains numerous references to these small traders who obtained
their goods from Llichillimackinac
.
2
John Anderson, for example, acted as the agent of
John Askin, of Detroit, at the trading post on the Miami* Ander-
son to Askin, iiovember 1, 14, and £4, 1794. Jurton Manuscript
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and commercially, between the great London merchant who did
not hesitate to communicate his wishes and desires to the re-
presentatives of the British government, or the merchant of
Montreal who spent his days in a counting house, and the petty
trader who lived with the Indians, bargained with them for the
purchase of their furs, and on the whole lived more like a
savage than a white man.
In order to understand the economic relationship be-
tween the different groups of merchants and traders which have
just been enumerated, as well as the character of the industry
as a whole, it must be constantly borne in mind that practical-
ly every step in the whole distributive process known as the
"fur trade" was based upon credit. The merchants of Montreal
almost invariably purchased their goods from the great London
firms on credit, making them up into outfits which they for-
warded to their correspondents at the upper posts, also on
credit. In the spring, the petty trader came in to the post
from the Indian country v/ith his peltry and set out again in
the fall with an outfit purchased from the merchant with whom
he dealt, still on credit. .'he proceeds of the furs which he
brought in to Miehillimackinac or Detroit in the spring to sell
were almost invariably used to pay for the outfit obtained the
previous fall, which had been consumed during the winter in
trading for the same peltry which he carried in with him. Very
Collection, vol. 1, pp. 71, 88, and 99.
"'"Memorandum Relative to the Trade in the Upper Country,
undated. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , X, 872.
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seldom, indeed, v/ere the goods paid for at the time of their
purchase and hence it followed that the merchant must necessar-
ily depend upon the success of the trader in the Indian country
for his pay.-^ Considering the basis upon which the trade was
conducted throughout its various stages, it is not difficult
to see how poor returns in furs, due to war, unsuccessful
hunting, or any other reason, in fact, would affect the whole
industry. If the trader in the Indian country had poor suc-
cess, it meant that not only his correspondent at the upper
post would have to wait for his remuneration, hut also that
the merchants of Montreal and London would be obliged to defer
the settlement of their accounts. Ho thing is more common in
the correspondence of the fur trade than to find the firms at
Montreal urging their customers at Michillimackinac and Detroit
to make their remittances as promptly as possible in order that
they themselves may in turn be enabled to meet their obliga-
te
tions to their English agents. " In like manner, the correspon-
dence of the traders at the upper posts frequently reveals
their anxiety concerning the returns which they are expecting
from their customers in the Indian country, upon which they are
relying in order to make remittances to their agents at ...ontreal
Owing to the fact that the fur trade was conducted
on a credit basis, it will be readily seen that at any given
"Correspondence of John Heeves with Grant, Campion,
and Company, ,3aby L1SS., passim .
p
LIcGill to Askin, April 12, 1786. ,. i scons in Histori -
cal Collections
,
XIX, 261.
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time, the merchants of London and Montreal had very consider-
able sums invested in the Indian country. This situation was
also due to the fact that a period of considerable length must
elapse before the exchange of merchaiidise for furs could be
effected and the returns brought to market, anywhere from two
to three years being required to carry the goods from London
to the Indian country, exchange them for peltry, and bring the
returns to the English market. The length of time required of
course varied according to the distance which the merchandise
must be carrieJ, and the state of the trade in the Indian
country - that is, the readiness with which goods might be
converted into peltry. It is said that in the case of the
trade carried on by the North-West Company, a period of three
years was required to effect this exchange of commodities, but
the posts at which its commerce was carried on were many of
them unusually remote, a fact which partially accotmts for the
length of time required. Under ordinary circumstances, goods
might be shipped from London to Lloiitreal by the spring or fall
trade fleet and sent to the Upoer Country by canoe brigades or
sailing vessels in the spring or summer of the following year.
Reaching the upper posts in the summer, the merchandise was
made up into outfits, which were purchased by traders and
carried out to the wintering grounds in the autumn, before
navigation closed. During the winter, the traders bartered the
"''Mass on, Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Ivord-Ouest , L,
51, 52; Mackenzie, Voyages , ed. 1902, L, p. li.
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goods with the Indians in exchange for furs whieh they carried
back to Detroit or MichillimaoklBSO in the spring. Under favor
able conditions, the peltry was sent down to Montreal during
the summer, in time to be shipped to England by the fall trade
fleet. Thus a period of about two years was required before
the returns from the goods were actually marketed in London.
The merchants of Montreal were indebted to their London corre-
spondents, the merchants at Detroit and Michillimackinac owed
those of Montreal, and so on down the line to the Indian him-
self, who was often in debt to the trader who supplied him with
goods. The Canadian merchants, in their report to the Commit-
tee of Council on Commercial Affairs and Police in 1786 or
1787, stated that the balance owing from the Indian trade to
the province of Quebec and chiefly to the city of Montreal, was
at least LSOC^OOO. 1
Y.'hen one considers the enormous distances involved
in the fur trade and the fact that it way conducted on a credit
basis, the necessity for a well-organized business machinery
is at once apparent. The merchant at I.lichillimackinac , for
example, was located hundreds of miles from the source of his
supplies and from the market for his furs. As his presence
was required in order to superintend business at the post, he
could not take the time to go to Montreal to attend to the
making up of his outfit each spring and the sale of his peltry
"
^Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collecti ons , XL,
473. This report was probably compiled some time between
October, 1786, and June, 1787.
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each autumn, but was obliged to depend, upon the firm with
which he dealt to transact all his business in that city. A
study, of the letters and accounts which passed back and forth
between the traders at the upper posts and their correspondents
at Montreal reveals how they cooperated and were of mutual
service in a business way. The latter firms acted as business
agents for their customers in the Upper Country, while the
London houses performed a similar service for the merchants of
Montreal.
In considering somewhat more minutely the organiza-
tion of the fur-trading industry, it will be convenient, first
of all, to consider the manner in which the Montreal firms and
their customers in the Upper Country cooperated. The outfits
which were imported "by the traders at the upper posts appear
in most cases to have been forwarded at the expense and risk
of the buyer. If a merchant at Michillimackinac , for example,
ordered an assortment of goods, he paid a certain sum for them
to his correspondent at Montreal, being obliged to assume the
p
expense and risk attendant u-con their transportation. His
There are in the Toronto Public Library (Quebec
Papers, vol. 3. 75, pp. 170-241) a number of accounts betv/een
David McCrae and Company and Y/illiam Kay, of dates ranging from
1778 to 1782. The firm of David McCrae and Company had its
headquarters at Michillimackinac, being a partner in the General
Store established at that post in 1779, while Y/illiam Kay be-
longed to a Montreal firm. These accounts throw a great deal of
light upon the character of the business relations betv/een the
merchants of Montreal and those living at the upper posts, and
furnish the source from v/hich many of the details in the follow-
ing description have been derived,
William Robertson of Detroit|stated that the merchants
at that post sent their orders to an a^ent at Montreal, who im-
ported their goods from Great Britain on commission. Vlichigan
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agent, however, attended to the making up of the outfits, a
task which involved the supervision of many details of one sort
and another. In the first place, canoes or bateaux had to be
secured for the transportation of the merchandise and likewise
men to navigate them; while upon hiring an engage* . it was ne-
cessary to make a contract or engagement with him before a
notary public, all of which was attended to by the correspon-
dent at Montreal. Provisions for the voyage must be secured,
and certain articles advanced to the engage" for his personal
use and charged to his 7/ages. During the period before 1790,
it was necessary to secure a license before any outfit might
be despatched for the Upper Country. As a series of rapids
rendered the St. Lawrence just above Montreal unnavigable, the
goods had to be carried in carts to Lachine, whence the canoes
and bateaux were accustomed to depart for the distant posts.
All these details were attended to by the Montreal concern and
the expense involved charged to the account of the customer at
Michillimackinac or Detroit. In addition to the services whi ch
have been enumerated, the Montreal firm acted in the capacity
of banker for its customers. Thus, if a merchant at Michilli-
mackinac desired to pay his engages ' wages, or meet any other
obligation, in fact, he might draw upon his agent in favor of
the person to whom he was making the remittance and thus the
conduct of his business was greatly facilitated.
Pioneer and Historical Collections, XL, 631. The correspondence
betv/een John Reeves and Grant, Campion, and Company would indi-
cate on the other hand that many of the traders in the Upper
Country purchased their goods directly from their Montreal corre-
spondents.
1See, for example, He eves to G-rant , Campion, and
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Besides supplying the traders at Michillimackinac
and Detroit with merchandise each season, the Moiitreal firm
also acted as agent for the disposal of the returns in peltry
which were sent down from the Upper Country from time to time.
The manner in which the furs v,rere placed upon the market will
help to illustrate the relationship between the wilderness
trader, the merchant at the upper post, and the Montreal firm.
When the trader came in from the wintering ground in the spring
with the peltry he had been able to secure from the Indians, he
usually did one of two things - he either sold it in the open
market, or turned it over to his outfitter at the market price,
the proceeds of the sale to be applied on his account, in pay-
ment of the merchandise purchased the season before.^" To be
strictly accurate, a third alternative was open to him. Instead
of disposing of his furs at Michillimackinac or Detroit, as the
case might be, he sometimes sent them to Montreal or even London
at his own risk, in order that he might have the advantage of the
better prices which they might be expected to bring in those
markets. But this practice appears to have been followed only
in the case of the more considerable traders in the Indian coun-
try, those whose capital and credit were sufficient so that it
was not a matter of great importance whether their returns were
immediately converted into money or not.^ Peltry was alv/ays a
Company, August 31, 1794. Baby MSS.
^Rp°ves to Grant Campion, and Company, July 9, 1794.
Baby MSS.
^iittrton Manuscript Collection, vol. 1, p. 189.
Such a trader, for example, was Francois Vigo, a corre-
spondent of John Askin who traded in the wabash country.
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saleable commodity, and a trader who had furs could usually
dispose of them at Michillimackinac or Detroit as well as Mon-
treal or London. Merchants at the upper posts made a practice
of speculating in furs, in the hope of being able to dispose
of them at a profit in another market. John Askin, while en-
gaged in business at Detroit, was in the habit of buying furs
for sale by the various traders resorting to that place, while
Todd & McOill of Montreal bought peltry at Detroit or Michilli-
mackinac whenever they saw an opportunity to make a profit by
so doing.
^
The trader residing at one of the upper posts con-
signed the furs he obtained to the merchant with whom he dealt
at Montreal, who was in turn instructed either to sell them as
advantageously as possible in the market in that city, placing
the proceeds to the credit of his customer, or ship them to
England to be sold in the London market. In the latter case the
merchant in the Upper country relied upon his agent at Montreal
to see that the furs were properly packed and shipped abroad -
the agent in turn consigning the peltry to his London corre-
spondent, who assumed responsibility for placing it upon the
"4)ay Books of John Askin, Burton Collection and Can-
adian Archives. These daily journals, or blotters, contain num-
erous entries listing furs purchased along with the prices paid.
Etienne Campion and Company to Grant, Campion, and Company, July
9, 1794, Baby MSS . In the Illinois country, furs were even the
circulating medium at the time of the revolution. See, for ex-
ample, Alvord, Cahokia Records (I. H. Col., II.), 53 and Alvord,
Kaskaskia Records (I. H. Col., V.), 15, 126. At the time of the
English occupation of Canada, furs were likewise the circulating
medium at Michillimackinac, but as business developed, drafts
and notes of hand came into use. Henry, Travels , Bain ed., 55»
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market.^" whichever method was followed, the merchant of Montreal
simply acted in the capacity of agent for his correspondent in
the Upper Country and the furs remained the property of the
latter until they were actually sold.
It must not be assumed that such a description as that
which has been attempted will fit every case, for, as is true
in every industry, all sorts of business relationships sprang
up between those who were engaged in the traffic in furs. Traders
who wintered in the Indian country themselves may have purchased
their outfits in person at Montreal and carried their peltry
back to market, while some Montreal firms, as that of Todd and
MoGill for example, at times doubtless furnished outfits direct-
ly to the forest trader through a member of the firm who occa-
sionally visited the upper posts. But such a description as
the one given, while not strictly accurate in every case, will
at the same time indicate in a general way the business connec-
tion between the merchants of Montreal and the traders at the
nosts in the Great Lakes' region.
Just as the Montreal firm acted as agent for its cus-
tomers in the Upper Country, so the great mercantile house in
London acted in the capacity of agent for its correspondents at
Montreal* Besides supplying them with goods it superintended
Reeves to C-rant, Campion, and Company, July 9, 1794,
Baby MBS; "Account Sales of Furrs &c received p the Betsy Captn
William Boyd from Montreal & sold by order of Messrs William &
John Kay for Account of David McCrae & Co. -London 6 May 1779
p. Robert Hunter." Toronto Public Library, vol. B 75, p. 240;
Examination of William Robertson, October 25, 1788, Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections, XL, 631.
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the marketing of the furs which they shipped from Canada, seeing
that they were properly unloaded and stored away in warehouses,
and later preparing them for the fur sales. The expense items
which the London merchant charged in his "account 01 sales" were
for unpacking, trimming, beating, sorting, lotting, telling,
etc. In short, the London firm transacted all the business
incidental to the marketing of the furs, for which services a
commission was received on the proceeds derived from the sale,
as well as interest on sums of money which it was necessary to
advance from time to time*
Those who were engaged in the Indian trade naturally
kept in close touch with the correspondents to whom they gave
credit, as the uncertain nature of the trade due to the numerous
risks involved, made it desirable, from the viewpoint of the
merchant, that he keep himself well-informed concerning the
prospects of those to whom he made advances. Just as business
men at the present time explain the state of their affairs to
their correspondents when undertaking any new enterprise which
will involve a necessity for considerable advances, so the
Brickwood, Pattle, and Company's Account "Sales of
3 Bales of Furs I G. B received of the Indian Trader Captn .
John Edwards from Montreal, by address of Messrs. Grant, Campion
i Co. Merchts. there on the proper Accot. & Risque of 7.'m. Grant
Esqr. of three Hivers, London, April 20, 1793." Baby MSS. "Ac-
count Cales of Furrs uc received p, the Betsy Captn . V. illiam
Boyd from Montreal Cc sold by order of Messrs. William & John Kay
for Account of David LIcCrae ix Co. in London 6 Hay 1779 p.
Robert Hunter." Toronto Public Library, vol. 3.75, p. 240,
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merchants of Montreal were accustomed to inform the London
firms v/ith whom they dealt concerning their business prospects.
In similar fashion, the merchants in the Upper Country kept
their agents at Montreal in touch v/ith the state of their af-
fairs, informing them with regard to any new projects which
they desired to undertake. The merchants of Montreal, on their
part, were very frank in expressing their opinions concerning
the "business activities of their customers, as the correspon-
dence between Todd and McGill and John Askin of Detroit will
illustrate. In 1766, when the Y.'abash country was in a state
of ferment owing to Indian troubles, they recommended to Askin
that the trade in that quarter be abandoned, or that at any
rate, the giving of credits be stopped, expressing the opinion
that if their advice were followed, the total returns would
not be very much less, and that even if they were, better prices
2
might be obtained for the furs which were secured. They also
kept Askin informed with regard to the state of the market and
advised him what sort of furs it would be most profitable for
him to buy. ^ Occasionally they made rather pointed criticisms
Probisher to Brickwood, Pattle,and Company, May 18,
October 16, 1787, and June 30, 1788. Letter Book of Joseph
Probieher
, lo, zo, 59.
2Todd & McGill supplied Askin for a number of years
during the devolution and the following period. Todd & McGill
to Askin, December 20, 1786, Burton Manuscript Collection, vol. 1
p. 217.
3
"I cannot yet say anything certain to you about the
price of Purrs, but I am persuaded deer skins have sold badly
k I fear Bear & otter have had a tumble. I advise you strongly
to change all your late fall cc winter deer Skins for Racoons &
Picheux but Poxes are really worth no more than 4 sh." McGill to
Askin, April 12, 1786 , Wisconsin jjistorleal Collections, X3Xt 262.
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concerning the variety and quality of the peltry which he con-
signed to them, as for example, in the following extract from
a letter written in 1786: "Part of the Packs A B being come to
hand we cannot help taking nottice to you of this apparently
inferior quality, they appear all to he long hair Skins, which
are of all the others the worst; insomuch that a Battoe load
of them is not worth the expense of sending for them to S*
Dusky were they to be got on the Beach, now that you have got
into a Company at Detroit, if you do not adopt some measure to
prevent the Traders from taking such trash, ruin must ensue
infallibly, we request of you also to advise that the GhucK
Skins tho mostly in good Season, are exceedingly unfit for the
London Market, owing to the manner in which they were stretched
and altho 1 Mr. Vigoe may be of opinion that the Skins are not
the less good, we can assure you that their value is much in-
ferior at that Market by which we must all be regulated."-*- Thus,
in a trade attended by unusually large risks, in which practi-
cally all transactions were based upon credit, and where the
market upon which the whole industry depended was thousands of
miles away, and conmninication slow ancl difficult, it was abso-
lutely essential that persons engaged in the trade and having
business relations with one another should work in harmony so
far as possible. It was to their mutual interests that the
most perfect understanding post ible should subsist between them.
The prosperity of the great houses of Montreal and London de-
Tood & McGill to Askin, July 16, 1786, "..i scons in
Historical Collections
,
XLX, 26$.
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pended in large degree upon the way in which their correspon-
dents managed their respective enterprises and hence the free-
dom in the matter of giving advice which has been commented
upon.
As the description of the economic aspects of the
fur trade thus far attempted has necessarily "been of a general
character, perhaps an account of the transactions carried on
by an individual trader during a brief period of time will
serve to illustrate in a more concrete way some of the state-
ments which have been made. Such a study is rendered possible
by a series of letters written by John Reeves of Mackinac,
to Grant, Campion, and Company of Montreal, during the year
1794. Although no correspondence of the Montreal firm is
available it is possible by means of that of Reeves alone to
form a rather clear conception of the character of the busi-
ness relations subsisting between himself and his correspon-
dents. ReeTea was a merchant having his headquarters at the
post of Michillimackinac , where he made up outfits which he
sold to the traders going out into the Indian country each
fall, and received the returns which were carried back in the
spring. Grant, Campion, and Company acted as his agents at
Montreal, forwarding the goods which he needed in his trade
and caring for the furs which he consigned to them for sale.
These letters are to be found in the oiaby MSS.,
which also contain the let'. ers and accounts of several other
traders. Taken collectively, this correspondence forms a most
interesting and valuable source for the study of the fur trade
of the period.
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In his first letter, dated June 17, 1794, Heeves
has little news of interest for his correspondents. None of
the traders have come in from the wintering ground as yet, hut
he fears that those who have been in the Lake Superior country
and the Mississippi have not done very well, and that some
have not even made sufficient returns to pay their engages .
There is still no news from the Indian country four days later,
when he writes to inform his correspondents that he is drawing
unon them for the wages of two of hie men who are in Montreal.
By July 6, however, the returns are beginning to come in and
his forebodings are justified, for Papin and _~ioy, two traders
whom he has supplied with goods, have brought in few furs, so
much the worse for himself and those to whom he is indebted.
Three days later, on «3uly 9, he sends his first consignment
of furs, consisting of twenty-nine packs, to his correspondents
at Montreal, whom he authorizes to sell them as advantageously
as possible, and he likewise asks for information concerning
the state of the fur market, in order that he may govern his
transactions accordingly. The furs which he sends down have
been purchased from Hoy and Benito who are just in from the
wintering ground and he has been obliged to pay rather dearly
for them. Notwithstanding their price, the furs come to but
a little over 9,665 livres while the amount which the traders
originally owed him was 154,000 livres but it is the best he
has been able to do. He is also sending down a remittance of
8,728 livres which he desires placed to his credit, in the
form of a draft given by Mr. Todd, to whom Papin, the trader
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mentioned in a previous letter, sold his furs. He has heard
no news as yet from Tabeau, another of his customers, and
rather dreads his arrival, fearing that he may have done no
better than those v.rho have already come in. ileeves takes oc-
casion on August 19 to make another remittance to Grant, Cam-
pion, and Company; and while it la about all they may expect
from him this year, he hopes that he may be able to settle
his account in full the following season. There is still no
news of Tabeau and a good many are of the opinion that he will
not come in to the post at all; but beeves himself has not
given up all hope. He has decided that his furs may as well
be sold in Montreal as they are too few to make it worth while
to ship them to London on his account. Also, can Grant, cam-
pion, and Company furnish an outfit of two canoes next spring,
which two traders resorting to the post have asked him to fur-
nish? While their credit is good, he does not desire to enter
into any definite agreement with them until he shall hear from
Montreal. By August 31, the long—awaited Tabeau has at last
come in, and beeves has been obliged to buy his furs, fearing
that otherwise they might be sold to someone else and he would
This transaction illustrates the principle of dernier
eouipement , or "Privilege of last Outfitter & Canoe-men." Be-
cause of the very considerable risk which the merchant was ob-
liged to assume when he advanced goods to a trader, there grew
UD a "Lav/ of Custom" which gave the merchant a lien on the re-
turns which the customer was able to acquire, after the wages
of the canoe men had been paid*, the engages, because of the
arduous nature of their work, being given first lien. Michigan
Pioneer and historical Collect ions
, IL, 475. Thus when the
trader Papin sold his furs to Todd, the latter gave a draft
which was placed to the account of beeves, who had furnished
a part of Papin' s outfit.
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then get nothing for himself. The peltry purchased from
Tabeau, along with a few beaver which he has picked up at a
low price, are being made up into packs which will be sent
down, this time by way of the lakes instead of the Grand .liver.
As Mr. LTichael Myers, another merchant at Michillimackinac
,
furnished a part of Tabeau 's outfit, Keeves is obliged to draw
upon his correspondents in his favor to the amount of 1,065
livres, to be paid only on condition, however, that the furs
are brought to market and sold. He also draws upon them in
favor of one I.Iontreuille, an engage" of Tabeau to whom there
is still a balance due on his wages. The debts which Papin
and Tabeau still owe are giving him considerable anxiety as
he fears they will not be discharged for a long time. They
owe Reeves himself 28,715 livres while they are indebted to
their other creditors to the amount of at least 36,000 livres.
The details contained in this correspondence between ..eeves
and Grant, Campion, and Company are in themselves of little
importance, but collectively, they throw considerable light
upon certain business aspects of the fur trade, illustrating
as they do the character of the relationship between the
Michillimackinac merchant and the Montreal firm, while at the
same time revealing some of the troubles and anxieties atten-
dant unon the conduct of the business.
From what has already been said, it will be readily
apparent that cooperation between the merchants engaged in the
fur trade was a great advantage - indeed, almost a necessity.
The small individual trader was greatly handicapped owing to
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the fact that his limited capital and resources compelled him
to lead a sort of hand-to-mouth existence in the conduct of
his affairs, and he was moreover obliged to depend upon another
merchant, his agent, to transact a large part of his business.
The turbulent and uncertain conditions under which the trade
was often carried on rendered it distinctly desirable, from
the standpoint of all concerned, that cooperative methods
should be enroloyed so far as -oossible. The tendency toward
centralization in the trade was very marked during the period
from 1774 to 1796 and it was at this time that the great and
powerful companies which dominated the northwest trade in the
early part of the nineteenth century may be said to have had
their origin. The cooperative methods which came to be em-
ployed varied from the simple agreement between individual
traders or firms, to the rich and powerful North-Test Company.
The relationship subsisting between the traders
operating in the Upper Country and the merchants of Montreal
rendered some definite understanding between the two very de-
sirable, especially in view of the enormous distances involved
in the fur traffic and the difficulty of communication. At
the time of the Revolution, David McCrae, ^ohn Kay, Peter
Barthe, and Charles Gratiot were associated in a joint concern
having its headquarters at Michillimackinac , and operating
under the name of ^avid LIcCrae and Company, their .Montreal
correspondent being the firm of William and John Kay. On
Anril 6, 1778 David McCrae and Company entered into a contract
With their correspondents, by which the latter agreed, for the

172
space of three years, to furnish the i-iichillimackinac concern
with such merchandise as they might require for carrying on
their trade, to supervise the making up of the outfits and the
sending them off each year; and, in short, to transact all the
necessary business at Montreal. The remuneration which they
were to receive for their services, as well as the terms of
payment, were set forth in the contract. The firm of David
McGrae and Company agreed to furnish their correspondents with
a memorandum of such goods as they might require in September
of each year, when the merchandise should be set aside for
their account, and they likewise agreed on their part to con-
sign the whole of their returns in furs to ffilliam and John
Kay. The value of the peltry was to be estimated by James
MeG-ill and John Porteous, and the Montreal firm had the option
of taking it at the appraised value, or of disposing of it to
whoever would give that amount or more. The advantages of
such an arrangement are perfectly abvious. It served as a
guarantee to David ivicCrae and Company that they would be sup-
plied each season with the goods necessary for their trade, and
±Agreement for the Indian Trade between uavid i-IcCrae
and Company of Michillimaekinac and William and John Kay of
Montreal, April 6, 1778. Toronto Public Library, vol. B, 75,168.
'It appears from the terms of the agreement that
William and John Kay acted as agents for the purchase of the
goods used by David LIcCrae and Company. The latter agreed to
pay for the merchandise at the rate of fifty per cent Halifax
advance on the sterling cost, and in case the Montreal firm v/as
obliged to buy any of the articles required, it was to receive
payment for them, together with interest from the time of pur-
chase, at the rate of six per cent.
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also as an assurance that their business interests at Montreal
would be properly attended to, thus enabling them to devote
their entire attention to their affairs at Michillimackinac
and its dependencies.
In the arrangement which has just been described,
however, there was no suggestion of a partnership between the
merchants of Michillimackinac and the Montreal firm. 'Jhere
were, however, certain very definite advantages to be derived
from an agreement, or partnership, whereby one concern might
carry on its business, both at Montreal, and in the Indian
country; in such a case, the profits of the agent, or middle-
man, were eliminated and there was an additional guarantee
that the entire business would be carried on in the interests
of those concerned. A partnership of this sort was the one
entered into between Richard Dobie and James Grant in 1787,
whereby the two made an agreement for carrying on the Indian
trade at the post of Temiscaminque and its dependencies for a
period of seven years. For the first three years Dobie was
to hold two third shares, and Grant, one third share in all
the outfits and returns of the trade, at the end of which time,
the partners were to share alike. Dobie agreed to furnish the
articles used in the trade upon certain terms stipulated in
the contract, and to transact all business at Montreal, without
charging any commission, while Grant on his side agreed to
winter at such posts as he might judge most advantageous, and
^"Articles of Agreement between Kichard Dobie and
James Grant, Merchants of Montreal." Beek, 1787, Ho. 254,
Arc! ives of Montreal.
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trade with the stock entrusted to him to the "best of his abili-
ty. Dobie was to receive two thirds of the profits during the
first three years, after which both parties were to share
alike, debts and losses being apportioned in the same manner
as profits, -he returns in furs were to be sold in Canada or
shipped to England by Dobie, whichever he might consider the
more advantageous method of disposing of them. Jhese articles
of agreement contain the germ of the idea which lay at the
foundation of the larger fur companies, recognizing as they do
the advantages to be derived from cooperation in the Indian
trade and the elimination of the "middleman." The position of
James Grant in the proposed arrangement bears more than a
superficial resemblance to that of the "wintering partner" of
the North-V.'est Company.
Cooperation also tended to do away with the evils
of competition, while at the sane time rendering possible a
more effective supervision of the conduct of the trade in the
Indian country, thus protecting it from the violence and dis-
order which were often so prevalent. It was to attain the
latter end that the General Store at Michillimackinac was formed
in 1779, when a sort of partnership was organized at the in-
stance of Major De Peyster, then commandant at Michillimackinac,
who suggested it as a measure rendered necessary by the war,
the whole purpose of the enterprise being to make possible a
more effective supervision of the trade in the Indian country."1"
^De Peyster to Haldirnand, October 5, 1779. I'lichigan
Pioneer Collections, Ii^ 390. The articles of agreement are
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Each merchant who signed the articles agreed to put all his
goods into the store at a price agreed upon by a committee,
and bound himself not to carry on any private trade with the
Indians. The proceeds were to be divided among the members
of the concern in proportion to the goods which each contri-
buted. Persons were to be chosen to winter among the Indians
by a general vote of the subscribers, subject to the approval
of the commandant of the post. One committee was designated,
whose duty it was to organize the various departments in which
the trade should be carried on, while another group was en-
trusted with the general supervision and management of the
enterprise. The articles were signed on July 1, 1779, and
v/ere to remain in force until July 31, 1780. It should be
printed in ibid .
,
X., 305. In volume IX., p. 658, is a "List
of the Proprietors of the General Store at Michilimackinac
,
the Number of Canoes each person .-a2£hPut in, their supposed
valun, and the present Residence oi^Proprietor • " The document
is undated, however, and there is on the face of it nothing
to indicate whether it pertains to the establishment of 1779,
or some later agreement. A comparison of the names in this
list with those signed, to the articles of 1779 showsthat the
Articles of Agreement bear some names not included in the list,
and vice versa. The position of the latter document among
the Haldimand papers seems to indicate that its date would
fall within the year 1780. It is very probable that the list
has reference to the condition of the store at some -oeriod in
the year 1780, whether under the original articles or not it
is impossible to say. It is unfortunate that the list is
undated, inasmuch as it contains some very interesting infor-
mation. The total number of canoes comprising the outfit of
the store is given as twenty-nine and one-fourth, and their
total value is estimated at 438,750 livres. The merchants
belonging to the concern resided at various places scattered
over a wide range of territory, including Montreal, LaPointe,
La Baye, St. Joseph's, Two Rivers, I.Iatchidash, the C^rand
River, the Mississippi, La Riviere au Sable, and Detroit; all
apparently, had business interests at Bliehillimackinac*

176
noted that this agreement in no wise altered the relationship
betv/een the individual traders and their correspondents at
Montreal, the members of the General Store continuing to obtain
their supplies as heretofore. -hey simply pooled their inter-
ests at the post for the purpose of ensuring order during the
continuation of hostilities; and, on the whole, the plan seems
to have fulfilled the purpose for which it was intended* Jut
it was a necessity for some form of trade supervision rather
than economic considerations which led to the establishment of
the store. The agreement was apparently renewed at the expira-
tion of the year, although in just what form it is impossible
to say, as there was some dissatisfaction with the original
plan, and in spite of all Sinclair's efforts to the contrary,
certain important changes were made in the management of the
concern. Prom the viewpoint of the individual merchant, an
unrestricted trade appeared to be more desirable than any ad-
ditional security which might attend a cooperative enterprise.
• Again in 1785, the merchants at the same post pooled
their interests in another general store, v/hich may be regarded
as a forerunner of the Mackinac Company, an organization which
nlayed an important part in the trade of the Great Lakes T re-
gion until it was absorbed by John Jacob Astor's American Pur
Company in 1808. Very little is known concerning the early
history of this enterprise, even the date of its origin having
been for long in doubt. I'he concern of 1785 was formed for
Sinclair to Haldimand, July 8, 1780. Michigan
Pioneer Collections, IX, 561.
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very different reasons from those which led to the establish-
ment of the General Store of 1779. After the close of the
Revolution, there followed a neriod of tremendous competition
in the fur trade. The market was glutted with merchandise, and
the consequence was that the individual interests of the traders
"began to suffer, and to this situation may he attributed the
origin of the Miehillimackinac enterprise as well as the Miami
Company, which was formed at about the same time.^" The general
store organized in 1785 has been referred to by various names.
According to Jean Baptiste Perrault, it was formed under the
name of the General Company of Lake Superior and the South, but
it was usually referred to as the General Society or the General
Store. The agreement of 1785 was to continue for a period of
The exportation of goods into the Indian country
reached the high water mark about 1783, when the value of the
merchandise for which licenses were issued was estimated at
£226,922 currency. Returns of Indian Trade Licenses . Statistics
for the year 1784 are lacking, but beginning with 1785 there was
a decline, and in 1787, the value of the goods exported dropped
to £97,972. These returns bear out the statements occurring in
the correspondence of the time, to the effect that the market
was glutted with merchandise, the result of which was great de-
pression in the trade. Henry to Edgar i November 22, 1786,
Letters and Accounts of the I-Iorth-V. est Co.
, 77; Memorial of
Joseph Howard to James Walker
,
Secretary to the Committee of
Commerce, Montreal, January 11, 1787. Canadian Archives, series
S, Indian Affairs; Askin to Todd & MoGill, June 22, 1786, Burton
Manuscript Collection, vol. 1, p. 181.
^Perrault Narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collections
,
XXXVTL, 536. There are numerous references to the
concern in the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XL, 514, e_t seq . ; Edgar to
Clark, October 23, 1786, Alvord, Kaskaskia records (I. H. Col.
V.), 395.
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three years. Among the merchants joined in the enterprise
were Gabriel Cotte, Andrew Todd, Etienne Campion, Charles
Chaboillez, one Marchessau, Jean Baptists Cadotte, John Sayer,
and Charles Patterson. The operations of the Company extended
over a wide range of country in the upper part of the Mississip-
pi Valley, from Lake Superior southward to the Illinois country,
and from Lake Michigan to the tribes dwelling far v/est of the
Mississippi in Spanish territory. Three departments v/ere or-
ganized and placed in charge of three directors; Charles Patter-
son was to superintend the trade of the upper Mississippi,
Etienne Campion that of the lower Mississippi, while John Sayer
was to take charge of the affairs of the Company in the Lake
Superior region. * The enterprise seems to have been far from
successful at the outset, however, Joseph Howard being authori-
ty for the statement that in 1786, the Company did not receive
returns on more than two-fifths of the outfits sent into the
2
Indian country. Though the original agreement was for a term
of three years, Perrault says that the Company broke up in 1787,
due to the mismanagement and inexperience of a number of clerks
who were thrown upon their own responsibility after the death
of Charles Patterson, director for the department of the upper
Mississippi. A reorganization was evidently effected at a
^"Perrault Narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collections , XXXVI I., 537. Perrault' s statements concerning the
organization of the company are corroborated by various passages
in the record of the "Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry" re-
ferred to in the preceding note.
2Memorial of Joseph Howard, January 11, 1787, Canadian
Archives, series S, Indian Affairs.
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later date, however, as references to the Mackinac Coinoany are
frequent until its final absorption in 1808. Very little is
known concerning the character of thi s later concern, beyond the
fact that it carried on an extensive trade in the Mississippi
country and the region south of Lake Superior."*"
The same causes which resulted in the establishment
of the General Store at Michillimackinac led to the formation
of the Miami Company by the merchants of Detroit. Ene trade at
that post was in a very bad state during the years following the
Revolution, as many more goods were sent into the Indian country
than could be profitably disposed of, while the unrest of the
Indians in the region northwest of the Ohio rendered the trade
still more "orecarious for the individual merchant. In order to
avoid the evil effects of the competition from which they were
all suffering, a group of Detroit merchants engaged in the In-
dian trade entered into a general partnership 7/hicn was known
as the Miami Company. The agreement was probably formed in 1786
and the stock was divided into six shares, which in 1789 were
held by the following Detroit merchants: Leith and shepherd;
Sharp and Wallace; Lieldrum and Park; James Abbott;; Angus Mackin-
tosh* and John Askin. 4 The Conroany supnlied outfits to those
"h?errault narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collect ions . XXXVI L, 545.
p
Henry to i^dgar, September 1, 1785, Letters and Accounts
of the Korth-- est Co.
, 67; March 5, 1786, p. 71; November 12, 1786,
p. 77; October 22, 1787, p. 81.
Askin to Todd & McGill, June 22, 1786. burton Manu-
script Collection, vol. 1, 181.
4
Power of Attorney to John Askin by the Miami Company,
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resorting to the t>ost of Detroit and at the same time carried
on a trade of its own in the Indian country "by means of hired
clerks, who were forbidden to do any business on their own ac-
count."^" At the time when the enterprise was launched, the mem-
bers were of the opinion that their outfits might be reduced
to less than half what they formerly amounted to, taken sepa-
rately, and still they expected that their individual profits
would be at least equal to, or greater than they were before
the formation of the Company - all of which is an interesting
commentary upon the depression which had resulted from extreme
competition. ^ There is no way of learning to what extent their
expectations were realized, but in general, the Indian trade
of Detroit during this period does not appear to have prospered.
By far the most important business development in the
fur trade between 1763 and 1796 was the rise of the North-west
Company, though its growth 7/as so gradual that it is difficult
if not impossible to say when it actually came into existence.
4
September 22, 1789. 3urton Uanuscript Collection, vol. 1, p. 299.
"'"Askin to Vigo, Uarch 15, 1786, .Jurton Uanuscript Col-
lection, vol. 1, p. 151; "Agreement between the Uiami Co. and
Gabriel Hunot, Trader," September 13, 1787, i hid . , 249; Instruc-
tions to Gabriel Hunot, September 13, 1787, ibid . , 253.
2Askin to Toad & McGill, June 22, 1786, Burton Uanu-
script Collection, vol. 1, p. 181.
It is not even certain how long the Company continued
in operation. That it was still in existence in 1789 is indi-
cated by the power of Attorney granted to Askin in that year.
Burton Manuscript Collection, vol. 1, p. 299.
4
Probably the best general account of the I;orth-'..est
Company thus far written, is Alexander l.Iackenzie ' s , "A General
History of the Fur Trade from Canada to the Uorth-T est , " which
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Prior to the conquest of Canada, the French had penetrated the
country "beyond Lake Superior and had opened up a considerable
trade in the region, but as a result of the Indian war and
general confusion which attended the English occupation, the
traffic in furs ceased for a number of years* Alexander Kenry
was among the first of the English traders to enter the Up-oer
Country after the Conquest. 3y 1765 he had extended his oper-
ations to Chequamegon, on the south shore of Lake Superior, and
in 1767, British traders were penetrating the Northwest as far
as Lake Winnipeg, although these early efforts to extend the
trade were greatly hindered by the hostility of the Indians.
In 1769, the Frobisher brothers formed a connection with Todd
and McGill and, after one unsuccessful attempt, succeeded in
reaching Lake Bourbon and opening up a trade with the tribes
in that quarter. thenceforth, the commerce of the Northwest
was rapidly extended and new posts were established in regions
unknown to the French.^ Besides the merchants already mentioned,
other pioneer traders in the region beyond Lake Superior were
»
- 4Jean Baptiste Cadotte, ^eter Pond, and a Mr. Patterson."
serves as an introduction to his Voyages .
.Ante .,15".
^Benjamin and Joseph Frobisher to Haldimand, October
4, 1784, Canadian Archives Reuort , 1890, p. 50; Henry, Travels ,
Bain ed. , 183 et seq.; Mackenzie, Voyages * ed. of 1902, L,p.xxix.
Benjamin and Joseph Frobisher to Haldimand, October 4,
1784, Canadian Archives Report > 1890, p. 50. There were three
of the Frgbisher brothers who were interested in the fur trade,
Thomas, Joseph, and Benjamin.
4Henry, Travels , Bain ed., 251, 255; Wisconsin Histori -
cal Collections, XLZ., 163, n. 20.
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According to L. R. Mas son, the Frobisher trothers
met Henry, Cadotte, and Pond while trading in the interior and
formed an agreement which was the origin of the IIorth-T.'est Com-
pany."1" This was probably the union referred to by Benjamin and
Joseph Trobisher in the letter of 1784 already cited; "Taught
however by experience that separate Interests were the Jane of
that Trade we lost no time to form with those Gentlemen
,
[Todd
& McGill] and some others, a Company," etc. 2 In 1778 another
attempt was made to organize the trade of the region beyond
Lake Superior, for which Grand Portage had become the general
rendezvous.*^ It apDears that during the early years of the
devolution, a new set of adventurers had entered the region
and there followed an era of unrestrained competition, which
resulted in much disorder and led certain of the older group
to withdraw altogether. 4 It was doubtless this situation which
led the northwest traders to petition Sir Guy Carleton, with
the result that Be Peyster sent an officer and a half dozen
men to Grand Portage in the summer of 1778 to settle the disputes
5
which were disturbing the commerce of the region. Although
"Slasson, Bourgeois de la Camnagnie du Nord-Quest
,
I., 11.
p
Canadian Archives Report , 1890, p. 50.
*^It is said that this agreement took place at sturgeon
Lake, and that Henry, Pond, and the Hrobisher brothers were among
the traders who joined their interests at this time. uisconsin
Historical Collections
,
ZVIIL, 314, n. 39. See also Mackenzie,
Voyages , ed. of 1902, L, p. xxxv.
Canadian Archives Report
, 1890, p. 50; Mackenzie,
Voyages , ed. of 1902, L, pp.xxxi-xxxiv. Mackenzie likewise com-
plained of the methods employed by the Hudsons ' Bey Company.
^De Peyster to Haldimand, September 16, 1778, I.lichigan
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definite information as to the purpose of the agreement of 1778
is lacking, it is very probable that it was formed with the
idea of resisting the competition of the interlopers. The trans-
action of the business of the concern was placed in the hands
of Joseph Frobisher and John McGill. The term "ITorth-Y. est Com-
pany" had by 1778 come into actual use as is revealed in the
correspondence of John Askin, who was then located at Michilli-
mackinac; and that the trade of these merchants had by this
time reached considerable dimensions is indicated by a passage
in one of his letters to Todd and McGill, in which he refers
to "the great Co. (as we must now term them for distinction
sake)
.
nl
Those who were engaged in the trade centering at Grand
Portage formed still another agreement in 1780, by which they
combined their stock of goods and divided the enterprise into
sixteen shares. These shares were held by various Montreal
firms which were in the habit of forwarding supplies for the
northwest trade, among them being Todd and McGill; .Benjamin and
Joseph ITrobisher; McGill and Patterson; and I.IcTavish and Company.
It is difficult to say precisely what was the relation between
Pioneer Collections
,
IX, 570; Askin to Beausoleille , May 18,1778,
7. is cons in Historical collections
,
XIX., 359.
•^Askin to Probisher and McGill, June 15, 1778, V.i scon-
sin Historical Collections
,
XIX, 245; Askin to Todd & McGill,
June 14, 1778, ibid . , 248.
2
Grant to Haldimand, April 24, 1780. Canadian Archives
Re-oort
, 1888, p. 61. The reasons for this pooling of interests
may be best given in Grant's ov/n words: "Last year the passes for
the Indian goods were given out so late, that it was impossible
to forward goods to the places of destination, especially in the
Horth-West. ?or that reason those concerned in that quarter
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this group of merchants and the "Company" to v/hich Askin fur-
nished supplies in 1778, but it is very likely that they were
both made up of the same interests. Meanwhile, the northwest
trade was growing rapidly, as is evidenced by the fact that in
1780 the annual returns in furs from that region were estimated
to be worth £50,000 sterling, while nearly three hundred men
were employed in the country beyond Lake Superior."'"
Finally, In the winter of 1783 and 1784, the merchants
trading to the Northwest definitely consolidated their interests
by the formation of a sixteen-share company at Montreal, v/hich
was to last for a period of five years. No capital in the form
of money was put into the enterprise but each share-holder fur-
nished a certain proportion of the goods to be used in the
trade. Benjamin and Joseph i?"robisher were named directors of
the company, it being their duty to superintend the making up
of the outfits each year and the licenses required for the
transportation of goods to the Upper Country were issued in
their name* All the merchants engaged in the commerce of this
joined their stock together and made one common interest of the
whole, as it continues at present in the hands of the different
persons or companies as mentioned at foot of this." Why the join-
ing of their stock should have been any compensation for the de-
lay in granting passes it is difficult to see.
^Petition from the North-West Traders, May 11, 1780,
Canadian Archives Rejoort
, 1888, p. 61. 2?his estimate was very
likely a little high.
pWisconsin Historical Collections
, XIX, 163, n. 20;
Frobisher to Mabane, April 19, 1784, Canadian Archives He port ,
1888, p. 63; Mackenzie, Voyages , ed. of 1902, p.xlii; Masson,
Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Lord -Quest , I* 20; returns of Indisn
Trade Licenses
.
Mackenzie says that Simon McTavish was likewise
one of the directors.

185
region, however, were not satisfied with the new arrangement,
and Peter Pond and Peter Pangman went to Montreal* where they
sought the aid of John Gregory and Normand LcLeod in the forma-
tion of a new company. -hey succeeded in organizing a rival
concern and in 1785 established a post at Grand Portage, across
the river from that of their rivals of the North-V/est Company,
and proceeded to divide the region into departments for the
purpose of traded Their competition could not have been a very
serious matter, however, if one may judge from the number of
canoes sent up by the opposing companies. Each year, from 1785
to 1790, the North-Vest Company sent up to the Grand Portage
from twenty-five to thirty-four canoe loads of goods, as well
as several bateaux by way of the Lakes, while their rivals did
not send up more than nine canoes during any one year of the
time in which they were in competition.
Another agreement was formed by the North-".. est Company
in 1787, this time for a period of nine years, while the number
of shares was increased to twenty. The promoters of the rival
concern were taken into the new company and thus opposition in
that quarter was destroyed. Simon LIcTavish, Joseph Probisher,
and John Gregory became directors of the Company, and as a re-
muneration for their services, were given a commission in addi-
3tion to their respective shares in the profits of the concern.
"4*lasson, Bourgeois de la Com-nagnie du Lord-Quest , L, 21
Selkirk, British Pur Trade , 11 ; Mackenzie, Voyages , ed. of 1902,
I., pp.xlii-xliv.
2
Returns of Indian I rad e Licenses .
3
V. i scons in Historical collections , XIX, 163, n. 20;
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Another reorganisation was effected in 1790, when certain mem-
bers of the Company withdrew, their shares being purchased by
their partners. ^ In 1798, the number of shares was increased
from twenty to forty-six, more of the members retiring, while
certain of the more enterprising clerks were promoted to partner-
ship. The extent to which the affairs of the concern had pros-
pered is revealed by the fact that at the time of the reorgani-
zation of 1798, there v/ere in the employ of the Company fifty
clerks, seventy-one interpreters, 1,120 voyageurs, and thirty-
five guides.^
It will be apparent that the organization of the
North-west Company differed from that of the company established
at i.Iichillimackinac in 1785 and from that of the Miami Company.
The two last-named concerns, besides carrying on their business
by means of hired clerks, likewise furnished outfits to private
traders. The merchants of Detroit continued to secure their
supplies from their correspondents at Montreal, just as they
had done prior to the formation of the partnership. The Worth-
iest Company, on ohe other hand, conducted its own business
through all its various stages, importing such goods as v/ere
I.Iasson, bourgeois de _la Compagnie du Ilord-Ouest
,
L, 30; Macken-
zie, Voyages, ed. of 1902, p. xlv. The members of the Company
who managed the business in the Indian country v/ere known as
"wintering partners." Y/hen partners holding double shares re-
tired, certain of the clerks or "bourgeois" in the employ of the
Company often succeeded to one of the shares, ibid
. ,
pp.xlvi-
xlviii
.
J-Masson, Bourgeois de la compagnie du l ord-Quest
,
L, 42.
p
^Mackenzie, /oyages , ed. of 1902, L, p. liii.
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required from London, and trading directly with the savages by
means of hired clerks, or "bourgeois," the net proceeds being
divided among the various partners in proportion to the shares
which they held in the Company. Such a system not only rendered
possible a strict supervision of the trade in all its stages,
but also did array with the middleman's profits.
Thus there was a tendency for the fur trade to become
centralized, instead of remaining under the control of a large
number of individuals. There is no way of ascertaining the
number of traders operating in the Indian country itself, but
a study of the returns of trade licenses issuer! from 1777 to
1790 clearly indicates that the trade between Montreal and the
Upper country was becoming centered in fewer hands. The number
of individual traders and companies who were licensed to carry
goods to the Upper Country in 1790 was only about half the num-
ber to whom passports were issued in 1777. Luring the earlier
years, the names of a great many small traders appear whose
outfits consisted of but a single canoe-load of goods, while in
1790, on the other hand, the name of but one trader appears in
the returns, whose outfit consisted of a single canoe. * The
economic conditions which characterized the fur trade favored
the development of the large-scale enterprise, the small trader
tending to disappear, with the result that before 1800, the ten-
dencies which were to centralize the control of the trade in the
hands of two or three great companies had already begun to be
clearly defined.
Returns of Indian Trade Licenses.
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CHAPTER VI.
The Fur Trade Process
Though repeated referenoes have been made to the small
traders who obtained their merchandise at Detroit and Michilli-
mackinac, nothing has been said concerning their activities in
the Indian country. While the complex mechanism of distribution
whioh grew up in connection with the fur traffic underwent a re-
markable development, the very nature of the trade in the wilder-
ness caused it to ohange but little and until the time when the
industry itself disappeared, the wild and adventurous lives of
those who oarried their goods to the hunting grounds of the in-
terior oontinued to shed a glamor of romance over the peltry trade.
On the other hand, this is an aspect of the subject which can be
little more than mentioned at this point, and indeed, the lives
and adventures of these forest argonauts may be best studied in
their own diaries and journals.
Upon the approaoh of winter, the Indians were accus-
tomed to depart from their summer camps for the hunting grounds.
It was the practice of the traders either to follow the savages
to their wintering grounds, or to establish themselves where they
might interoept them as they passed back and forth through the
interior or returned in the spring with their peltry; so in the
late summer or fall, before the ice should render the streams im-
passable for their canoes, they departed from the posts whence
they drew their supplies and set out for the Indian country.
Having seleoted a suitable spot, the trader erected a shelter of
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some sort and made ready to open up his winter's traffic. 1
As soon as his whereabouts became known, he was very-
apt to receive visits from bands of Indians hunting in the neigh-
borhood; and if they brought furs with them, he endeavored by
shrewd bargaining and a liberal use of rum, to seoure them in ex-
change for such goods as the savages regarded as necessities.
If the trader considered the Indians with whom he was dealing
trustworthy, he gave them or edit, — that is to say, advanced
them oertain goods, relying upon their bringing back the returns
from their hunts in order to settle the account. This was a
custom which was much followed, and appears to have been a fair-
ly satisfactory method of conducting the trade, though the
Indians occasionally stole their credits, carrying off their
furs to some rival trader, a practice in which they were often
4
encouraged by the latter. In the actual barter with the
Indians, the "plus" was the unit of value, being reckoned at one
beaver skin. Credits, as well as the values of goods and skins,
were reckoned in "plus." ^
The Indian trade required a high degree of ability and
resourcefulness on the part of those engaged therein, and no
little courage as well. The visits of the savages to the trad-
Perrault Narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collections
,
XXXVIL, 526; Long's Voyages, 1768-1782, Thwaites,
Early Western Travels
,
II., 122, 132; Pond's Journal, Wisconsin
Historical Collections , XVI I L, 340.
^Perrault Narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collections, XXXVIL, 526, 531, 562.
5Ibid., 515, 538, 562.
4Ibid
., 547.5
Missouri Historical Collections, 1912, p. 33, note.
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er's headquarters were usually made the occasion for drunken
"frolics, " which often ended disastrously to one or more of the
participants and occasionally to the trader himself. 1 The
whims of the savages must be studied and a certain degree of
restraint exeroised over them without losing their friendship.
Though the trader's existence was never humdrum, to say the
least, it was sometimes enlivened by competition, the strenuous
nature of which is revealed in a passage from Perrault's narra-
tive in which, referring to his rivalry on one occasion with a
trader by the name of Giasson, he says, *I assure you that I did
not Sleep for more than fifteen nights in my bed, and it was with
difficulty that we bore off the honors, mr. giasson got only
5 packs, and we had taken enough to make 14-1/2. It was lit-
tle wonder that experience was regarded as the most valuable as-
set which a trader could possess.
Thousands of miles removed from the wilderness in which
the trader lived and bartered with the Indians, though closely
linked thereto by the great business organization which has al-
ready been described, was the city of London, the fur market of
the world and the clearing house for practically all the peltry
gathered in North America. Besides those exported from Canada,
Long's Voyages, Early Western Travels
,
IL, 93, 93.
Both Long's Voyages and the PerrauH; Narrative contain numerous
descriptions of these "frolics.
"
2Perrault Narrative, Michig an Pioneer and Historical
Collections, XXXVII, 542.
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many furs were annually aent to England from the region occupied
by the Hudson's Bay Company, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, while
a few found their way to the English market from the United
States. 1 Great public sales were held in London each year, usu-
ally during the months of January, February, and March, whioh
were attended by some of the leading fur merchants of Europe or
their agents. 2 With the exoeption of beaver skins, a compara-
tively small amount of the peltry which came to the London market
was actually used in England. In 1789 or thereabouts, it was
estimated that about five-eighths of the beaver imported into
Great Britain was consumed at home in the manufacture of hats,
while the remainder was sold abroad. A considerable number of
fox and deer skins were also used in England but of the other
varieties of peltry imported from North America, by far the
greater number, including marten, otter, raccoon, muskrat, cat,
bear, etc., were exported to various European countries. A very
large number of the furs sold in the London market found their
way to Germany, France, and Russia, while a smaller number were
purohased by the merohants of Italy, Spain and Holland. Accord-
ing to an estimate whioh was probably drawn up about 1790, the
value of the returns in peltry annually imported to England was
1
"Importation of Skins from Canada 1788 and sold in
January, February, and Maroh 1789." Canadian Archives, series Q,
vol. 43-2, p. 826. The total value of the peltry sold is plaoed
at L 191, 277. See also, American State Papers , Commerce and Nav -
igat ion, I, 160.
2
"Importation of Skins from Canada. M Canadian Arohives,
series Q, vol. 43-2, p. 826. It is apparent from a study of var-
ious aooount sales of furs, together with the correspondence of
the merchants themselves, that the sales were generally held in
January, February, and Maroh. Foreign-looking names of purchasers
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from b 200,000 to L 250,000, of which amount, fura to the value
of only some b 60,000 were consumed at home, while the remainder
were shipped abroad. China was the ultimate destination of a
large part of the peltry which was exported from North Amerioa.
Prior to 1785, most of the beaver and otter skins which were
sent to Russia were re-exported to China, being carried overland
through Siberia, but thi3 trade had to be discontinued to a large
extent because of the fact that communication between the two
countries was interrupted. 1 The result was that a direot trade
was opened up by British merohants with China, furs being carried
2
to Canton in the East India Company's ships.
In view of the fact that a great deal of the peltry
sent to London was reshipped to various European oountries, it is
occasionally appear in these accounts as for example, Shrieber,
Weigand, Thellison, and Putt. "Account Sales of Furs," May 6,
1779. Toronto Public Library, vol. B. 75, p. 240.
^Two reasons for this interruption of the trade were
given; one to the effect that communication between Russia and
China wa3 shut off because of a war between the former nation
and the Turk3; the other being that the interruption wa3 oc-
casioned by a dispute between the Russians and the Chinese them-
selves. Frobisher to Coffin, Powell, and McGill, February 1,
1788, Frobisher Letter Book
,
42; "Observations relating to the
proposed Settlement on the N. W. Coast of Am^. " Canadian
Archives Transcripts, C. 0. 42, vol. 21, p. 107.
2When Lord Macartney wa3 sent to China to negotiate a
commercial agreement, a committee of London merohants petitioned
that he be instructed to try and arrange for the importation of
beaver and other furs, on as favorable terms as possible. Mer-
chants to Dundas, August 10, 1792. Canadian Archives, series Q,
vol. 61-2, p. 463. A project was also formed for a direct
trade with China, to be carried on from the northwest coast of
North Amerioa. "Observations relating to the proposed Settle-
ment on the N. W. Coast of Am^. " Canadian Archives Transcripts,
C. 0. 42, vol. 21, p. 107.
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not at all strange that the market should have been very sensi-
tive to 3hifts and changes in continental politics, and that the
fur sales 3hould have been affected in very marked degree by war3
and rumors of wars. The interruption of the trade between
Russia and China, which ha3 just been noted, caused a marked de-
cline in the price of furs in London, beaver and otter being par-
ticularly affected, inasmuch as St, Petersburg had previously been
the principal market for those varieties. 1
The international upheaval accompanying the Frenoh
Revolution likewise had a very injurious effeot upon the market.
As the war clouds gathered over Europe, the forebodings of the
merchants increased and early in 1790, John Richardson wrote from
London, "I tremble for the Fur Sales - but a general Commotion in
Europe must be ruinous to them. M ^ His fears were not without
justification, for in January of 1793, before the actual outbreak
of hostilities between England and France, the gravity of the sit-
uation was clearly reflected in the state of the market. Hudson
Bay beaver which in the preceding season had sold for nineteen and
twenty shillings a pound dropped to thirteen and fifteen, while
merohants anticipated a fall in prices equal to twenty or thirty
per cent as a result of the impending struggle. 5 When France
"••Letter to Thoma3 Williams & Co., Ootober 24, 1785,
Burton Manuscript Collection, vol. 819, pi 100; Frobisher to Coffin
and Powell, January 10, 1788. Frobisher Letter Book , 37.
o
Richardson to Porteous, February 15, 1790, Canadian
Archives, M. 852.
3Robertson to Askin, January 31, 1793, Burton Manu-
script Collection, vol. 2, p. 88.
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finally declared war on England in April of 1793, a oommercial
panio ensued, and in the general demoralization of bu3ines3,
those engaged in the Canada trade suffered along with the rest. 1
The price of furs went still lower and certain of the merchants
of Quebeo suffered an actual loss on the peltry which they had
consigned to their London agents to be sold. William Robertson
of Detroit, who was abroad at the time, reported that upwards
of 40,000 furs bought in London had been shipped to New York and
Philadelphia, a fact which i3 a rather interesting commentary on
the trade situation, as the Unit9d States wa3 not usually re-
garded as a market for the peltry sold in England. Robertson
advised hi3 friend John Askin to withdraw from the Indian trade
so far as possible as there was no prospect that the situation
would mend in the near future. 2 The feelings of those inter-
ested in the fur trade are well illustrated by the words of
John Richardson: "The Returns from the Indian Country are this
year very bad, whioh with the great fall in prices at home, will
go nigh t6 ruin every man concerned in the Trade—F. R. & Co.
[Forsyth, Richardson, and Company J are most severe sufferers by
last years Shipments—May all the curses of Emaulphus fall upon
those Sans Culottes Villains of France ? w5
Though accurate information concerning the state of
the London market is meager, the statistics quoted in the ap-
ARobertson to Askin, April 10, 1793, Burton Manuscript
Collection, vol. 2, p. 121.
2Robertson to Askin, April 23, 1793, ibid . , 133.
3Richard8on to Porteous, August 15, 1793, Canadian
Archives, M. 852.
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pended note ar9 sufficient to 3how certain of the fluctuations
in the prioe of furs during the year3 which followed the Revolu-
tion. 1 Prices in 1784 were unusually good, but by 1789, the
interruption of the communication between Russia and China had
made its influence felt. In 1795, rumors of approaching war
oaused a still further deoline. By 1802, however, prices had
begun to rise again. Needless to say, merchants in England en-
deavored to keep their friends and correspondents in America in
close touch with the condition of the London market, and their
letters throw many interesting sidelights upon the havoc played
by European complications.
The problem of transporting goods and peltry between
the Indians* hunting grounds and the London fur market was one
of the principal eoonomic factors which the merchants and traders
*The following table will show the fluctuations in the
prices of a few common varieties of peltry.
1784 j 1789 1703 1802Otter 27/ - 50/ 25/10 18/ 28/6
Mink 4/6 - 6/ 2/4 2/ 4/6
Raccoon 3/3 - 5/6 2/9 l/9 3/4
Bear 40/6 - 50 21/ 8 30/ 55/
The figures quoted for 1784 are from "A Price Current of Skins,
& c. imported at London, from Canada. " Burton Manuscript Col-
lection, vol. 818, p. 177; those for 1789 are the average prices
at which these particular furs sold in January, February, and
March of that year, and are to be found in Canadian Arohives,
series Q, vol. 43-2, p. 826; those for 1793 are the prices paid
for an assortment belonging to William Grant, from an account
Sales in the Baby MSS. ; the prices quoted for 1802 are averages,
taken from an enclosure in a letter of Milne to Hobart, October
30, 1802, Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 89, p. 144.
2
Sansom & Co. to Thomas Williams & Co., Maroh 16, 1784,
April 5, 1784. Burton Manuscript Collection, vol. 817, p. 36.
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were obliged to take into aocount. There were two routes from
Montreal to the posts of Miohillimaokinao and Detroit, the one
by way of the Grand or Ottawa River, Lake Nipissing, and the
French River, and the other by way of the St. Lawrence and the
Great Lakes, Most of the trade of Detroit and its dependencies
was oarried on by the southern route, although peltry was occa-
sionally shipped to Miohillimaokinao, to be sent down by way of
the Ottawa River. 1 The Miohillimaokinao trade was oarried on
through both channels, furs and merchandise, including rum,
firearms, and ammunition, being as a general rule transported
over the northern route, while bulkier articles, such as corn,
flour, and other provisions, were carried by way of the lakes,
though furs were also occasionally sent down to Montreal from
that post in sailing vessels. Indian goods might also be sent
up by way of the lakes when there was no particular hurry for
them. 2
Communication between Montreal and Michillimackinao
was much more rapid by way of the Ottawa River than by the lake
route, the relative distance being very much shorter, as may be
XA list of exports from Detroit to Michillimackinao
and St. Mary's between April 15 and November 20, 1793, includes
1979 packs of peltry, Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 280-2,
p. 396. In all probability these furs were carried from
Michillimackinao down to Montreal in canoes.
2Reeves to Grant, Campion, & Co., August 31, 1794,
Baby MSS. See Returns of Indian Trade Licenses for list of
canoes going to the Upper Country by way of the Ottawa River,
A series of letters written by John Askin in 1778 throws a good
deal of light on transportation in the Upper Country at the
time of the Revolution. Wisconsin Historical Collections,
XIX., 235-259.
'
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seen from a glanoe at the map. The Ottawa River route was a
difficult one, however, because of the large number of falls and
rapids which interrupted navigation, there being upwards of forty
carrying places between Montreal and Michillimackinao, where the
canoes must be unloaded and their cargoes transported, sometimes
for considerable distances, on the backs of the engage's . The
oharacter of the stream in faot rendered navigation impossible
for anything excepting canoes, * To one who holds the modern
conception of such craft, however, the load which could be car-
ried in one of the old "Northwest canoes 1' is rather surprising.
The cargo was generally three or four tons in weight and as the
canoe was navigated by eight men and occasionally carried one or
two clerks besides, the load was increased by several hundred
pounds. The canoes themselves were made of birchbark and in
size were perhaps thirty-five feet long, four or five feet wide,
and two feet and a half in depth. The average cargo of peltry
consisted of about thirty-six packs, while the voyage from
Michillimaokinac to Montreal wa3 often accomplished in three weeks
though of course the time required might vary considerably,
^Frobisher to Hamilton, May 2, 1735. Canadian Archives -
Report
, 1890, p. 55.
2Canadian Arohives, series Q, vol. 280-2, p. 405. For
a good description of the fur-carrying canoe and its navigation,
see Henry, Travels
, Bain ed. 13 et seq.
3Canoe Driver's Receipts, Baby MSS. Many of the let-
ters in the Baby collection bear the dates on whioh they were re-
ceived, in the form of an endorsement. By comparing the endorse-
ment with the date of the letter itself, it is possible to deter-
mine the length of time consumed in the journey from Miohilli-
maokinac. According to an anonymous account of a trip to the
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The economic importance of transportation in the business of the
fur trade is evidenced by the faot that the freight on a ton of
goods carried by canoe from Montreal to Michillimackinac by way
of the Ottawa River was estimated at more than forty-3even
pounds.*
Trade by the southern route was carried on in bateaux
and sailing vessels, the former being employed to carry goods
and furs on the St. Lawrence between Lachine and the outlet of
Lake Ontario, while either sailing vessels or bateaux might be
used upon the lakes. During the Revolution and the years which
followed, when ti» navigation by vessels other than the King's
ships was prohibited, merchandise was unloaded from the bateaux
at Carleton Island and placed aboard ship. The goods must be
unloaded again at Niagara and transported across the carrying
place, after which they were reloaded in the King's ve3sel3 at
the foot of Lake Erie, whence communication with Detroit and
Michillimackinac was uninterrupted. After the restriction upon
the navigation of the lakes in private vessels had been removed,
merchant shipping increased with considerable rapidity.
Upper Country in 1793, oontained in the Ma3son collection, a
little more than a month was required for the journey from
Lachine to the Sault.
Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 280-2, p. 403.
2
Information concerning the navigation of the lakes
has been derived from numerous petitions and letters upon the
subject of trade and navigation, as for example, the memorial
of the merchants of Montreal, Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Collections
,
XX, 58.
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To give a detailed account of the communications be-
tween Detroit and Michillimackinac and the posts and hunting
grounds in the Indian Country would require more time than can
be given the matter here. There were, however, certain well-
defined ohannels through which passed the greater part of the
commerce of the interior. Many of those who resorted to upper
Louisiana reached the Mississippi by way of Lake Superior and the
St. Croix River. 1 Traders had access from Lake Michigan to the
Mississippi by two principal routes: they could go either by way
of the Fox and Wisoonsin Rivers, or by way of the Illinois, the
latter stream being reached either by the Chicago River, or by
the St. Joseph and the Kankakee. Traders going from Detroit
to Vincennes and the surrounding country ascended the Miami
3River and crossed a portage to the Wabash; while numerous riv-
ers and portages gave access to the Shawnee country and other
more eastern parts of the Ohio valley. These interior streams
were usually navigated in canoes, goods being carried across the
portages by means of carts or horses, or on the backs of the
engages
. Certain of the portages and carrying places which have
been mentioned were granted to individuals, who enjoyed exclusive
rights to the transportation of goods for the merchants and
traders resorting thereto. Privileges of thi3 sort were granted
at the carrying plaoe of Niagara and the Miami portage. 4
Winsor, The Westward Movement , 468.
2Dick3on to Hamilton, July 14, 1793, Canadian Arohives,
series Q, vol. 280-2, p. 364; Hulbert, Portage Paths , 165.
5Hulbert, Portage Paths , 164.
4Petition of Alexander Ellice in Behalf of Detroit
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The moat picturesque of all the persona engaged in the
fur trade were the "voyag eurs " who navigated the canoes and
bateaux on the great system of lakes and rivers of the Northwest.
They were nearly all French-Canadians and formed a distinot class
whose principal occupation was the navigation of the trading
craft between Laohine and the upper posts, as well as between
the upper posts and the Indian country. The voyageur or engage ,
as he was usually called, was obliged to enter into a formal con-
tract with his employer in the presence of a notary public at
Montreal before setting out for the Upper Country. This con-
tract, or engagement
, as it was called, indicated the place to
which he agreed to go, the time when he was to be allowed tore-
turn, the amount of hi3 wages, and the equipment which was to be
furnished him before setting out. The homes of a great many of
the engages were in Montreal and the little French villages
thereabouts and some of the engagements even indicate the parish
to whioh they belonged. They were for the most part an unedu-
cated clas3, as is shown by the fact that a majority of them were
unable to sign their names to these contracts. Those who navi-
gated the canoes were designated according to their position in
the craft. There was the milieu , or middleman, the devant , and
the gouvernait, the last two being persons of particular skill,
who occupied respective positions in the front and rear enda of
the craft; the canoe itself, or the brigade, if there were more
Merchants, May 26, 1779. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Col-
lections, XIX, 424; Letter to Major Basaett, October 10, T77S7
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
X., 256.
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1
than one, was under the charge of a guide . Besides those who
manned the canoes and bateaux, there were the matelots , or sail-
ors, who bound themselves to serve for a given period on board
«~>
merchant vessels sailing the lakes. * When a canoe set out from
Michillimackinac the guide in charge gave a receipt, containing
a statement of the furs entrusted to his care, promising to de-
liver the canoe and its cargo intact to the persons to whom it
was consigned, "saving the risks of the River. The canoe and
the engage were both relics of the old French regime, vrtiich the
British merchants found at their disposal when they entered
Canada. The personnel of those engaged in the business of the
fur trade gradually changed, but this was not true of the men who
navigated the canoes upon the mighty lakes and rivers of the Norths
west. As a means of transportation, neither the canoe nor the
engage could be improved upon by the newcomers and the French-
Canadian voyageur
. ?/ith his picturesque attire and rollicking
songs remained to add a touch of color and romance to the fur
trade until the industry itself finally disappeared.'*
There has been a tendency to picture the fur trade in
glowing colors from the business standpoint; and sometimes one
iVovageurs ' engagements, Notarial Records, Archives of
Montreal; Henry, Travels
, Bain ed. , 14; Mackenzie, Voyages , I. p.
LV
* 2^Notarial Records, Archives of Montreal.
5Canoe-Man's Receipt, Baby MSS.
4For some of the songs of the Canadian vovageurs . see
Hunt ' s Merchants' Magazine
,
III., 189.
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is apt to receive the impression that the industry was tremendous-
ly profitable for all concerned, all that was necessary in order
to make a fortune being for the trader to sally forth into the
wilderness, give the Indians a few trinkets in exchange for furs
of ten times their value, carry the peltry to market, and reap
the profit. But there were heavy expenses and large risks in-
volved in the conduct of the fur trade, an occupation in which
experience and shrewd judgment were essential to success, just
as in any other form of business. In many cases the outfits
which were finally traded to the Indians were made up of goods
which were received at third or fourth hand, and upon which a
profit or commission was received by the London firm, the Montreal
merohant, and the trader at Michillimackinac or Detroit. The
same was true of the furs which were marketed in London,^ After
making due allowance for the pessimism which often characterizes
business correspondence, the lugubrious tone of many of the let-
ters whioh passed between the merchants and traders of the period
leads one to the conclusion that the fur traffic was by no means
always an easy and certain road to wealth.
In addition to the items of expense which were to be
anticipated in the ordinary ccurse of events, the conditions
under which the fur trade must be carried on rendered it subject
to very great business risks. The transportation of goods and
ADavid McCrae & Co. in Account with William Kay.
Toronto Public Library, vol. B. 75, pp. 170-241. These accounts,
which are of various dates from 1777 to 1782, are very illuminat-
ing with regard to the numerous expenses involved in the conduct
of the fur trade. Account Sales of Purs, Baby MSS.

203
peltry was necessarily attended by very considerable danger,
the passage of the Ottawa River being particularly perilous,
due to the turbulence of the stream and the frail character of
the craft in which it was navigated. Mishaps were numerous in
which both engages and cargo were lost, and in 1791, a bill was
enacted by the Legislative Counoil of Quebec, prohibiting the
sale of liquor to voyageur3 along a certain stretch of the Ottawa
River, in order to avoid the many accidents which occurred when
the canoemen endeavored to shoot the rapids while in an intoxi-
cated condition. When it is remembered that a canoe carried
a cargo which was worth anywhere from fa 200 toi700 currency,
and sometimes even more, the loss of even a single one was a
very serious matter to the owner from a financial standpoint, to
say nothing of the sacrifice of life which generally accompanied
such accidents.
Delay in the transportation of goods to the Upper
Country was one of the most dreaded of all the uncertainties at-
tendant upon the traffic in furs, the reason lying in the fact
that the various operations oonneoted with the trade were so
largely dependent upon climatic conditions. Streams and lakes
could be navigated only during certain seasons of the year, and
hence delay in the transportation of merchandise at any stage
was apt to be the source of considerable loss and inconvenience
to the merchant. In 1784, merchandise was late in arriving at
Detroit, and as a result could not be sent out into the Indian
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XXIV., 205.
Returns of Indian Trade Licenses.
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country until the season was far advanced; but before it could
be carried to its destination, winter set in and the goods were
frozen up in the Miami River, where they remained until spring.
The merchants declared that in consequence of this delay, about
1000 packs of peltry which would ordinarily have come to Detroit
found their way to the market at New Orleans. 1 Such incidents
were the more vexatious inasmuch as the traders' goods were
nearly always obtained on credit, and hence they were obliged to
pay interest charges on whioh they received no corresponding re-
turn. In 1785, while the navigation of the lakes in private
vessels wa3 prohibited, the merchants of Detroit declared that
they were paying an annual interest charge of b 3700 sterling
on goods which were then lying at Carleton Island and Niagara.
Besides the danger of loss through Indian wars, from
which the merohants often suffered, the absence of any recog-
nized authority together with the generally lawless conditions
whioh prevailed in the interior rendered the fur trade a still
more precarious occupation. Merchants who advanced outfits to
the traders resorting to the upper posts necessarily ran some
risk of not receiving the returns due them. On the whole, however
this danger was perhaps less than might be supposed, considering
^Petition of the Merchants of Detroit, July 16, 1785.
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections XL, 459; Henry to
;ar, "June 23," 1785. Letters and Accounts of the North-West
Co., 65. 2petition of the Merchants of Detroit, July 16, 1785,
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XL, 460.
5See, for example, the Memorial of the Merchants of
Montreal, April 4, 1786. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Col-
lections, XI, 483; Henry to Edgar, November 12, 1786. LetteTs
•atmr-^gnounts of the North-West Co., 77.

tha laok of facilities for the collection of debts. Under ordi-
nary circumstances, a trader who attempted to cheat his outfitter
of the returns whioh he owed, thereby rendered himself virtually
an outlaw, as he would not dare to return to the post where his
creditor lived. So long as there was but one market available
in whioh furs might be disposed of, the outfitter ran comparative-
ly little risk of being wilfully oheated by those whom he sup-
plied. But the proximity of foreign markets altered the situa-
tion; there was always the temptation for a trader who happened
to be heavily in debt, instead of carrying his returns to the
post at which he had secured his outfit, to resort to some other
place where he might obtain ready money for his returns, 1 This
was the situation which existed in a large part of the Indian
country dependent upon Detroit, it being comparatively easy to
carry furs either to the Atlantic seaboard or to the Spanish
market at New Orleans. Todd and McGill of Montreal were not in-
clined to regard the trade in this region with a great deal of
favor in 1786, because of the danger that traders might steal
their credits by carrying furs either to the American states or
p
to New Orleans. The trader in the Indian country was confronted
with the same problem in his relations with the Indians but he de-
pended in large measure upon his personal influence over the
savages in order to protect himself against loss.
AClark to Todd, April 25, 17S8, Burton Manuscript Col-
lection, vol. 5, p. 15.
2Todd & McGill to Ask in, December 20, 1786, Burton
Manuscript Collection, vol. 1, p. 217.
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British merchants had little to fear from the rivalry
of foreign traders during the period under consideration; in
fact, it was the foreign merchant who suffered from the competi-
tion of the British. But a more serious matter was the competi-
tion between British traders themselves in the Indian country,
many of whom made it a practice to seoure the furs which should
have been turned over by the Indians to their rivals, from whom
they received their credits.^" The manner in which competition
demoralized the trade by causing the importation of great quanti-
ties of goods into the Indian country after the Revolution has
been mentioned in another connection, together with the measures
which were adopted in order to eradicate the evil.
As in other industries, fluctuations in market prices
introduced an element cf uncertainty into the business of the
fur trade. The merchant must always be on the qui vive in order
to purchase the varieties of furs whioh could be 30ld most ad-
vantageously, and to secure them at such prices as might ensure
him a profit. This was not always an easy matter inasmuch as
the prices of the different varieties of furs fluctuated in ac-
cordance with variations in the demands of the European market.
Slow communication between the London market and the Indian
country further increased this element of uncertainty, but those
in touoh with the situation kept their correspondents informed
so far as possible by means of letters.
xRival traders appear to have suffered no qualms of
conscience in receiving furs from Indians who had stolen their
or edits. Perrault Narrative, Michigan Pioneer and Histor ical
Collections
,
XXXVIL, 547.
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Besides the various factors which have been mentioned,
there was always the danger of poor returns from the Indian
country, due to ill success on the part of the Indians, or cli-
matic conditions, perhaps. Good returns in the form of furs,
both as regards quantity and quality were no more definitely as-
sured than the obtaining of good crops in agriculture. * Perhaps
the dangers and uncertainties connected with the industry have
been unnecessarily dwelt upon but it has seemed desirable to
emphasize the fact that the traffic in furs required the same
experience and sound judgment for its successful prosecution
which are essential to any business enterprise. Too many per-
sons have the same opinion regarding the fur trade as was ex-
pressed by a traveller in America in 1776. Commenting upon the
dangers undergone by the traders, he naively states that the
only compensation for these perils is the certainty of acquiring
an ample fortune in the course of three or four voyages!
In the absence of adequate material in the form of ac-
counts relating to the larger firms engaged in the fur trade, it
is difficult to make any exact statement concerning the profits
derived from the industry. Judgment must in such a case neces-
sarily be based upon the general external aspects of the business
and upon such miscellaneous correspondence as has been preserved.
•The success of the Indian's hunting depended to a
certain extent upon climatic conditions, a fall of snow being
considered desirable for the hunt.
2Anburey, Travels
,
L, 125. Letter dated Montreal,
November 26, 1776.
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The profits secured by the small traders who wintered among the
Indians seem in many cases to have been very modest, as, for ex-
ample, in the case of Jean Baptist e Perrau.lt, who formed a
partnership with one Thomas Richardson and spent the winter of
1788 and 1789 trading with the Indians. The two men carried
their furs back to the post of Miohillimackinac in the summer of
1789 and made settlement with their outfitter. Perrault says
in his journal: BWe had hoped to make a little profit, but the
messieurs [meaning the outfitters] were Accustomed to give them-
selves free rein in The purohase of skins, and each year they
lowered the price more and more, until one could hardly make both
Ends meet. They took back all that remained to us, oanoe and
rigging." 1 The following season he and Alexis Reaume entered
into a partnership, which appears to have been more successful
than that of the preceding year, for the two succeeded in making
6125, "Current value," over and above expenses. 2
The outfitters at the posts of course made larger
profits than did the traders whom they supplied, but they were
by no means certain to make a fortune "in three or four voyages."
John Askin, of Detroit, after having been oonnected with the fur
traffic for nearly twenty-five years, in 1801 found the state of
his affairs so low that he considered it advisable to withdraw
from that branch of trade altogether.^ It is safe to say, on
1Perrault Narrative, Michig an Pioneer and Historical
Collections , XXXVI L, 555.
2Ibid., 556.
3Askin to Henry, December 30, 1801. Burton Manuscript
Collection, vol. 11, p. 89.
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the whole, that there was nothing phenomenal in the gains made
by the ordinary small merchant engaged in the trade, though in
the case of the North-West Company the situation was somewhat
different. There is every indication that the merchants be-
longing to that concern really met with most gratifying success,
the rapidity with which the oompany grew and extended its opera-
tions during the last quarter of the eighteenth century afford-
ing pretty good evidenoe of the profitable character of the
trade.
The merchants who operated in the Great Lakes' region
did not derive all their profits from the traffic in furs. There
was a great deal of business carried on in the Upper Country
which was rather auxiliary to and dependent upon the peltry trade.
The furnishing of provisions and supplies of various sorts to
those who lived at the upper posts and in the interior was in it-
self an important branch of commerce. The North-West Company
depended largely upon the supplies drawn from Detroit and certain
parts of the Indian country for the provisioning of their trad-
ers.
1
The traffic in corn and grease was a very considerable
item in the commerce of the Upper Country, and John Askin, in ad-
dition to his general trade and Indian ventures, carried on a
Transportation of Goods to the Upper Country in 1778,
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection
,
XIX, 339; Memorial
of the Merchants o?"~Montreal, April 19, 1781. Ibid . , 620.
Corn for the use of the traders and garrisons at the posts was
secured from various parts of the Indian oountry, as Arbre
Croohe, Saginaw, and Milwaukee. Mompesson to DePeyster, September
20, 1780, ibid . 575. Probisher to Brickwood, June 30, 1788,
Frobisher Letter Book, 59.
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very profitable business by supplying provisions to the North-
west Company.
1
Not even all the Indian goods which were oarried to the
Upper Country were actually bartered for furs. The British
government was in the habit of giving enormous quantities of sup-
plies to the Indians in the form of presents. Often the mer-
chants found it more profitable to sell goods to the government
to be distributed among the savages than to use them in carrying
on the peltry trade. The extent to which this sort of trade was
carried on is evidenced by the large numbers of bills drawn in
favor of traders at the upper posts for supplies furnished the
2Indian department. This practice of purchasing supplies from
the merchants, however, led to abuses, for they oharged exorbi-
tant prices for their goods, the outcome of which was that the
government made an effort to reduce expenses by ordering the com-
manders at the posts to purchase as little as possible from the
traders. The merchants were even accused of exhibiting valuable
goods to the Indians in order that the latter might request the
British commandant to make them presents of those particular
xIn 1778, Askin was engaged in supplying provisions to
the northwest traders. His letters in the Wisconsin Historical
Collections. XI&, 234-258, throw much light upon this sort of
traffic. In 1793, he entered into a three-year contract with the
North-West Company, by which he agreed to deliver annually a cer-
tain quantity of corn and flour; another similar contract was en-
tered into in 1796, likewise for a period of three years. Burton
Manuscript Collection, vol. 2, p. 16; vol. 3, p. 158.
o
See accounts of bills drawn by commanders at the upper
posts, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
XX., 206-212.
Haldimand to DePeyster, May 8, 1780, Michigan Pioneer
Collections
,
IX., 634.
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articles and thus oblige him to purchase them. 1
The relation between the fur trade and the system of
present-giving as practiced by the British government is of in-
terest from the economic standpoint. In the first place, the
character of the articles distributed among the Indians and
those used in the fur trade was identical, as a comparison be-
tween a return of Indian presents in store at one of the upper
posts and an invoioe of a canoe-load of traders' goods will
readily show. The question then arises, why did not the merchants
oppose the distribution of presents as a form of competition, the
effect of which would be to reduce the demand for their own
goods? That they did not regard the matter in that light is
evidenced by the fact that traders themselves often acted as the
medium through which these articles were distributed. They
were willing and anxicus to sell goods to the Indian department,
and on occasion, even solicited the government to make presents
to the savages. 3 There are several reasons why this practice
was not regarded in the light of competition. In the first
iHaldimand to Germain, October 25, 1780. Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
X, 445.
^Letter of Sinclair [to Haldimand]^ July 31, 1781,
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
, X, 504.
3
In 1780, the merchants associated in the General Store
at Miohillimackinac petitioned that they might be given prefer-
ence in supplying goods for the Indian department. Memorial of
the Merchants of Michillimackinac, April 27, 1780. Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
IX, 549; Memorial of the
Merchants of Montreal, April 4, 1786, ibid . , XI, 483. See also
the memoranda, dated April 13, 1786, ibid . 485.
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place, the Indians were notoriously improvident, being seldom if
ever satisfied and their wants, if not their necessities, may be
said to have been practically insatiable. Hence the fact that
they received large presents from the government did not neces-
sarily decrease their demand for traders' goods, while rum was a
saiaDie commodity at any time, no matter what the amount. But
even disregarding these considerations, the political influence
secured over the Indians by the giving of presents greatly out-
weighed any possible disadvantage arising from the practice, con-
sidered a3 a form of competition. The political attachment of
the Indians was absolutely essential to the welfare of the fur
trade and the merchants were fully aware of the efficacy of the
custom as a means of retaining their friendship.
Another consideration of great importance was the fact
that 30 long as there was no foreign competition to be feared,
British traders obtained all the fur3 gathered by the Indians
regardless of the quantity of goods carried into the interior,
small or large. It wa3 not a matter of so great importance to
the trader how many goods were given to the Indians in the form
of presents, just so long as there was no increase in the number
of those who were to receive the returns in furs. The only oc-
casion on which the trader raised his voice in protest was when
the agent who distributed the presents sometimes yielded to the
temptation to use them in trade on his own behalf. This waa a
form of competition which never failed to arouse the merchants,
not neoessarily because it increased the quantity of goods car-
ried to the Indians but because it increased the number of those
.1
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who reoaivad the returns in furs. 1 Indeed, the amount of mer-
ohandiaa delivered to the Indiana in the courae of trade or in
the form of presents appears to have had little effect upon the
quantity of furs secured by the merchants from one year to anoth-
er; a fact which may be illustrated by a comparison of the quan-
tity of goods annually sent into the Indian country with the re-
turns of furs exported from the province of Quebec. Although
the value of the goods imported for purposes of trade fluctuated
very considerably, the quantities of furs shipped to England do
not show any corresponding variations; the annual returns in
paltry 3eem to rsmain about the same or even to 3how a slight in-
crease from year to year.
When it i3 reoognized that the Indian derived his sup-
plies, of identical quality, from two sources, the government and
th9 trader, and that the latter received the entire product of
his industry in the form of 3kins and peltry, it will perhaps be
doing no violence to the truth to say that the fur trade was a
subsidized industry, and that in estimating the worth of this
particular commerce to Great Britain, more factors must be taken
^Representation of Merchants and Traders at Michilli-
mackinac, August 10, 1787, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Col-
l ections
,
XL, 497 ; Henry to Edgar, October 22, 1787, Letters
a~nd Ac counts of the North-West Co., 81. On the other hand,~*~if
the agents traded goods at lower "prices than the merchants were
accustomed to demand, the result was a most injurious form of
competition. The point to be emphasized is that the giving of
goods to the Indians in the form of presents did not in itself
damage the business of the traders.
^Returns of Indian Trade Licens es} returns of furs ex-
ported from the province of Quebec, Canadian Archives Report,
1888. Calendar of Haldimand Collection, vol. Ill, p. 12.
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into account than th9 value of the goods exchanged by the mer-
chants for the fur3 which they shipped to England. It is an
undoubted fact that the friendship and trade of the tribes of
th3 Northwest could hardly have been retained for the commercial
welfare of British merchants without the substantial aid and as-
sistance given by the Crown in the form of presents. There may
perhaps be some truth in the statement that the advantage in the
fur trade gained by the retention of the posts was not worth the
amount which it cost. At any rate, the complaintsof British
officials, from the ministry down, with regard to the expenses
of the Indian department were loud and frequent.
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CHAPTER VII
Diplomacy and the ?ur Trade »
After Haldiraand had refused General Knox's demand for
the evacuation of the posts in 1784, ^- no further efforts were
made by the United States to secure the withdrawal of the Brit-
ish garrisons, save through diplomatic channels. But in pro-
portion as the commerce of Canadian merchants and traders flour-
ished in the Great Lakes' region, the more loath were the Brit-
ish to evacuate the western posts; and as their desire to retain
them increased, the more were they disposed to believe that the
Americans cherished designs of seizing them by force. One of
the ministry in a memorandum drawn up in 1785 expressed a belief
that the Americans would soon attempt to take possession of the
posts for the sake of gaining control of the fur trade and that
the only thing which had thus far deterred them was their fear
of the Indians. Major Ross, discussing matters connected with
the welfare of the Upper Country in the same year, declared that
in New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, there was a general
clamor for the frontier forts. 3 All such manifestations were
2
Memorandum concerning Quebec Matters, 1785, Canadian
archives Transcripts, C. 0. 42, vol. 18, p. 138. In the margin
appears the note "Points to be decided upon previous to the de-
parture of Sir Guy Carleton."
Paper endorsed "Canada Affairs From Major Ross. R 2
May 1785." Canadian Archives Transcripts, C. 0. 42, vol. 17,
p. 38.
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regarded with apprehension "because of certain advantages sup-
posed to be possessed by the Albany and Mohawk River communica-
tion with the Upper Country over that by way of Montreal and the
St. Lawrence. The preservation of the fur trade appears to
have been always uppermost in the minds of those v/ho imagined
that the Americans were planning to seize the posts. ^
The occupation of the American frontier by British
garrisons very naturally aroused a great deal of irritation in
the United States, a feeling which was accentuated by the loss
of the fur trade occasioned thereby. The whole situation was,
however, greatly aggravated by the state of Indian affairs in
the Northwest, the interests of Great Britain and the United
States being mutually antagonistic. The British were interested
in the Great Lakes' region almost solely from the standpoint of
the fur trade, the welfare of which depended upon the friend-
ship of the Indian tribes. As a very extensive trade was car-
ried on in American territory in the region south of Detroit,
it was to the advantage of British merchants that the Indians
should remain in undisturbed possession of their hunting grounds
LBOpinionsand observations of different persons respect
ing the United States," in Dorchester's letter of October 14,
1788, Canadian archives , series 3, vol. 38, p. 146. according
to this memorandum, the Federalists in the New York convention
at Poughkeepsie urged that the establishment of a strong central
government would enable the United States to obtain possession
of the posts, upon which a large part of the fur trade would
pass down the Mohawk River to ^Ibany.
2 Jefferson to Hammond, December 15, 1791, ^Morican
gtate Papers
,
Foreign Relations
,
I., 190. Jefferson -oointed out
that the fur trade was of importance to the United States, not
only because of its intrinsic value, but also as a means of con-
trolling the Indians.
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for if they were driven out by the Americans, their commerce
would depart along with them. If, on the other hand, they
should for any reason he aroused to hostilities against the
British, the safety of the province of Quebec would be en-
dangered and the whole fur trade ruined. The British desired
above all else to maintain the s tatus^nuo in the Northwest, an
A
object which they believed more apt to be fulfilled if the posts
were garrisoned by their own troops. In addition to commercial
considerations, they felt themselves under certain moral obli-
gations to the Indians, all whose interests lay in the same
direction as their own. The savages: had fought for them during
the Revolution, thereby incurring the enmity of the Americans,
and it appeared to the British as though it would be little
short of an act of treachery for them to sit calmly by and see
their former friends and allies exterminated
.
The interests of the Americans were directly antag-
onistic to those of the British. While they wished to share
in the fur trade from which they had been excluded by the war,
they were primarily interested in the region from the settler's
viewpoint and after the close of the revolution, the westward
movement which had commenced years before began again with re-
newed vigor. The result was that the intruders came into con-
flict with the Indians northwest of the Ohio and there followed
an era of war and bloodshed which lasted for more than a decade.
•'"The arguments of those who opposed the provisional
articles in parliament in 1783, as v/ell as the correspondence of
British officers, bear v/itness to this statement.

218
What the Americans desired was to establish a modus Vivendi
with the Indians, by which certain lands should be opened for
settlement, while others were reserved for hunting grounds. To
this end a series of councils was held with the various tribes
living beyond the Ohio and several treaties were concluded, of
which the most important were those of Fort Stanwix, Fort Mcin-
tosh, and Fort Harmar. It was the purpose of these negotiations
to come to some agreement with the Indians concerning the divi-
sion of lands between themselves and the white settlers, but
all efforts to come to an arrangement which should be satisfac-
tory to all parties were fruitless, with the result that the
violence and disorder increased in the country northwest of the
Ohio. 1
Difficulties between the Americans and the Indians
grew more and more serious in 1766 and 1787; and rumors of ap-
proaching hostilities began coming to the ears of British of-
ficers, Who feared that the United States, under the pretext
of subduing the tribes with which they were at war, was contem-
plating the establishment of posts in the Indian country and on
the lakes which would serve to cut off a large share of the
British fur trade and divert it through American channels.^ Lord
Dorchester, who in 1786 took up his residence in Quebec as gover-
nor of the province, reported to Lord Sydney, in 1787 that he
"S.'insor, The Westward Movement
,
passim ,
2Mathews to Kaldimand, August 3, 1787, Michigan Pioneer
and Historical Collections
,
XX, 286; Dorchester to Sydney, August
18, 1787, Canadian Archives, series Q, vol. 28, p. 134.
Sir Guy Carleton was created Baron Dorchester in 1786.
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believed it was the intention of the Americans to leave the
British in possession of the posts for the time "being, but
meanwhile to station themselves along the communications to the
Northwest in such a manner as to intercept the fur trade and
enable them to occupy the whole region when they judged the
time to be ripe.-1-
As the outlook grew more serious, the Indians natur-
ally turned to their former allies for council and assistance.
The British were placed in an exceedingly embarrassing position,
for while their commercial interests and sympathies were all on
the side of the Indians, yet on the other hand, prudence dic-
tated a policy of neutrality and the avoidance of any measures
which might give the savages just ground for complaint. In
1786, Joseph Brant was in London, seeking to learn what attitude
the British government would assume in case of hostilities be-
tween his people and the Americans. Sydney's reply was non-
committal, though he assured 3rant that the Xing had the wel-
fare of the Indians at heart. His instructions to Lieutenant
G-overnor Hope of the "province of Quebec were equally vague.
In case of hostilities, no open support must be given the savages
but inasmuch as the peace and prosperity of the province de-
manded that they should not be entirely abandoned and estranged,
he concluded by leaving the line of conduct to be followed in
^Dorchester to Sydney, June 13, .1787, Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol. 28, p. 16.
2Sydney to Brant, April 6, 1786, Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol. 26-1, p. 80.
^Sydney to Hope, April 6, 1786, Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol. 26-1, p. 73.
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case of emergency to Hope's own discretion.
There is no doubt that the British sincerely desired
peace "between the Americans and the Indians and every effort was
made to avoid inciting the latter to hostilities. But as the
situation became more strained, the British began to regard the
danger which threatened the savages as likewise constituting a
menace to the posts and the fur trade. The friendship of the
tribes northwest of the Ohio must for political and commercial
reasons be preserved at all hazards, ae their assistance might
be required to defend the posts in case of attack, and hence
Sydney came to the conclusion that it would be very improper
to refuse them ammunition with which to defend themselves. 1
Attention has already been called to the fact that the
ministry had from the very outset regarded the negotiation of
a commercial treaty which should define the status of the north-
west trade, as prerequisite to any consideration of the evacua-
ption of the posts. But so long as British traders continued
to enjoy the benefits of the commerce of the Great Lakes' re-
gion, it was only natural that the ministry should not display
any eagerness to negotiate such a treaty. The United States,
on the other hand, had every reason to desire that the whole
matter of commercial relations and the posts should be settled
as speedily as possible. Washington in 1789 accordingly in-
structed Gouverneur Morris to sound the ministry with regard
Sydney to Lorchester, April 5, 1787, Canadian Archives
series G, vol. 1, p. 62; same to same, September 14?, 1787, series
Q, vol. 28, t>. 28; Fraser to Uepean, October 31, 1789, ibid .
,
43-2, p. 786.
2Ante,105.
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to the possibility of negotiating a commercial treaty, by which
all the questions at issue between the United States and Great
Britain might be settled.^ Morris did as he was instructed and
indicated that since there remained no obstacle to the recovery
of iritish debts ir. the United states,which was the reason given
by the ministry for delaying the evacuation of the posts, there
was no longer any ground for refusing to fulfill the terms of
the Treaty of 1783 by withdrawing the British garrisons. Pitt,
however, on being pressed by Morris, admitted that it was per-
haps the idea of the ministry to negotiate a new treaty rather
than to fulfill the old one, and that there was a possibility
that G-reat Britain might desire to retain the posts. Morris
argued that the posts could not be of sufficient value to her
to warrant the expense of maintaining them, to which Pitt re-
plied that if they were of so little value, there was less
reason why the Americans should desire to obtain possession of
them. 2
The ministry was, however, at this time strongly
considering the possibility of giving up the posts and was mak-
ing every effort to learn what would be the probable effect of
such action upon the fur trade. In his letter to Washington
on Llay 29, Morris said that on that very day Grenville had
called in certain persons familiar with the fur trade and that
there was good reason to believe that the British garrisons
lixjsor, The Westward Movement % 316.
pMorris to V.ashington, May 29, 1790, American State
Papers , - oreign Helati ons
,
L, 123.
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would be withdrawn4 Two days later, Grenville asked Haldimand
his opinion with regard to the effect which the surrender of the
posts might have upon the Indian trade. Haldimand, strange to
say, 'favored the withdrawal of the garrisons, saying that the
Americans were so numerous that they could obtain the posts by
force if they were so disposed, and therefore the British govern-
ment should give them up voluntarily. Even though a part of the
fur trade were surrendered, British merchants would more than
make good the loss by the goods which they would sell to the
Americans. Grenville likewise asked the advice of Major Mathews,
who replied that his principal objection to the surrender of the
posts was that it would be apt to estrange the Indians* A report
was likewise received from Captain Schank, another British offi-
cer familiar with the situation in the Northwest, on the subject
of the posts along the v/ater communication between the United
States and Canada, their value to the trade, and the possibility
of erecting forts to take their place on the British side of
2the line.
John Inglis, one of the prominent London merchants
engaged in the Canada trade, likewise made a report at the re-
quest of Grenville concerning the commerce of the Great Lakes'
region. He estimated that if the posts were surrendered, at
-^Haldimand's Diary, May 31, 1790, Canadian Archives
Re-oort
,
1889, p. 287; Memorandum from Lord Grenville, Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Collections , XXIV., 91.
^"Account of Posts in Canada Including a Short Descrip-
tion of Detroit, Michilimakinac , Miamis River, and Sandusky."
Received, May 31, 1790, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collec -
tions
,
XXIV./ 89.
^Inglis to Grenville, May 51, 1790, Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol.49, p. 287. The renort itself appears in Michigan
Pioneer and Historical collections, XXIV,, 686. See also
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least half the fur trade v/ould be lost to Great Britain, and
expressed the belief that the Americans were in no condition to
garrison the forts and afford adequate protection to commerce
.
He at the same time offered to wait upon Grenville, along with
Isaac Todd, who was then in London. The latter would be able,
from his long and intimate acquaintance with the fur trade, to
give such information as might be desired. The attitude of
John Inglis clearly illustrates Great Britain's real motives
in retaining the posts, for on June 5, he called attention to
a statute which was still in force in Georgia, the effect of
which was to withhold justice from British subjects. It is
clear that he regarded this act as a pretext upon which the
posts might be held, though his real interests were concerned
with the fur trade."'"
By the autumn of 1790, nothing had yet been accom-
plished, and Morris took occasion to inform the Duke of Leeds
that in his opinion, the retention of the posts would prevent
the negotiation of the treaty; as it was quite generally believed
that England was retaining them simply for the sake of the fur
trade, which was regarded as a very serious injury to the United
States. There was, moreover, a widespread suspicion that the
"Memorandum from Lord Grenville," ibid . , 90. It is clear from
the memorandum that Grenville was at this time most carefully
considering the possible evacuation of the posts in connection
with its effect upon the fur trade. The surrender of Michilli-
mackinac and Oswego was a sore point with the ministry, because
of the strategic position of these posts with reference to the
trade.
1Letier of John Inglis, June 5, 1790, Michigan Pioneer
and His torical Collec tl ons , XKI7., 92. It is interesting to note
that later, certain of the British merchants themselves regarded
the reason advanced by the ministry as a pretext. The courts of
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British were exerting a bad influence over the Indians of the
Northwest, which added to the American feeling of distrust con-
cerning their motives in general*"*
General Harmar's invasion of the Miami country in
October of 1790 caused great excitement among those interested
in the trade of the Great Lakes' region and was the first of a
series of events which had a very marked influence upon the
negotiations affecting the posts and the northwest fur trade.
Though the military features of the campaign were not of par-
ticularly great importance, yet it was apparent that an era of
war and general disorder had begun which must necessarily have
a very important effect upon the commerce of the region. ^ The
merchants of Montreal pictured the bad state of affairs to their
London correspondents and requested that they meet together and
draw up a statement concerning the general situation, to be laid
before the King.^ They were of the opinion that nothing could
Virginia had refused to grant relief to the foreign creditors
until the -costs were evacuated and connoensation rendered for the
negroes alleged to have been carried off. The merchants accord-
ingly applied to the 3ritish government for their remuneration,
arguing that their property had been sacrificed for the sake of
the fur trade, which was protected by the western posts. If the
retention of this trade was a national advantage, the nation
should compensate them for their losses. Letter of Henry Glass-
ford, July 29, 1794, P. B. 0., 1% 0., class 5, vol. 7.
Morris to Washington, September 18, 1790, American
State Papers
,
Foreign relations
,
I, 126.
g
It was in this campaign that the Indian village on
the Miami was burned, along with the traders 1 huts and a large
quantity of corn. V.insor, The Westward I.Iovement, 419.
Extracts from letters from Montreal, dated December 11,
1790. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
,
JQCIV., 159.
It was pointed out that Messrs. Todd, P.ichardson, Robertson, and
McTavish, Canadian merchants who were in London at the time,
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save the Indians, together with their trade , unless the British
government should either assist them in the event of another
American invasion or mediate between them and their enemies.
The merchants likewise lost no time in drawing up a memorial
to Lord Dorchester, in which they called attention to what they
regarded as the aggressions of the Americans and pointed out
how they were threatening the fur trade of the Upper Country ?-
They urged the adoption of two measures to ensure the safety
of their commerce? first, they requested that their trade should
he uninterrupted for a period of five years in order to give
them time to secure their property; and in the second place,
they suggested that if at the end of that time it should he
thought advisable to cede the posts, the Indian country might
be regarded as neutral territory and remain free to British as
well as American traders. This memorial was signed by the
principal merchants of Montreal, including those interested in
the trade to the far Northwest as well as those operating in
the region dependent upon Detroit. On February 1, John Brick-
wood, a member of a London firm, transmitted to Grenville some
correspondence from Canada bearing upon the subject of the dis-
turbance in the Indian country and its effect upon the trade;
while it appears that upon the following day a committee of
merchants, accompanied by certain of their Canadian correspon-
ds
dents, waited upon Grenville and discussed the matter with him.-'
would be able to advise them concerning the fur trade.
Memorial of the Merchants of Montreal, December 28,
1790, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , aXIV., 162.
23rickwood to Grenville, February 1, 1791, Michigan
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The British ministry was placed in a most difficult
position as a result of the outbreak of war between the Indians
and the Americans. Grenville wrote to Dorchester on March 7,
1791, asking him for full information with regard to the situa-
tion and expressing the hope that it might be possible for Great
Britain to mediate between the Americans and the tribes with
which they were at war, and thus afford an opening for the set-
tlement of the question of the frontier posts. ^ As time went on,
there appeared to be no prospect of an early peace. The Ameri-
cans spent the summer and autumn of 1791 preparing for another
attempt to break the power of the Indians and the forebodings
of the merchants increased. On August 10, Forsyth, Richardson,
and Company and Todd, McGill, and Company, addressed a memorial
c
to Sir John Johnson, in which they described the ruinous state
of the Detroit trade and urged that measures be taken to per-
suade the savages to listen to reasonable terms of peace, I'hose
who v/ere engaged in the fur trade were unanimous in desiring a
settlement of the difficulties between the Americans and the
Indians but their interests likewise demanded a peace which
should leave the latter in the pos; ession of their hunting grounds
To this end, they hoped that Lord Dorchester might be able to
mediate between the contending parties and effect the establish-
Pioneer and Historical Collections , XXIV., 171. '2he correspondence
referred to was doubtless that which has been mentioned, dated
Montreal, December 11, 1790.
Grenville to Dorchester, March 7, 1791. Canadian
Archives, series Q, vol 50, p. 16.
2Forsyth, Richardson & Company and Todd,sss& McGill, &
Company to Johnson, August 10, 1791, Michigan Pioneer and Histor -
ical Collections, XXIV., 305.
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ment of an Indian boundary, which should ensure the future pros-
perity of their trade.
The ministry was no less anxious for peace than were
the merchants themselves. In the autumn of 1791, Hammond was
sent to the United States as minister from Great Britain, and
one of the objects of his mission was to assist in bringing
about some form of settlement between the Americans and the
northwest tribes. The attitude of the ministry is clearly set
forth in a letter of Dundas to Dorchester, dated September 16,
1791."*" The latter was instructed to cooperate with Hammond by
using his influence with the Indians to listen to any reasonable
terms which should ensure to them the peaceable possession
of their hunting grounds. It was moreover desirable that the ex-
tent of the lands which they were to be allowed to occupy should
be clearly defined. The way in which the ministry regarded the
whole matter is revealed in the following passage from the
despatch of Dundas already referred to: "Your Lordship's exper-
ience and knowledge of the British interests in America super-
sede the necessity of my enlarging upon these topicks, but I
cannot help adverting to the consideration of our trade with
the northern and north-western parts of the Continent of America.
If the Indians are either extirpated from their countries, or
rendered insecure in the poes ession of them, our trade in that
quarter, and which Your Lordship and the merchants of IJontreal
state to be so valuable, must be much injured, and the enjoyment
of it rendered altogether precarious."
Dundas to Dorchester, September 16, 1791. Canadian
Archives Report
,
1890, p. 173.
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"The subject of the posts in dispute between this
Country and America is unfortunately connected with what I have
just adverted to."
The victory of the Indians over the army of General
St. Clair on November 4, 1791, very materially altered the
diplomatic aspect of affairs. They were greatly emboldened by
their success and encouraged in their demand that they be allowed
to occupy all the land north of the Ohio RiYer and west of the
Muskingum. ^ Those who were interested in the fur trade believed
that the time had arrived when terms of peace might be arranged
between the United states and the Indians, which would be favor-
able to the latter.^ The merchants of Montreal, accordingly lost
no time in endeavoring to turn the situation to their advantage.
On December 9, they addressed a memorial to Lieutenant Governor
Simcoe, in which they urged that the boundary established by
the Treaty of 1785 be altered so as to conform to the southern
boundaries of Canada as defined by the Quebec Act and also that
the British garrisons might be retained at Niagara and Oswego,
Bassett, Federalist System , 64.
An unsigned letter from Niagara, dated IT ovember 24,
1791 (P. R. 0., 2-."0. t class 4, vol. 11) reveals the attitude of
those interested in the commerce of the Great Lakes 1 region. The
writer tells the story of St. Clair's defeat and adds that he has
just written to Mr. Askin, requesting him to join the traders in
urging the Indians to be moderate. He hopes that through the
mediation of the British government, and the influence of the
traders, peace may be brought about and that an opportunity may
arise to alter the terms of the Treaty of 1783.
By the constitutional act of 1791, Quebec v/as divided
into the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. Shortt and Doughty,
C ons t i tuti onal Documents , 695. John Graves Simcoe became Lieu-
tenant Governor of Upper Canada.
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in order to ensure control of the trade of the Upper Country.
In case so radical a change in the "boundary could not be obtained,
certain alternative lines were proposed. Simcoe sent this mem-
orial to Eammond, in the hope that it might be of some service
in the negotiations which were in progress at Philadelphia."1"
The rout of St. Clair's force did not tend to facili-
tate the negotiation between Jefferson and Hammond, which had
already been in progress for some little time, inasmuch as the
incident served to convince the Americans more firmly than ever
that the Indians were receiving encouragement and assistance
2from the British. Jefferson made the charge again and again
but to all his accusations Eammond made the most vigorous and
sweeping denial. The very fact that the British were through
diplomatic channels endeavoring to atcain the same ends which
the Indians were seeking by force of arms, made it inevitable
that such a situation should arise. The British government "
vigorously denied ever having incited the Indians to hostilities
against the Americans and all correspondence goes to prove that
its official attitude was one of neutrality. 2he British did,
it is true, furnish the savages with guns and ammunition, but
they gave the plausible explanation that they were simply con-
tinuing a practice which had been followed in time of peace.
*
Memorial of the Merchants of Montreal, December 9,1791,
Michigan Pioneer and Hit-torical Collections , UIY., 338; McGill to
Askin, January 24, 1792, Burton Manuscript Collection, vol. 2, p. 43.
Y.'insor, The T/estward Movement , 431.
"srenville to Hammond, September 1, 1791, P. H. 0..F.0.,
class 4, vol. 11; Hammond to Jefferson, December 14, 1791, State
See next page for note 4.
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But there was nevertheless a strong feeling of sympathy and
a community of interests between the British and the Indians,
,
which was the source of a great deal of moral support to the
latter, and which served to convince the Americans that the
former were rendering much greater and more direct assistance
than was actually the case. G-renville correctly stated the
attitude of the ministry when he said that England had strong
political and commercial interests in the resotration of peace
in the Indian country.
The extent to which the traders were responsible for
the situation northwest of the Ohio is another matter. Ameri-
can officers repeatedly charged them with inciting the Indians
and strong representations were made to the British authorities
on the subject. 2 The more influential merchants, living at
Llontreal and I/etroit, were strongly desirous of peace, and
their attitude was identical with, and indeed partly responsible
rz
for, the position of the ministry. There were on the other
Department, British Legation Rotes J same to same, January SO,
1792, ibid . j McLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the British
Debts," American Historical Association Report , 1894, p. 439.
Dorchester's speech to the Indians in 1794, may, however, be
regarded as a breach of neutrality on his part, while Simcoe's
action in building a fort on the Hiami was clearly unjustified.
See post .
,
Z38.
^Hamilton to Sydney, August 29, 1785, Canadian Ar-
chives, series Q, vol. 25, p. 151; Chew to McKee, May 1, 1792,
Claus Papers, V., 9.
^"Grenville to Hammond, September 1, 1791, P. R. 0.,
F. 0., class 4, vol. 11.
2
Harmar to Secretary of YTar, July 7, 1787, Smith, St
.
Clair Papers
,
IL, 26; St. Clair to Hurray, September 19, 1790,
ibid
. , 187; St. Clair to the Secretary of Uar, November 26,1790,
ibid . , 194; VTar Department to St. Clair, May 19, 1791, American
See next page for note 3.
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hand irresponsible traders in the region south of Detroit who
were the source of much mischief among the savages, ^ven Simcoe
admitted the fact, for in a letter to Portland, after pointing
out that no official encouragement had been given the Indians,
he ended by saying, "At the same time Your Grace must be con-
vinced that the different [Traders from interest would make use
of that language which would best conciliate the favour of the
Indians; and that the Briti sh Officers , not immediately in-
trusted tmated with particular duties in respect to those
people, could not be at all times prevented from expressing in
strong terms, that Compassion which in this Province is univer-
sally felt for these unhappy nations. The traders were many
of them a sordid lot and almost invariably acted in accordance
With self-interest, 'without particular reference to considera-
tions of hostility toward the United States or of loyalty to
Great Britain. It is not surprising that they incited the
Indians against the Americans when they believed it to be in
their interests to do so, inasmuch as in 1795, they even supplied
Wayne's army with goods, greatly to the chagrin of British of-
ficers, and in defiance of a proclamation by Simcoe forbidding
State Papers , Indian Affairs , L, 176.
^Conversation Upon the State of Affairs in the western
Country, January 31, 1791, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Col -
lections , XXIV., 167; unsigned letter from Niagara, dated Novem-
ber 84, 1791, P. R. 0., F, 0., class 4, vol. 11.
"^Simcoe to Portland, December 22, 1794, Michigan
Pioneer and historical Collection?
, XXV., 74*
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them to do so. The United States undoubtedly had just ground
for complaint against these irresponsible and venal traders.
But returning again to a consideration of the progress
of diplomatic negotiations concerning the status of the North-
west, on January 9, 1792, the British envoy wrote to Grenville
of an interview which he had held with Alexander Hamilton, who
was then secretary of the treasury. Hamilton was of the opinion
that the United States would not be likely to yield any of the
territory ceded by the Treaty of Peace but that it might be
possible to grant to 3ritish subjects such commercial privileges
as would enable them to continue to carry on the fur trade.
"
The ministry nevertheless determined to press the diplomatic
advantage which it believed it had gained by St. Clair's defeat
and on March 17, Hammond was authorized to suggest to the Ameri-
can government the establishment of an independent Indian coun-
try, from which both Great 3ritain and the United States should
withdraw all claim. Lord Dorchester, who was then in London,
was asked to submit his views with regard to the proper boun-
daries for such an Indian barrier, in the formulation of which
he was to bear in mind three things; first, the welfare of the
Indian trade; second, the interposition of a barrier along the
whole extent of the American frontier; and third, the drawing
of such a boundary as might serve to protect those parts of
^"Simcoe to Portland, March 17, 1795, Simcoe Papers,
IV, 104.
Hammond to Grenville, January 9, 1792, P. R. 0.,F. 0.,
class 4, vol. 14.
Grenville to Hammond, March 17, 1792, ibid .
,

233
Canada most open to attack from the Americans.^ In his reply,
Dorchester recommended that the southern boundary of the pro-
posed barrier territory should follow the line proposed by
Brant in the summer of 1791, which would reserve to the Indians
the territory north of the Ohio and east of the Muskingum and
extending to the Great Lakes and Mississippi. He believed thatA
the establishment of such a buffer state would ensure peace
between the Indians and the Americans, remove every cause of
dispute between the United States and Great Britain, and es-
tablish the fur trade of the two countries on a fair and equal
footing. 2
The Canadian merchants were not idle, as may readily
be supposed. William Robertson, of Detroit, and Isaac Todd, of
the firm of Todd, MoGill, and Company, were in London at the
time and conferred with Dundas ' secretary with regard to the
proposed Indian barrier, though they were apparently able to
secure but little information concerning the intentions of the
ministry. On April 23, McTavish, Probisher and Company; For-
syth* Richardson and Company; and Todd, McGill and Company, ad-
dressed a second memorial to Lieutenant Governor bimcoe, which
they desired that he should transmit to Hammond at Philadelphia,
as well as to the British ministry. They strongly recommended
"'"Dundas to Dorchester, March 15, 1792, Canadian Ar-
chives, series Q, vol. 58-1, p. 59.
Dorchester to jundas, March 23, 1792, Michigan . ioneer
and Historical Collections
,
XXIV., 386.
"^Robertson to Askin, March 26, 1792, Burton Manuscript
Collection, vol. 2, p. 46.
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the alteration of the boundary established by the Treaty of
1783, but in case that proved to be impossible, they proposed
other measures which they proceeded to outline. They suggested
in the first place that if Great Britain were to make an offer
of reciprocal trading privileges, the Americans might perhaps
be more willing to consent to a change in the boundary of
1783. If they refused any such change, however, it would stili
be a great advantage if freedom of trade were granted to both
countries, as the Canadian merchants possessed capital, exper-
the
ience, and friendship of the Indians, all of which would giveA
them a tremendous advantage over possible American competitors.
It was desirable that a free communication with the Mississippi
be assured the Canadian merchants, in order to enable them to
carry on their trade in Spanish territory west of the Missis-
sippi, and it was absolutely necessary that fctee Grand Portage
should either be surrendered to the British, or declared an
o oen highway, free to the traders of both countries. The mer-
chants further argued that they had a right to trade within
American territory, even without any definite stipulation to
that effect, for, as they contended, the Treaty of Utrecht
granted free commercial intercourse with the Indians to both
the English and the Trench and inasmuch as the British govern-
ment occupied the position formerly represented by the ITrench,
they had a right to all the privileges to which the latter
had been entitled.^
Memorial of Merchants of Montreal, April 23, 1792,
Michigan Pioneer and iiistorical collections, SJLIV. t 402.
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Siracoe transmitted a copy of the memorial to Hammond,
and likewise to the ministry, taking occasion in his letter to
Dundas-to give a lengthy exposition of his own views on the
subject of the fur trade in Upper Canada. Ke amplified the
arguments of the merchants of Montreal based upon the Treaty
of Utrecht, urging in the strongest terms that even though
Great Britain should give up the frontier posts, British mer-
chants would still have a perfect right to deal with the Indian
tribes within American territory, on the ground that by the
terms of that convention they were free nations, with the
privilege of trading v/ith whom they chose. * Sirncoe, it should
be said, was exceedingly jealous of the fur trade as well as
distrustful of the Americans and was determined to do all in
his Dower to protect the merchants of Canada in the enjoyment
of the commercial monopoly which they had acquired during the
preceding years.
Early in June, 1792, a few days after he had received
Grenville's instructions on the subject of the proposed barrier
territory, Hammond held a conversation with Hamilton, in which
he casually mentioned that the time might perhaps be favorable
for a settlement of the outstanding questions involving the
United States, Great Britain, and the Indians. He outlined the
plan suggested by Grenville, presenting it, however, as an
idea of his own. Hamilton replied, "briefly and coldly," that
the United States would consider no proposal which involved
a cession of territory or the interference of any other power
"'"Simcoe to i)undas, April 28, 1792, Canadian Archives,
series Q, vol. 278, o. 110.
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in the dispute with the Indians, i'rom further correspondence
with Hammond during the weeks that followed, it is clear that
he regardedthis statement of the position of the United states
government as final. 1
In a letter to Grenville dated July 3, 1792, the
British minister once more declared it to be his opinion that
the United States government was opposed to the establishment
of an Indian barrier, but he also took occasion to outline
the conditions to which he believed the Americans might be
willing to agree. ^ From his conversations at Philadelphia* he
was inclined to think that the United States would be ready to
consent to such conditions with regard to the evacuation of
the posts as great Britain might consider essential to her own
commercial and political interests in the Great Lakes' region,
and that it might be possible to enter into some agreement with
regard to the armaments which should be maintained by the two
countries along the boundary. But so anxious were the Ameri-
cans for the withdrawal of the British garrisons, that he be-
lieved they might be persuaded to agree to conditions which
would guarantee to British subjects certain valuable privileges
relating to the fur trade, including free use of the rivers
and carrying places along the frontier, as well as such a
settlement of the northwest boundary as should give British
traders free communication with the Mississippi, by means of
"Hammond to Grenville, June 8, 1792, P. R. 0., F. 0.,
class 4, vol. 15; same to same, June IS, 1792, ibid .
2Hammond to Grenville, July 3, 1792, P. H. 0., ?. 0.,
class 4, vol. 16.
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one of the rivers flowing into Lake Superior.
After Hamilton's unequivocal declaration of the
summer of 1792, there remained little hope that the ministry
would succeed in realizing its dream of peace between the
United States and the northwest tribes on the basis of an In-
dian barrier unless the Americans should suffer defeat in the
impending struggle, or the Indians themselves should request
mediation. 1 Ever since St. Clair's defeat in November of 1791,
the United States had been preparing for an expedition which
should break the power of the Indians. General Wayne was
placed in command of the American force and recruiting and
drilling proceeded during the greater part of 1792 and 1793. 2
But at the same time, efforts were being made to reach an ami-
cable settlement with the tribes beyond the Ohio* These efforts
culminated in a council held at Sandusky in the summer of 1793,
which was attended by three co:nmissi oners whom V/ashington had
appointed on behalf of the United States. The Indians demanded
the Ohio as a boundary between themselves and the white set-
tlers, and the council broke up without any agreement having
been reached. On August 16, the commissioners left Jetroit,at
once informing V.'ayne of the failure of the negotiations and it
was clear that war was inevitable.*^ The progress of the dispute
"^Simcoe to Hammond, September 27, 1792, Michigan
Pioneer and historical Collections, XXIV., 478.
p
Winsor, The Westward Movement , 451.
Ibid . , 446 — 451. It has been maintained that the
efforts of the commissioners were frustrated by the influence
of Simcoe and the British traders. See Bassett, Pederalist
System, 65. 7/hether or not Simcoe was directly responsible
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appears to have been watched with considerable interest by
those engaged in the fur trade as is evidenced by certain
letters of John Richardson, in which he mentions the negotia-
tions at the mouth of the Detroit River and expresses the be-
lief that the Indians will not make peace unless the Ohio is
given them as a boundary."'"
Military preparations on the American side were
carried actively forward during the winter. The British, how-
ever, professed to see in Wayne's movements a menace to Detroit
and on February 17, Dorchester ordered Simcoe to occupy a
position on the Miami in order to cover that post. A week
earlier he had spoken to a delegation of Indians visiting
Quebec, and had hinted that Great Britain and the United States
would probably soon be at war, in which event the Indians would
have an opportunity to secure a satisfactory boundary. The
building of a fort upon the Miami and Dorchester's ill-advised
speech to the Indians came very near leading to hostilities
between the United states and Great Britain. The ministry
disavowed the Governor's speech, however, v/hich eased the
situation somewhat. Dorchester and Simcoe ardently desired
Wayne's defeat in the impending struggle, believing that such
an outcome might result in the establishment of an Indian
for the rejection of the demands of the United States, his
whole attitude with reference to the boundary dispute is only
too well known. Simcoe to i.icKee, June 22, 1793, Glaus Papers,
VM 155; June 23, 1793, ibid . , 171.
^Richardson to Porteous, August 15, September 1, 1793
Canadian Archives, 11, 852.
^WinsOTi The Westward Movement
,
453-455.
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"barrier south of the Groat Lakes, which would ensure the con-
tinuation of British political ascendancy over the Indians in
that quarter and preserve the monopoly of the fur trade. The
British sincerely desired peace between the Americans and the
Indians, but they desired a peace which should be favorable to
the latter, and one which should be negotiated under their
own supervision. Their hopes were in vain, however, for on
August 18, General Wayne met a band of thirteen hundred Indians
and decisively defeated them at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. 1
The power of the tribes northwest of the Ohio was broken.
While Wayne was carrying his military campaign to
a triumphant conclusion, John Jay was in London conducting
negotiations which were finally to settle the questions left
open by the Treaty of Peace and definitely determine the polil-
tical and commercial status of the Northwest, The negotiations
may be most easily understood in the light of those provisions
p
of the treaty itself which have a bearing upon the fur trade.
Article tv/o provided that the frontier posts should be evacua-
ted on June 1, 1796 and that all settlers and traders living
within the jurisdiction of the -oosts should continue to enjoy
full rights in their property. Those residing within the
boundaries of the United States might either retain their
British citizenship or become subjects of the United States,
being allowed a year in which to make their choice. At the
Bassett i Federalist System , 67.
*Por the text of the treaty, see Malloy, Treaties and
Conventions
,
L, 591-606.
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end of that time, those who had not declared their intention
of remaining British subjects were to he considered as citizens
of the United States. The third article -provided that both
3ritish and American subjects, as well as Indians living on
either side of the boundary, should be free to carry on trade
both in the United states and Canada and were to be allowed
free navigation of the lakes and rivers on either side of the
boundary.^ The navigation of the Mississippi was to be free
to both parties to the treaty, and its eastern banks were to
be iree to both British and American traders. It was stipu-
lated that all merchandise, the importation of which into
Canada was not entirely prohibited, might be carried for com-
mercial use into British territory by citizens of the United
States, without paying any higher duties than were demanded
of 3ritish subjects on the importation of similar goods from
Europe. A similar concession was granted by the United States.
No duties of entry might be levied on peltries carried by land
or inland navigation into the territory of either Canada or
the United States, v/hile Indians passing and repassing across
the boundary should not be compelled to pay any duties whatso-
ever on goods of their own. Moreover, the carrying places on
either side the boundary were to be free to the traders of both
countries. Y7ith regard to the northwest boundary, the fourth
The territory occupied by the Hudson's Bay Company
was excluded from this arrangement.
p
The 3ritish regarded the communication with the
Mississippi as of great importance, because of the important
trade carried on within Spanish territory.
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article provided that a survey should be made and the line
fixed "by friendly negotiation if any further adjustment were
found to be necessary.
The question of the northwest "boundary had "been a
matter of some debate between Jay and Grenville. The anxiety
of the British merchants for control of the route to the coun-
try beyond Lake Superior by way of Grand Portage has already
been noted. It was also held that the right to navigate the
Mississippi implied free access to the stream without the
necessity of passing through foreign territory. ^ In spite of
Jay's denial of this claim, Grenville proposed two possible
alterations in the boundary west of Lake Superior, either of
which would have involved the cession of territory by the
United States and would have placed Grand Mortage under the
British flag, while at the same time giving free access to
the Mississippi. Jay refused to listen to any proposal which
involved the cession of territory by the country which he re-
presented. ^
The natural outcome of the negotiations with regard
to the commercial status of the Northwest was just such a pro-
vision for reciprocal trading privileges as was finally em-
bodied in the treaty. It was at one time proposed that commer-
cial intercourse should be free from all duties or imposts on
either side, but upon Jay's representations that certain dis-
Jsee note 2, page 240.
Jay to Randolph, September 15, 1794, American State
Papers
,
foreign delations
,
L, 490-492; Winsor, The V.'estward
Movement , 471.
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advantages would result from such an arrangement, it was agreed
to subject this trade to "native duties," of the sort already
mentioned in enumerating the provisions of the treaty.^ Jay
said with regard to this provision: "In this compromise, which
I consider as being exactly right, that difficulty terminated;
but for this compromise the whole article would have failed,
and every expectation of an amicable settlement been frustrated.
A continuance of trade with the Indians was a decided ultimatum;
much time and paper, and many conferences were employed in pro-
ducing this article; that part of it which respects the ports
and places on the eastern side of the Mississippi, if considered
in connection with the article in the treaty of peace, and
with the article in this treaty which directs a survey of that
2
river to be made, will, I think, apoear unexceptionable."
The treaty was signed on November 19, 1794, and there
ensued a nation-wide debate in the United States which lasted
for more than a year. The bitter strife which the publication
of the treaty aroused is a familiar story and all that can be
attempted here will be to consider briefly the discussion of
those articles defining the status of the Indian trade. Before
the terms of the treaty were made public, the administration
expressed its disapproval of the time set for the surrender of
the oosts. It was feared that if evacuation were delayed until
1796, the British would employ themselves during the interval
in securing an ascendancy over the Indians and in adopting
"^Jay to Randolph, November 19, 1794. American State
Papers
,
Foreign Relations
.
I., 503.
2
Ibid.
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measures to counteract American competition in the fur trade.
Washington desired that June, 1795, might be the time set for
the evacuation, since he was satisfied that so long as the
3ritish held Detroit, there could be no peace with the Indians.
1
Jay, on the other hand, declared that no earlier date for the
withdrawal of the garrisons could be set and he gave the reasons
for the 3ritish demand that the surrender be delayed. It is
interesting to note that these reasons as outlined by Jay were
exactly the same as those which had been advanced by the London
merchants in 1785. The goods of the traders were scattered
throughout the Indian country and the merchants must be allowed
to enjoy the protection of their own government until they
should be able to settle their affairs. It was uncertain,
moreover, what attitude the Indians might take and as the United
States might not be able to protect the traders, due to the war
beyond the Ohio, it was desirable that the evacuation of the
pposts should be delayed.
Washington was not disposed to regard those articles
providing for reciprocal trading privileges in the Indian
country with a great deal of favor. He feared that since the
British merchants already possessed the trade and friendship
of the Indians, they would do all in their power to keep the
Americans out of Canadian territory and disputes would arise
which might result seriously. He also anticipated that the
Randolph to Jay, November 12, 1794, American State
Papers
,
foreign Relationa
,
L, 501; December 5 and 15, 1794,
ibid
. ,
ZC7
.
2 Jay to RaadOlphi November 19, 1794, ibid. , 505.
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desire of foreign merchants to monopolize the trade might also
lead to serious disputes within American territory. V.'ashington
would have preferred that the merchants of "both countries be
confined to their respective sides of the line and that the
Indians be allowed to go where the;/ pleased.^ Hamilton, on the
other hand, considered the portion of the treaty dealing with
the Indian trade as on the whole favorable to the United States
While the American fur trade was relatively unimportant, that
on the British side of trie line, to which the Americans were
given access, was of great value. Some persons, he said, were
of the opinion that there were advantages on the side of the
merchants of the United States which would enable them to carry
their competition into British territory with success.^
During the latter part of April the Jay Treaty was
discussed from beginning to end in the House of Representatives
the debate arising over the question of carrying its provisions
into effect. The article containing the stipulation for re-
ciprocal trading privileges was attacked on the ground that
it would enable the Jritish to retain their evil influence over
the Indians within the territory of the United States. It was
contended that while formerly, the commercial interests of the
3ritish led them to desire peace, they would now have a motive
for inciting the Indians to war in order to keep out American
"'"Washington to Hamilton, July 13 < 1795, V.ri tings ,
Ford ed., XIIL, 63-66.
p
^Hamilton to Washington, July 9, 1795, l.orks , Lodge
ed.
,
IV., 32.5-325.
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traders ,^ The freedom of intercourse allowed to the merchants
of both countries was also objected to on the ground that the
superior capital of the British would enable them to drive
their American competitors out of the field. It was still
further urged that freeing the trade from all imposts with the
exception of "native duties" would likewise give an advantage
to the British merchants owing to the fact that goods imported
into Canada paid little or no duty. Those who supported the
treaty on the other hand emphasized the valuable trade lying
within British territory which was thrown open to American
merchants. They were certain that sufficient capital could
be obtained to carry on effective competition with foreign
traders, and as for American merchants, were they not as enter-
prising as their rivals?^ It was also asserted that the Albany
communication with the Great Lakes was much superior to that
by way of the St. Lawrence Hiver, a circumstance which would
redound to the advantage of the Americans. In support of this
argument, Representative Cooper, of New York, called attention
to the dilligence With which the British had guarded the Albany
communication by means of the garrison at Oswego. 4
The 3ritish on their side regarded the article de-
fining the status of the Indian trade of the Northwest as of
much importance, as is shown by an incident which occurred in
1
Annals of Congress
, 4th Cong,, 979, 1007,1029,1195.
2
Ibid
. ,
979, 1029.
3
Ibid.
, 1053, 1071.
4
Ibid., 1095t1097.
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connection with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Green-
ville, concluded between General Wayne and the Indians on Aug-
ust 3, 1795. The eighth article provided that all persons
trading with or residing among the Indians who were parties
to the treaty must have a license procured from the proper
United States authorities. The British ministry took exception
to the article on the ground that it was in violation of that
portion of the Jay Treaty which guaranteed to British merchants
a free participation in the Indian trade, and Grenville instnicfc-
ted Phineas Bond, who was then representing Great Britain in
the United States, to demand an explanation from the American
government. Dorchester was informed that all arrangements
looking toward the evacuation of the posts must be provisional,
p
until the matter should be adjusted. The difficulty was easily
settled, however, and on liay 4, 1796, an explanatory article
was concluded, which declared that no orovision in any subse-
quent treaty should be regarded as impairing the commercial
privileges granted to the subjects of both Great Britain and
the United States by the treaty of 1794. This incident is of
importance chiefly because it reveals the extreme jealousy with
which the ministry guarded British fur-trading interests.
American State Papers , Indian Affairs
,
L, 563.
^Report of the Privy Council, January 14, 1796, P. R.O.
f« 0., class 5, vol. 16; Grenville to Bond, January 1C, 1796,
Simcoe Papers, V., 5; Portland to ^orchester, January 15, 1796,
Canadian Archives Report , 1891, Calendar State Papers - Lower
Canada, 121.
3
Llalloy, Treaties and Conventions
,
I„ 607.
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The principal posts were evacuated in the summer
and autumn of 1796 and American garrisons took formal posses-
sion."'" Thus ended the long diplomatic contest which had begun
even before the ratification of the treaty of Peace and in
which the struggle of the British to retain their monopoly of
the fur trade had played such an important part.
The Jay treaty and the evacuation of the posts
formed the logical sequel to the decision which had been
reached during the course of the negotiations in 1783, when
it was agreed to leave the settlement of questions affecting
the status of the fur trade to a future commercial treaty.
Great Britain very naturally delayed the evacuation of the
posts, pending such an agreement; and she likewise avoided
the negotiation of a treaty as long as possible, led by a
desire to secure to her merchants a monopoly of the peltry
trade and always hoping to be able to secure an alteration
in the boundaries which had been established in 1783. The
United -tates stood firm, however; and consequently, when an
agreement was finally reached, it constituted what it was
originally intended to be, namely, a treaty of amity and
commerce. After tracing the course of events connected with
the history of the Northwest beLween 1783 and 1796, the con-
clusion is inevitable that a desire to retain control of the
fur trade was largely responsible for England's policy and
that the argument based upon the failure of the United States
"hvinsor, The Westward Movement, 482*483.
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to give satisfaction in the matter of the British debts was
to a considerable degree a diplomatic pretext for refusing
to evacuate the posts. Though Great Britain failed to secure
any change in the provisions of the Treaty of 1783, the con-
tinued occupation of the frontier posts enabled her to strength-
en her monopoly of the commerce of the Great Lakes' region;
and as a result, the influence of British merchants and traders
continued to be felt within American territory until the close
of the War of 1812.
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McGill,& Co.
Williams Papers
.
Manuscripts, vols. 19-25. - This material
is very similar to that contained in the Askin collection.
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Canadian Arohivea, Ottawa
Aakin Pap era . - So poorly arranged aa to be almost uaelesa
to .the ordinary inve8t igator . There are in the Archives, how-
ever, a number of John Askin'a day books, or "blotters," which
throw considerable light upon the fur trade at Detroit.
Claua Papers . Series M. vols. 104-115. - Papers of Col.
Daniel Claus, Col. William Claus, and Col. Alexander McKee,
deputy superintendents of Indian affairs. Contain mass of mater-
ial relating to Indian politics, with frequent references to the
fur trade. The manuscript volumes are also numbered from 1 to
12 with reference to their position in the Claus collection.
Colonial Office Transcripts. - Referred to in notes as
C. 0. 42. This material is at present in portfolios, not having
been bound up with any series as yet. These transcripts contain
a considerable amount of valuable miscellaneous material on the
fur trade.
Haldimand Papers, Series E. 248 vols. - Transcripts of orig-
inals in the British Museum. These documents are calendared in
the Canadian Archives Reports, while many of them are reprinted
in the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections. A mine of
material relating to the administration of the Great Lakes' re-
gion and the regulation of the fur trade. Referred to in foot-
notes as "series E.
"
Lansdowne MSS. - Transcripts of selected papers in Lans-
dcwne Collection in England. Besides much material relating
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to the fur trade, these papers of Lord Shelburne are of value
for any study of the Treaty of 1783.
• Letter Book of Joseph Frobisher , 1787-1788 . Transcripts
of letters in library of McGill University. This correspondence
relates to the formation of the house of McTavish, Probisher, &
Company, and also to the history of the North-West Company.
Masson Col lection . - A collection of journals and diaries
of the 'bourg eoi s" or clerks of the North-West Company made by
L. R. Masson, some of which are in the Libary of McGill Univer-
sity. Seme of thi3 material has been reprinted in Masson'
s
Bourg eois de la Compagnie du No rd-Quest . The collection con-
tains much interesting descriptive material.
Ordinances of Quebec , 1764-1791. - Certain of these ordinan-
ces have to do with the regulation of the fur trade. Cited
Quebec Ordinances
, etc.
Returns of Indian Trade License s, 177? 1790, inclusive, with
the exception of 1780 and 1784. - Found in series S, Indian Af-
fairs. The returns include the names of the merchants to whom
licenses were issued, number of canoes and bateaux with their
destinations, number of engages, quantity of liouor and ammuni-
tion carried, value of cargoes, and names of securities. A
study of these returns would indioate that valuations are given
in term3 of the pound, New York currency, which was worth con-
siderably less than the pound sterling.
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Series C. Military Papers . - Contains a great deal of mater-
ial concerning the administration of the Northwest under the
/
English regime.
Series G. Governor General ' s Papers . - Contains little of
interest in connection with the history of the fur trade during
the period under consideration.
Serie s M. 852 . Correspondence of John Richardson, 1789-1792.
Contains letters written by John Richardson, of the firm of
Forsyth, Richardson, & Company, to John Porteous. This corre-
spondence throws some light on the fur trade in connection with
political events.
Series 869 vols . Copies of Canadian state papers in the
Public Record Office, London. Of inestimable value for the
history of the Northwest and the fur trade. Many of these docu-
ments are reprinted in the Canadian Archives Reports and in the
Michigan Pioneer and Histor ical Collections.
Series S. Department of Indian Affairs . - Contains a number
of portfolios of original documents from the Indian department
of Canada, covering the entire period of the present study. The
collection includes many memorials, petitions, etc, dealing with
the fur trade, as well as returns of Indian trade licenses is-
sued by the governor, which are considered separately. An ex-
ceedingly valuable collection, which has not hitherto been ex-
ploited.
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Simcoa Papers
.
Transcripts in the Library of Parliament. -
These papers contain a mass of correspondence relating to the
history of Upper Canada, of which John Graves Simcoe became
lieutenant governor in 1791. There are frequent references to
Indian affairs and the fur trade. The transcripts appear to
have been poorly made, however.
McGill University Library
Masson Collection . - A part of this collection is to be
found in the Canadian Archives. See previous note with re-
gard to this material.
Public Record Office , London
Chatham Manuscripts. - Collection contains important ac-
count of a conversation between Richard Oswald and the London
merchants, relating to the Treaty of 1783.
Colonial Office Papers . - Collection includes a large quan-
tity of material relating to the fur trade. Class 42, relating
to Canada, is particularly valuable.
Foreign Office Papers . - Contain correspondence relating to
the negotiation of the Treatyof Peace and the diplomacy culmi-
nating in the Jay Treaty. Referred to as P. R. 0., F. 0., etc.
Treasury Paper s. - Contain several documents relating to
an illicit peltry trade from the Illinois country prior to the
Revolution.
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State Department
,
Washington
Archives of the Department of State
,
Washington. - There
is considerable material in the department of state relating
to the controversy over the western posts and the matter of
British relations with the northwest Indians.
Toronto Public Library
Dummer Powell Collection
,
Manuscripts, B. 70 - B. 94.- B.7§,
forming a part of a group known as the Quebec Papers, contains
documents relating to a suit brought by William Kay, a merchant
of Montreal, against the firm of David McCrae & Co. of Michilli-
mackinac in 1787. • The volume includes a number of accounts and
inventories which throw much light upon economic aspects of the
fur trade. Referred to as Toronto Public Library , B. - .
See addendum
, p. 269.
University of Illinois Library
Johnson Manuscripts
,
Transcripts of selected documents in
the Johnson collection at Albany. These papers are invaluable
in any study of the fur trade between 1763 and 1774.
Lansdowne Manuscripts . - Transcripts of selected documents
in the Shelburne Papers, preserved in Lansdowne House, London.
Invaluable for a study of the Eritish fur trade.
Printed Sources
American Archives : a Documentary History of the Origin
and Progress of the North American Colonies ; of the Causes and
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Accomplishment of the American Revolution ; and of the Constitu-
tion of Government for the United States , to the First Ratif ica-
tion Thereof . Edited by Peter Force. 4th aeries, 6 vols.; 5th
series, 5 vols. Washington, 1837-1853.
American State Papers : Document s, Legislative and Executive .
38 vols. Washington, 1832-1861. - The series designated Indian
Affairs
,
Foreign Relat ions, and Commerce and Navigation , have
been used in the present study.
Anburey, Thomas, Travels through the Interior Parts of
Ameri ca, In a Series of Letters by an Officer . 2 vols. London,
1789. - Contains a brief description of the Canadian fur trade,
which is apparently based upon rather superficial observation.
Annals of the Congre ss of the United States
,
1789-1824. 42
vols. Washington, 1834-1856.
"Bougainville's Memoir, 1757," in Wisconsin Historical Col-
lections, XVIIL, pp. 167-195, Madison, 1908. - Contains a val-
uable description of the administration and trade of Canada near
the close of the French regime.
Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts
Preserved in the Capitol at Richmond
,
11 vols. Richmond, 1875-93.
Contains some material relating to Indian affairs in the West dur-
ing the Revolution.
The Dip lomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution .
Edited by Jand Sparks. 6 vols. Washington, 1857.
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Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada,
1759-1791
,
selected and edited with notes by Adam Shortt and
Arthur G-. Doughty. Ottawa, 1907.
Documents Relative to t he Colonial History of the State of
New York . Edited by E. B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow. 15 vols.
Albany, 1856-1887. - Collection includes much valuable corre-
spondence of Sir William Johnson.
Hamilton, Alexander, Works . Edited by Henry Cabot Lodge.
9 vols. New York and London, 1885-86.
Hay, Henry, "Journal from Detroit to the Miami River, 1789-90.
Edited by Milo M. Quaife, In Wisconsin Historical Society Pro -
ceedings
,
1914, pp. 208-261. - A vivid description of life at
the trading post on the Miami.
Henry, Alexander, Travels and Adventures in Canada and the
Indian Territories between the Years 1760 and 1776, Edited by
James Bain, Boston, 1901. - Contains a good deal of interesting
descriptive material.
Houck, Louis, The Spanish Reg ime in Missouri . 2 vols.
Chicago, 1909. - A collection of original documents relating to
the history of Upper Louisiana. There is some material bearing
upon trade conditions in the upper part of the province.
Illinois Historical Collections , 11 vols. Springfield,
1903-
. The volumes U3ed are noted below. The following form
of citation is used, Alvord, Cahokia Records (I. H. Col. II), p. -
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Alvord, Clarence W., Cahokia Records, 1778-1790 (vol.
II.). Springfield, 1907. - The introduction, pp. - XIII -
CLVI, consists of an exhaustive study of the history of
the county of Illinois, and contains much valuable informa-
tion concerning trade conditions in the region during the
Revolution and the years which followed.
Alvord, Clarence W. , Kaska3kia Records
,
1778-1790 (vol.
V.). Springfield, 1909. - Includes many documents throwing
light upon trade conditions in the Illinois country.
James, James A., George Rogers Clark Papers , 1771-1781 .
(vol. VIII.). Springfield, 1912. - There is some material
in the collection illustrating the close relation between
Indian trade and politics.
Alvord, Clarence W., and Carter, Clarence Ew, The Crit -
ical Period
,
1765-1765 . (vol. X,). Springfield, 1915. -
Documents illustrate early efforts of British ministry to
solve problems concerning the fur trade and the administra-
tion of Indian affairs.
"Journal of Jean Baptists Trudeau among the Arikara Indians
in 1795," in Missouri Historical Collections
,
IV., 9. - Contains
remarkable tribute to enterprise of British merchants. Intro-
duction contains considerable material on the fur trade of
Louisiana. Named 3pelled"Truteau" in the text.
Journals of the Continental Congress
,
1774-1789 . Edited by
Worthington C. Ford. Washington, 1904 - . 23 vols, published
to date,bringirg journals down to 1782.
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Long, John, Journal, 1768-1782 , in Thwaites, Early Western
Travels
,
1748-1846, vol. II. Cleveland, 1904. - A most interest-
ing description of the fur trade by one who participated therein.
Though one is sometimes inclined to believe that Long over em-
phasizes his own prowess, the account is nevertheless one of the
most valuable descriptions of a trader's life extant.
Mackenzie, Alexander, Voyag es from Montreal through the
Continent of North America to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans in
1789 and 1795 with an Account of the Rise and State of the Fur
Trade . 2 vols. New York, 1902. - The introductory study of the
fur trade contains a good deal of valuable information concern-
ing the early history of the industry, though it is rather doubt-
ful whether it is strictly accurate in all cases. The author
likewise gives a most interesting description of the methods em-
ployed in the traffic in furs.
Masson, Louis F. R. , Les Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Nord-
Ouest; recits de voyages , lettres et rapports inedit3 relatif
s
au Nord-Oueat Canadien . 2 vols. Quebec, 1889-90. The editing
of the document has been very poorly done,with absolute disregard
of critical principles. The journals are in many cases so muti-
lated as to be almost worthless. The introduction bears evidence
of the editor's predilection for the North-West Company.
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections . 38 vols.
Lansing, 1874-
.
- Volumes I. to IX, inclusive, are called the
Pioneer Collections . A mine of material, including a large number
of the papers in the Haldimand Collection, as well as Series Q,
>
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of the Canadian Archives.
The Parliamentary History of England , from the Earliest
Period to the Year 1805 . 36 vols. London, 1806-1820. Printed
by T» C. Hansard. - First eleven volumes called Cobbfett ' s
Parliamentary History . Cited Hansard, Parliamentary History .
Perrault, Jean Baptiste, "Narrative of the Travels and
Adventures of a Merchant Voyageur in the Savage Territories of
Northern America Leaving Montreal the 28th of May. 1783 (to
1820 )," in Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections , XXXVI L,
508-619. Edited by John S. "Pox. Lansing, 1909, 1910. - An in-
valuable account of the operations of a small trader in the
country dependent upon Michillimackinac, The narrative must
have been compiled from a diary or detailed notes, as the state-
ments bear marks of unusual accuracy.
Pond, Peter, "Journal, 1740-1775, " in Wisconsin Historical
Collections
,
XVIIL, 314-354. Madison, 1908. - A most picturesque
narrative of the life of a fur trader. Contains interesting
descriptions of Michillimackinac and Prairie du Chien. In spite
of the phonetic spelling, Pond's Journal is a real literary mast-
erpiece.
Reports on Canadian Archives
,
1881- . Ottawa, 1882- . A
number of documents bearing upon the fur trade are printed in the
volumes for 1888 and 1890. Cited as Canadian Archives Report s,
etc.
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Robertson, James A., Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain
,
France , and the United State s, 1785-1807 , 2 vols. Cleveland,
1911. - A valuable collection of original sources containing
some material on the fur trade of Louisiana.
Smith, William H. , The Life and Public Services of Arthur
St . Clair , Soldier of the Revolutionary War; President of the
Continental Congress ; and Governor of the North-Western Territory
with his Correspondence and other Papers . 2 vols. Cincinnati,
1882.
Treaties
,
Conventions , International Acts , Protocols and
Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers
,
1776-1909, Compiled by William M. Malloy. 2 vols. Washington,
1910.
Washington, George, Writings . Edited by Worthington C.
Ford. 14 vols. New York and London, 1889-93.
Wisconsin Historical Collections . 21 vols. Madison, 1855- .
Volumes XVIII. and XIX. contain many documents relating to the
history of the Great Lakes' region and the fur trade between 1763
and 1800.
Wraxall, Peter, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs contained
in four folio volumes, transact ed in the colony of New York , from
the year 1678 to the year 1751. Edited by Charles H. Mcllwain.
Cambridge, 1915. - The principal theme of the document is the
close relation between Indian trade and politics.
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Addendum . ( Toronto Public Library
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Letters and Accounts of the North-W33 t Co. 1765-1787 . -
Copies of letters in possession of Herman L. R. Edgar, of New
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